Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

Hume's Impression of Succession (Time)

  • Jon Charles Miller (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300002869
  • Published online: 01 April 2009
Abstract
ABSTRACT

In this article I argue that Hume's empiricism allows for time to exist as a real distinct impression of succession, not, as many claim, merely as a nominal abstract idea. In the first part of this article I show how for Hume it is succession and not duration that constitutes time, and, further, that only duration is fictional. In the second part, I show that according to the way Hume describes the functions of the memory and imagination, it is possible to explain how we are able to perceive a distinct impression of succession.

Copyright
Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Robert McRae , “The Import of Hume's Theory of Time,” Hume Studies, 6, 2 (111980): 119–32, p. 122.

Oliver Johnson , “Time and the Idea of Time,” Hume Studies, 15, 1 (041989): 205–19, p. 213.

Janet Broughton , “Impressions and Ideas,” in The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise, edited by Saul Traiger (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 4358, p. 53.

Wayne Waxman , Hume's Theory of Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 203204.

Donald Baxter , “Hume on Steadfast Objects and Time,” Hume Studies, 27, 1 (042001): 129–48

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×