Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 March 2011
Recently, strong arguments have been offered for the inclusion of jus post bellum in just war theory. If this addition is indeed justified, it is plain that, due to the variety in types of post-conflict situation, the content of jus post bellum will necessarily vary. One instance when it looks as if it should become “extended” in its scope, ranging well beyond (for example) issues of “just peace terms,” is when occupation of a defeated enemy is necessary. In this situation, this article argues that an engagement by jus post bellum with the morality of post-conflict reconstruction is unavoidable. However, the resulting extension of jus post bellum's stipulations threatens to generate conflict with another tenet that it would surely wish to endorse with respect to “just occupation,” namely, that sovereignty or self-determination should be restored to the occupied people as soon as is reasonably possible. Hence, the action-guiding objective of the theory could become significantly problematized. The article concludes by considering whether this problem supports the claim that the addition of jus post bellum to just war theory is actually more problematic than its supporters have realized.
4 Ibid., pp. 620–21Google Scholar; A fully adequate theory of jus post bellum would also address the following scenarios as well:
(i) a just war which ends with the defeat, but not the occupation, of the just side;
(ii) a just war which ends with the defeat and the occupation of the just side; and
(iii) a just war which ends in stalemate (which may or may not mean continued hostilities).
Although my focus in this paper is on the moral situation of the just (post- )combatants, I do not believe that jus post bellum should be silent on that of the unjust opponents. And, although it would not strictly speaking be part of just war theory, considerations of what should be done in the various possible aftermaths of unjust wars can and should be theorized as well.
6 Orend, Brian, The Morality of War (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006), pp. 180–81.Google Scholar
8 For more on the distinction between “just peace” and “just society,” see Evans, , “Balancing Peace,” pp. 543–47.Google Scholar
9 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), p. 39.Google Scholar
11 Arendt, Hannah, Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Kohn, Jerome (New York: Schocken Books, 2003), pp. 35–36.Google Scholar
12 Kant, Immanuel, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Reiss, H. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 105.Google Scholar
14 This statement is a significant revision of the theory first offered in my “Moral Theory and the Idea of a Just War,” inEvans, Mark, ed., Just War Theory: A Reappraisal (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), p. 13.Google Scholar
20 Again, postinvasion Iraq provides important evidence on this score: see, for an acclaimed insider's view, Chandrasekaran, Rajiv, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside the Green Zone (New York, Vintage: 2007).Google Scholar
22 I limit myself here to a theory of justified termination for just occupiers, but there is clearly need for one for unjust occupations (for present-day Iraq, for example), not least because the “quit as soon as possible” demand is not always appropriate in such instances. Pacifists coherently argue on many occasions that, although aggressors should never have started the war that they did, morality does not free them from obligations consequent on that initial immorality which, in an occupation scenario, may prohibit overly hasty withdrawal.
23 Schweid, Barry, “Poll: U.S., Allies, Kabul Government Losing Ground,” Associated Press, February 9, 2009; available at http:\\examiner.com/a-1841700~Poll_US_allies_Kabul_government-losing_ground.html(accessed February 9, 2009).Google Scholar