Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 September 2011
Targeted sanctions—often referred to as “smart sanctions”—began in large measure as a response to the UN Security Council sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990 and 1991, after its invasion of Kuwait. By 1991 it was clear that the sanctions on Iraq, initially welcomed by antiwar activists as a peaceful alternative to military action, were different from any sanctions seen before. Combined with the destruction from the bombing campaign of the Gulf War, they were devastating to the Iraq economy and infrastructure, resulting in widespread malnutrition, epidemics of water-borne diseases, and the collapse of every system necessary to ensure human well-being in a modern society. As the sanctions seemed to have no end in sight, there was considerable “sanctions fatigue” within the United Nations, as well as a growing body of literature that questioned whether sanctions were effective at obtaining compliance by the target state, even when there was considerable impact on its economy.
In the wake of these concerns, there were efforts in many venues to design sanctions that would not have the humanitarian impact of broad trade sanctions, and that would also be more effective by putting direct pressure on individual national policy-makers. These targeted sanctions included arms embargoes, financial sanctions on the assets of individuals and companies, travel restrictions on the leaders of a sanctioned state, and trade sanctions on particular goods. Many viewed targeted sanctions as an especially promising tool for foreign policy and international governance, and many still see targeted sanctions as a natural and obvious solution to a broad array of difficult situations. But there are considerable difficulties with each type of targeted sanction, with regard to implementation, humanitarian impact, and, in some cases, due process rights. Some of these difficulties may be resolved as these measures continue to be refined. Others are rooted in fundamental conflicts between competing interests or intractable logistical challenges.
1 See, e.g., Claudia von Braunmühl and Manfred Kulessa, “The Impact of UN Sanctions on Humanitarian Assistance Activities: Report on a Study Commissioned by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs” (Berlin: Gesellschaft für Communication Management Interkultur Training mbH—COMIT, 1995).
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6 Cornelio Sommaruga, “Strengthening the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance: Humanitarian Policy and Operational Activities,” Address at the United Nations General Assembly, 49th session, November 23, 1994, in International Review of the Red Cross, no. 304 (February 28, 1995).
7 Boutros-Ghali, Report of the Secretary-General, “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace,” para. 75.
8 UN Security Council, “Letter Dated 24 September 1996 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724 (1991) Concerning Yugoslavia Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/1996/776, September 24, 1996, p. 16, para. 95.
9 Watson Institute for International Studies, “Toward More Humane and Effective Sanctions Management: Enhancing the Capacity of the United Nations System,” Occasional Paper 31, 1988, p. vi.
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13 “Preventing Deadly Conflict,” Final Report, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York, pp. 54–55; www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/rept97/finfr.htm.
14 Watson Institute, Targeted Financial Sanctions Project; www.watsoninstitute.org/tfs/targetedfinsan.cfm.
15 United Nations Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, “The Experience of the United Nations in Administering Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions,” in Brzoska, Michael, ed., Smart Sanctions: The Next Steps (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001), p. 46Google Scholar.
16 Ibid.
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18 Biersteker, Thomas et al. , “Consensus from the Bottom Up? Assessing the Influence of the Sanctions Reform Processes,” in Wallensteen, Peter and Staibano, Carina, eds., International Sanctions: Between Words and Wars in the Global System (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 17Google Scholar.
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21 United Nations Secretariat, “The Experience of the United Nations in Administering Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions,” p. 46.
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23 Watson Institute, Targeted Financial Sanctions Project; www.watsoninstitute.org/tfs/targetedfinsan.cfm.
24 Special Program on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions (SPITS), the “Stockholm Process”; www.smartsanctions.se/.
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29 “Introduction: Assessing Smart Sanctions: Lessons from the 1990s,” in Cortright and Lopez, eds., Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, p. 15.
30 Peter Wallensteen et al., p. 105.
31 Michael Brzoska, “Putting More Teeth in UN Arms Embargoes,” in Cortright and Lopez, eds., Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, p. 128.
