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Health care and health innovation in Europe: regulating for public benefit or for commercial profit?

  • Amanda Warren-Jones (a1)
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Abstract
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Corresponding author
*Correspondence to: Dr Amanda Warren-Jones, Director, SIBLE - Health; Senior Law Lecturer, Sheffield University School of Law, Bartolome House, Winter Street, Sheffield, S3 7ND, UK. Email: a.warren-jones@sheffield.ac.uk
References
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Health Economics, Policy and Law
  • ISSN: 1744-1331
  • EISSN: 1744-134X
  • URL: /core/journals/health-economics-policy-and-law
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