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Vote markets, democracy and relational egalitarianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 August 2022

Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Bartholins Allé 7, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark

Abstract

This paper expounds and defends a relational egalitarian account of the moral wrongfulness of vote markets according to which such markets are incompatible with our relating to one another as equals qua people with views on what we should collectively decide. Two features of this account are especially interesting. First, it shows why vote markets are objectionable even in cases where standard objections to them, such as the complaint that they result in inequality in opportunity for political influence across rich and poor people, are inapplicable. Second, it specifies the sense in which, politically speaking, we should relate as equals, and in doing provides a richer version of recent relational egalitarian accounts of the ideal of democracy.

Type
Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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