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Emotions: Rationality Without Cognitivism

  • Stanley G. Clarke (a1)

In the aftermath of emotivism and behaviourism, cognitivist theories of emotion became current in both philosophy and psychology. These theories, though varied, have in common that emotions require propositional attitudes such as beliefs or evaluations. Accordingly, cognitivist theories characterize emotions themselves with features of such attitudes, including syntax, semantic meaning, and justifiability.

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R. B. Zajonc , “Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need no Inferences”, American Psychologist 35 (1980).

W. R. Kunst-Wilson and R. B. Zajonc , “Affective Discrimination of Stimuli that Cannot be Recognized”, Science 207 (1980).

R. de Sousa , “The Rationality of Emotions”, Dialogue 18 (1979)

S. Schachter and J. E. Singer , “Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State”, Psychological Review 69 (1962).

Z. W. Pylyshyn , “Computation and Cognition: Issues in the Foundation of Cognitive Science”, The Behavioural and Brain Sciences 3 (1980), 127.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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