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Meaning and Evidence

  • John C. Bigelow (a1)

What is it for a person to mean something by an utterance? Until recently, few philosophers have explicitly set themselves the task of answering this question. Of those who have, most have proposed answers which in one way or another analyze the act of meaning by appeal to the utterer's intentions.

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1 Meaning”, The Philosophical Review, 66 (1957), pp. 377388; Utterer's Meaning and Intentions”, The Philosophical Review, 78 (1969), pp. 147177; Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning”, Foundations of Language, 4 (1968), pp. 225242.

2 Meaning, Oxford, 1972.

3 Speech Acts, Cambridge, 1969; especially pp. 42–50.

4 Meaning and Communication”, The Philosophical Review, 80 (1971), pp. 427447.

5 See for instance Grice, “Meaning”, pp. 385–386.

6 See for instance Armstrong, “Meaning and Communication”, pp. 443–444.

7 “Utterer's Meaning and Intentions”, pp. 152–165; also clause “III” on p. 176.

8 Meaning, p. 30 ff.

9 The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy”, Foundations of Language, 10 (1973), pp. 141168; also unpublished work which should appear soon as a book.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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