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Externalism and Scepticism

  • Keith Butler (a1)
Abstract
Résumé

L'externalisme permet-il, de concert avec certaines thèses plausibles concernant la connaissance de soi, une réfutation a priori de certaines formes de scepticisme? Cette perspective sourit à certains, tandis que d'autres craignent que cela ne révèle le caractère trop compromettant de l'externalisme sur le plan épistémologique. Je soutiens ici qu'on peut contrer l'argument en question et bloquer la réfutation a priori du scepticisme. Au bout du compte, cependant, des tensions logiques demeurent entre l'externalisme et le scepticisme, de sorte que la menace d'limplications épistémologiques trop fortes continue de planer sur l'externalisme.

Résumé

L'externalisme permet-il, de concert avec certaines thèses plausibles concernant la connaissance de soi, une réfutation a priori de certaines formes de scepticisme? Cette perspective sourit à certains, tandis que d'autres craignent que cela ne révèle le caractère trop compromettant de l'externalisme sur le plan épistémologique. Je soutiens ici qu'on peut contrer l'argument en question et bloquer la réfutation a priori du scepticisme. Au bout du compte, cependant, des tensions logiques demeurent entre l'externalisme et le scepticisme, de sorte que la menace d'limplications épistémologiques trop fortes continue de planer sur l'externalisme.

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References
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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
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