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Le Moi comme un objet intentionnel. Une sémantique de «je» sans engagement ontologique

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2013

Manuel Rebuschi*
Affiliation:
Université de Lorraine — Archives Poincaré

Abstract

RÉSUMÉ : Les attitudes de se sont généralement considérées comme constituant une classe particulière d’attitudes de re. Cet article propose une analyse différente, qui s’appuie sur la notion d’attitude de objecto et qui évite un engagement ontologique envers le sujet. La proposition élabore l’idée de Hintikka d’une logique épistémique dite de seconde génération, qui introduit un marqueur syntaxique permettant d’exprimer des relations d’indépendance entre certaines constantes logiques. De cette sémantique résulte une conception du Moi, dénotation de «je», comme un objet simplement intentionnel.

Type
Research Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2012

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