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CONFIDENCE IN BELIEFS AND RATIONAL DECISION MAKING

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 October 2018

Brian Hill
Affiliation:
GREGHEC, CNRS and HEC Paris, 1 rue de la Libération, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France. E-mail: hill@hec.fr. URL: www.hec.fr/hill.
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Abstract:

The standard, Bayesian account of rational belief and decision is often argued to be unable to cope properly with severe uncertainty, of the sort ubiquitous in some areas of policy making. This paper tackles the question of what should replace it as a guide for rational decision making. It defends a recent proposal, which reserves a role for the decision maker’s confidence in beliefs. Beyond being able to cope with severe uncertainty, the account has strong normative credentials on the main fronts typically evoked as relevant for rational belief and decision. It fares particularly well, we argue, in comparison to other prominent non-Bayesian models in the literature.

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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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