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36 “Letter Dated 7 October 2009 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1572 (2004) Concerning Côte d'Ivoire Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2009/521, October 29, 2009, para. 15, para. 11.
37 “Letter Dated 12 May 2010 from the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2010/571, November 5, 2010, para. 36.
38 “Letter Dated 7 October 2002 from the Panel of Experts on Liberia to the Chairman of the Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1343 (2001) Concerning Liberia,” S/2002/1115, para. 62.
39 “Letter Dated 30 November 2008 from the Panel of Experts on Liberia Addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1521 (2003),” S/2008/785, December 17, 2008, p. 4.
40 “Letter Dated 14 February 2005 from the Members of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 751 (1992),” S/2005/153, para. 13, para. 14.
41 Damien Fruchart et al., Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “United Nations Arms Embargoes: Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour” (SIPRI and Uppsala University, 2007), p. x. In a subcategory of six cases, there was some improvement in the actions of the target state immediately before and after the imposition of arms embargoes, in five of six cases studied. Ibid., p. 46. However, it is difficult to identify the direct cause of the changes, since in most cases the arms embargoes are accompanied by other measures, including other types of sanctions. In the five cases where there were “standalone” arms embargoes, one study found that there was little or no impact: Cortright and Lopez, eds., Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, p. 24. Cortright and Lopez “Targeted Sanctions: Lessons from the 1990s,” in Brzoska, Smart Sanctions: Next Steps, p. 24
42 Brzoska, Michael, “A Quantitative Analysis of Arms Embargoes,” in Brzoska, and Lopez, , eds., Putting Teeth in the Tiger, p. 207Google Scholar.
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44 Bondi, Loretta, “Arms Embargoes: In Name Only?” in Cortright, and Lopez, , eds., Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, p. 112Google Scholar.
45 Fruchart et al., “United Nations Arms Embargoes,” p.24.
46 Brzoska, “Putting More Teeth in UN Arms Embargoes,” p. 127.
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50 Ibid., pp. 153–54.
51 Ibid., pp. 156–57.
52 Ibid., p. 149.
53 Ibid., pp. 149, 163.
54 Ibid., p. 160; and Kimberly Ann Elliott, “Analyzing the Effects of Targeted Sanctions,” p. 173.
55 Richard W. Conroy, “The UN Experience with Travel Sanctions.”, p. 147.
56 Ibid., p. 158.
57 UN Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003).
58 “Introduction,” in Cortright and Lopez, eds., Smart Sanctions, p. 10.
59 David Cortright et al., “Targeted Financial Sanctions That Do Work,” in Cortright and Lopez, eds., Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, p. 29.
60 Ibid., p. 34.
61 Peter Fitzgerald, “Compliance Issues Associated with Targeted Economic Sanctions,” in House of Lords, Select Committee on Economic Affairs, 2nd Report of Session 2006–07, The Impact of Economic Sanctions, Vol. II: Evidence, p. 150.
62 Elliott, “Analyzing the Effects of Targeted Sanctions,” p. 179.
63 UN Security Council Resolution 1173 (1998).
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66 Kofi Annan, non-paper written to the United Nations Security Council referenced by Under-Secretary General for Legal Affairs Nicola Michel in his address to the United Nations Security Council, Proceedings of 5474th Meeting, S/PV.5474 (2006), p. 5.
67 UN General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur,” A61/27 (2006), para. 34.
68 UN Security Council Resolution 1730 (2006).
69 Hudson, Andrew, “Not a Great Asset: the UN Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Regime: Violating Human Rights,” Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2007), p. 123Google Scholar.
70 International Commission of Jurists, “Assessing the Damage, Urging Action: Report of the ICJ Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Human Rights,” February 27, 2009, pp. 116–17.
71 UN Security Council Resolution 1904 (2009).
72 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, judgment of September 3, 2008, par. 326.
73 Formerly known as the Court of First Instance.
74 Kadi v European Commission, Judgment of the General Court, September 30, 2010, T-85/09, para. 149.
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