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EPISTEMIC NORMS AND ‘HE SAID/SHE SAID’ REPORTING

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 May 2016

Abstract

This paper discusses the permissibility of exclusively relying on a procedural objectivity model for news reporting, from the perspective of the normativity of informative speech acts. It is argued that, with the exception of urgency situations, the paradigmatic application of procedural objectivity is in breach of the relevant norms.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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