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Intentional Normativism Meets Normative Supervenience and the Because Constraint

  • Daniel Laurier (a1)

ABSTRACT: I explain and rebut four objections to the claim that attributions of intentional attitudes are normative judgments, all stemming, directly or indirectly, from the widespread assumption that the normative supervenes on the non-normative.

RÉSUMÉ: J’explique et réfute quatre objections à la thèse selon laquelle les attributions d’attitudes intentionnelles sont des jugements normatifs, qui découlent toutes, directement ou indirectement, du présupposé que le normatif survient sur le non-normatif.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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