Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-rvbq7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-14T13:24:50.696Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Problem of Higher Knowledge in Hegel's Philosophy*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2014

Terje Sparby*
Affiliation:
Junior Visiting Scholar, Mind and Life Instituteterje.sparby@gmail.com
Get access

Abstract

There are two main aspects of the problem of higher knowledge in Hegel's philosophy. Firstly, how exactly does Hegel appropriate Kant's conception of higher knowledge in the shape of intellectual intuition and intuitive understanding? Secondly, how does Hegel envision the connection of higher knowledge to empirical reality? Recent attempts at answering these questions pull in opposite directions. According to Eckart Förster, Hegel claims knowledge of a supersensible reality, while others, such as James Kreines and Sally Sedgwick, deny this, focusing rather on Hegel's claims to knowledge of nature. I suggest an interpretation where Hegel makes a modest claim to supersensible knowledge but at the same time is unable to provide a satisfactory account of the connection of higher knowledge to empirical reality.1

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Hegel Society of Great Britain 2014 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

This essay was written as a part of a research project on higher knowledge and the supersensible in German idealism, founded by the Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung. Thanks go out to all those who commented on an earlier draft of this essay when it was presented at Tobias Rosefeldt's reserach colloquium at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, as well as two anonymous reviewers who helped me improve my case on specific points. All translations are my own unless otherwise specified.

References

Allison, H. (2004), Kant's Transcendental Idealism. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Beiser, F. C. (2005), Hegel. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Förster, E. (2002), ‘Die Bedeutung von §§76, 77 der Kritik der Urteilskraft für die Entwicklung der nachkantischen Philosophie’, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 56(2), 177n10.Google Scholar
Förster, E. (2012), Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.Google Scholar
Fulda, (2004), ‘Hegels Logik der Idee und ihre epistemologische Bedeutung’, in C. Halbig, M. Quante, L. Siep (eds.), Hegels Erbe. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.Google Scholar
Gabriel, M. (2011), Transcendental ontology. Essays in German idealism. New York: Continuum.Google Scholar
Hegel, G. W. F. (1991), The Encyclopedia Logic. Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar
Houlgate, S. (2007), German Idealism. Contemporary Perspectives. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Houlgate, S. (ed.) (1998), Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature, Albany: State Univesity of New York Press.Google Scholar
Kreines, J. (2007), ‘Between the Bounds of Experience and Divine Intuition: Kant's Epistemic Limits and Hegel's Ambitions’, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50(3), 307f.Google Scholar
Kreines, J. (2008), ‘Metaphysics without Pre-Critical Monism: Hegel on Lower-Level Natural Kinds and the Structure of Reality’, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 57/58, 5.Google Scholar
Longuenesse, B. (2007), Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.Google Scholar
Longuenesse, B. (2000), ‘Point of view of man or knowledge of god’, in S. Sedgwick (ed.), The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
McDowell, J. (1994), Mind and World. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Pinkard, T. (2012), Hegel's Naturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Pippin, R. (1989), Hegel's Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Schäfer, R. (2001), Die Dialektik und ihre besondere Formen in Hegels Logik. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.Google Scholar
Sedgwick, S. (2012), Hegel's Critique of Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Songsuk Hahn, S. (2007), Contradiction in Motion: Hegel's Organic Concept of Life and Value. Othaca: Cornell University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Westphal, K. (2003), Hegel's Epistemology. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.Google Scholar
Wildenauer, M. (2004), Epistemologie des freien Denkens. Die logische Idee in Hegels Philosophie des endlichen Geistes. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.Google Scholar
Wolfgang, J. (2009), Die dreifache Vollendung des Deutschen Idealismus. Amsterdam: Rodopi.Google Scholar