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Epistemology and Possibility

  • Rebecca Hanrahan (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300000020
  • Published online: 01 April 2009
Abstract
ABSTRACT

Recently the discussion surrounding the conceivability thesis has been less about the link between conceivability and possibility per se and more about the requirements of a successful physicalist program. But before entering this debate it is necessary to consider whether conceivability provides us with even prima facie justification for our modal beliefs. I argue that two methods of conceiving—imagining that p and telling a story about p—can provide us with such justification, but only if certain requirements are met. To make these arguments, I consider those of Paul Tidman, whose position I use as a foil.

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Katalin Balog 1999Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.” The Philosophical Review, 108, 4: 497528.

Ned Block , and Robert Stalnaker 1999Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap.” The Philosophical Review, 108, 1: 146.

David Chalmers , and Frank Jackson 2001Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation.” The Philosophical Review, 110: 315–61.

Joseph Levine 2001 Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.

S. Yablo 1993Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, 1: 142.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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