1. Some revisionist histories question the degree to which the CCP came to power as the result of a “revolution.” It may be more appropriate to consider the CCP's ascension to power and the establishment of the PRC as the result of a combination of the collapsing Kuomintang state and the military victory won by the PLA (then Red Army) over KMT forces on the battlefield. The revisionist view is expressed, for example, in my “The building of the civil-military state in China, 1949–1965: bringing the soldier back in,” in Cheek Timothy and Saich Tony (eds.), The Construction of State Socialism in China, 1949–1965 (Armonk, NY: ME. Sharpe, 1996).
2. Particularly nuclear weapons and air, sea and ground-based ballistic missiles delivery systems.
3. These are traced in Jencks Harian W., From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945–1981 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982); Nelsen Harvey W., The Chinese Military System (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997 and 1981); Joffe Ellis, The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
4. For a sampling of this study see Pillsbury Michael (ed.), Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997).
5. China has over 12,000 miles of land frontiers, over 11,000 miles of coastline, 1.86 million square miles of claimed territorial waters, and 30,000 square kilometres of naval air space to protect. Interview, PLA General Staff, 6 December 1998.
6. See Godwin Paul H.B., “From continent to periphery: PLA doctrine, strategy and capabilities toward 2000,” in Shambaugh David and Yang Richard H. (eds.), China's Military in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Godwin, “Chinese military strategy revised: local and limited war,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 519 (01 1992); Godwin, “Changing concepts of doctrine, strategy, and operations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army, 1979–1987,” The China Quarterly, No. 112 (12 1987); Li Nan, “The PLA's evolving warfighting doctrine, strategy, and tactics, 1985–1995: a Chinese perspective,” in Shambaugh and Yang, China's Military in Transition; Shambaugh David, “The insecurity of security: the PLA's evolving doctrine and threat perceptions towards 2000,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Spring 1994); and Johnston Alastair I., “China's new ‘old thinking’: the concept of limited deterrence, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995).
7. The best study of PLA demobilization is Shichor Yitzhak, “Demobilization: the dialectics of PLA troop reduction,” in Shambaugh and Yang, China's Military in Transition.
8. Ding Arthur S., “The streamlining of the PLA,” Issues & Studies (11 1992), pp. 92–93.
9. Ironically, the U.S. military gives its field commanders far greater individual authority.
10. A Special Arms Department (Te hing bu) was formed under the General Staff Department and combines and fulfils procurement needs for these units.
11. Interview with former General Staff Department official, 8 December 1998.
12. Interview, National Defence University, 16 July 1998.
13. See Mulvenon James, “Military corruption in China,” Problems of Post-Communism (03/04 1998), pp. 12–21.
14. Interview, General Logistics Department, 9 December 1998.
15. Ibid. This figure rises considerably at and above the group army level, and among those who graduate from the National Defence University.
16. “Army seeks mobility in force cuts,” Janes Defense Weekly, 16 12 1998.
17. For an explication of this thesis see my “The soldier and the state in China: the political work system in the People's Liberation Army,” The China Quarterly, No. 127 (09 1991), pp. 527–568.
18. The National Defence Law must also be seen as part of a larger and important process to govern military procedures through law and regulations. In the last decade nearly 120 military-related regulations have been adopted by the CMC, State Council and National People's Congress, as well as more than 1,000 rules and regulations adopted by individual PLA service arms and Military region commands. Source: China's National Defense (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 1998), pp. 18–19.
19. “Air Force frontliners to see new fighter breed,” Janes Defense Weekly, p. 26.
20. “New PLAN to train, purchase vessel mix,” Janes Defense Weekly, 16 12 1998, p. 25.
21. Stokes Major Mark A., “China's strategic modernization: implications for U.S. national security,” unpublished manuscript, 1997; and Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare.
22. Stokes, “China's strategic modernization.”
23. See the articles in Shambaugh and Yang, The Chinese Military in Transition.