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  • Cited by 2
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Sizer, Laura 2006. What Feelings Can't Do. Mind and Language, Vol. 21, Issue. 1, p. 108.


    Salmela, Mikko 2002. Intentionality and Feeling. A Sketch for a Two-Level Account of Emotional Affectivity. SATS, Vol. 3, Issue. 1,


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Emotions, Feelings and Contexts: A Reply to Robert Kraut*

  • Robert C. Solomon (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300013019
  • Published online: 01 April 2010
Abstract

Unwarranted antagonism between reason and the passions is an ancient problem, dating back at least to Plato. Even philosophers who sought to give the passions their due—David Hume for example—juxtaposed reason and emotion and contrasted them as slave and master (or vice versa). The point of a so-called “cognitive” theory of emotion, simply stated, is to deny this antagonism. The most succinct (if not very informative) statement of the cognitivist view is Nietzsche's: “as if every passion did not possess its quantum of reason.” Hume's own theory anticipated such a synthesis (in his awkward analysis of “ideas” as both necessary causes and effects of emotions) while Spinoza and Hobbes clearly defended cognitive theories with the wisdom of reconciliation in mind. The aim of a cognitive theory is not to reduce volatile emotion to cool and calm belief, nor is the emphasis on emotion a romantic attempt to extol the passions and excoriate reason—though that exercise may have its place in philosophy too; it is rather to understand reason and the passions together and appreciate their shared properties, similarities and complementarity as well as their obvious differences and oppositions. So understood, cognitive theories have, generically, gained widespread acceptance; only a few reactionaries in philosophy and psychology still insist on a cognition-free concept of emotion, however backhandedly cognitive concepts might be acknowledged as presuppositions, causal preconditions or criteria for the appropriate labelling of emotion rather than as proper constituents of emotion.

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Robert Kraut , “Feelings in Context,” Journal of Philosophy, 83, 11 (November 1986): 642652.

Kendall Walton , “Fearing Fictions,” Journal of Philosophy, 75, 1 (January 1978), cited in Kraut, “Feelings in Context,” p. 642.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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