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A primer in social choice theory, Wulf Gaertner, Oxford University Press, 2006, xiii + 200 pages.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Juan D. Moreno-Ternero
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero*
Affiliation:
Universidad de Málaga, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, CORE, Université catholique de Louvain
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Economics & Philosophy , Volume 25 , Issue 3: Economics and Philosophy on Ambiguity Aversion , November 2009 , pp. 397 - 403
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

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