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WHAT SEEMINGS SEEM TO BE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2015

Samuel A. Taylor
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Abstract

According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), if it seems to a subject S that P, S thereby has some degree of (defeasible) justification for believing P. But what is it for P to seem true? Answering this question is vital for assessing what role (if any) such states can play. Many have appeared to adopt a kind of non-reductionism that construes seemings as intentional states which cannot be reduced to more familiar mental states like beliefs or sensations. In this paper I aim to show that reductive accounts need to be taken more seriously by illustrating the plausibility of identifying seemings and conscious inclinations to form a belief. I briefly close the paper by considering the implications such an analysis might have for views such as PC.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , September 2015 , pp. 363 - 384
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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