Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 August 2011
With the exception of Raphael Lemkin's efforts on behalf of the 1948 Genocide Convention, no idea has moved faster in the international normative arena than “the responsibility to protect” (RtoP), which was formulated in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Friends and foes have pointed to the commission's conceptual contribution to reframing sovereignty as contingent rather than absolute, and to establishing a framework for forestalling or stopping mass atrocities via a three-pronged responsibility—to prevent, to react, and to rebuild. But until the international military action against Libya in March 2011, the sharp end of the RtoP stick—the use of military force—had been replaced by evasiveness and skittishness from diplomats, scholars, and policy analysts.
1 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001)Google Scholar. See also Weiss, Thomas G. and Hubert, Don, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001)Google Scholar.
2 See Barnett, Michael and Weiss, Thomas G., Humanitarianism Contested: Where Angels Fear to Tread (London: Routledge, 2011)Google Scholar.
3 See Kuperman, Alan J., “Mitigating the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Economics,” Global Governance 14, no. 2 (2008), pp. 219–40;Google ScholarKuperman, Alan J., “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans,” International Studies Quarterly 52 (2008), pp. 49–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Kuperman, Alan J., “Darfur: Strategic Victimhood Strikes Again?” Genocide Studies and Prevention 4, no. 3 (2009), pp. 281–303CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 The author's version is Weiss, Thomas G., Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007)Google Scholar.
5 Ban Ki-moon, “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report from the Secretary-General,” UN document A/63/677, January 12, 2009.
6 Ban Ki-moon, “Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General,” UN document A/64/864, July 14, 2010.
8 I. William Zartman, “Preventing Identity Conflicts Leading to Genocide and Mass Killings,” International Peace Institute, 2010, p. 4.
11 Chesterman, Simon, “Hard Cases Make Bad Law: Law, Ethics, and Politics in Humanitarian Intervention,” in Lang, Anthony F. Jr., ed., Just Intervention (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003)Google Scholar, p. 54.
14 See Thomas G. Weiss, “Politics, the UN, and Halting Mass Atrocities,” in Adam and Ernesto Verdeja, eds., The International Politics of Genocide (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming).
15 Collinson, Sarah et al. , Realising Protection: The Uncertain Benefits of Civilian, Refugee and IDP Status (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2009), HPG Report 28, p. 3Google Scholar.
16 Bass, Gary J., Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Knopf, 2008), p. 382Google Scholar.