¹ Studies specifically concerned with the Anglo-German Naval Agreement include the following: Charles Bloch, ‘La Grande-Bretagne face au rearmament allemand et l'accord naval de 1935’, in Revue d'histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale, xvi, no. 63 (July 1966), pp. 41–68;Google Scholar a translation of the same article appears under the tide ‘Great Britain, German Rearmament and the Naval Agreement of 1935’ in Gatzke, Hans (ed.), European Diplomacy between Two Wars, 1919–1939 (Chicago, 1972), pp. 125–151;Google ScholarWatt, D. C., ‘The Anglo-German Naval Agreementof 1935: An Interim Judgement’, in Journal of Modern History, XVIII (June 1956), pp. 155–76;CrossRefGoogle ScholarPapp, Nicholas G., ‘The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935’, unpublished doctoral dissertation (University of Connecticut, 1969);Google Scholar and Haraszti, Eva H., Treaty-Breakers or “Realpfllitiker”? The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935. Translated by Sandor Simon (Boppard am Rhein and Budapest, 1974). Bloch regards the agreement as a typically complicated example of British perfidy and unreliability meant to double cross the French. Papp's dissertation was based almost entirely on German sources and does not challenge the widely accepted view that the naval agreement was part and parcel of appeasement. Watt, writing without access to unpublished sources, perceived most of the complexity of British motives in making the agreement, and accurately identified some though not all of the primary considerations influencing British policy. Haraszti's book, the most ambitious attempt to comprehend the total diplomatic setting of the agreement, is based very largely on non-British sources. Haraszti echoes the view that the naval agreement was the initial act of appeasement.Google Scholar

² A very helpful description of some aspects of the policy-making process can be found in Watt, D. C., ‘The Nature of the Foreign-Policy-Making Elite in Britain’, in Watt, Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (Notre Dame, 1965), pp. 1–15.Google Scholar

³ One of the best treatments of the commonwealth's role in British foreign policy-making is still Gwendolen Carter, The British Commonwealth and World Security (Toronto, 1947).Google ScholarWatt, D. C., ‘Imperial Defence Policy and Imperial Foreign Policy, 1911–39: The Substance and the Shadow’, in Personalities and Policies, pp. 139–58, is also excellent.Google Scholar

⁴ In phrase, A. J. P. Taylor's, ‘Ministers, too, were men of the time’. Taylor, English History, 1914–1945 (Oxford, 1965), p. 367.Google Scholar

⁵ Pacifist public opinion as manifested in the famous East Fulham by-election as well as in other by-elections in the autumn of 1933 and early 1934 has often been cited to explain and/or justify the government's reluctance to rearm and to adopt a more forceful foreign policy with respect to Germany. Medlicott, W. N., British Foreign Policy since Versailles, 1919–1963 (London; 1968), p. xvii;Google ScholarNorthedge, F. S., The Troubled Giant: Britain among the Great Powers, 1916–1939 (New York, 1966), p. 386;Google Scholar and Middlemas, Keith and Barnes, John, Baldwin, a Biography (London, 1969), pp. 744–7,Google Scholar all take this general view. Apologists for the leaders of the period, of whom the most cunning is Lord Templewood (Hoare), blame ‘larger forces’ rather than individuals for the mistakes that were made. Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (London 1954), p. 114.Google Scholar Anti-appeasers such as A. L. Rowse tend to minimize the importance of public opinion and to insist upon individual responsibility. See Rowse, , Appeasement: A Study in Political Decline, 1933–1939 (New York, 1961), passim.Google Scholar

⁶ See Rowse, Appeasement, p. 117.

⁷ D. C. Watt offers a shrewd assessment of the background to the Anglo-German naval talks in ‘The Anglo-German Naval Agreement’, pp. 162–3. Middlemas and Barnes suggest that Stanley Baldwin's willingness to support an Anglo-German understanding stemmed from his fear of a possible German-Japanese combination. Baldwin, p. 786. I have not discovered any evidence in support of this thesis.Google Scholar

⁸ A good survey of Neville Chamberlain's conduct of British financial affairs, and of the motives and attitudes which influenced him, may be found in Coghlan, F., ‘Armaments, Economic Policy and Appeasement. Background to British Foreign Policy, 1931–37’, in History, LVII (06 1972), pp. 205–16. For general comments, see Taylor, English History, p. 360.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ See Northedge, Troubled Giant, pp. 578–9; Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 786. Among the first formal official warnings of German rearmament was a chiefs-of-staff report in the fall of 1933. See COS, no. 310, October 1933, in CAB 53/23, for this document. In July 1934, a detailed list of ‘non-secret’ evidence of German violations of the treaty of Versailles respecting arms was submitted to the cabinet, and there were periodic subsequent reports. See C.P. 205(34), Appendix II, in CAB 24/250, Public Record Office. All citations hereinafter of British official documents designated CAB (Cabinet) or F.O. (Foreign Office) are in the custody of the Public Record Office, London, and I am grateful to the Keeper of the Records for permission to cite them.

¹⁰ There is no really good assessment of Simon as-foreign secretary or of any phase of his important career in British politics. His later association with Neville Chamberlain during the latter's years as prime minister, and the vigorous role which Simon took in supporting appeasement at Munich and after, have reinforced the tendency to characterize his years as foreign secretary as the genesis of appeasement. Anti-appeasers such as Martin Gilbert and Margaret George facilely lump Simon together with other villains such as Chamberlain, Halifax and Hoare; Rowse cheerfully notes that he was a fellow of All Souls and there fore almost an appeaser by definition. Eva Haraszti perpetuates the outmoded ‘guilty men’ thesis in her interpretation of Simon, even going so far as to suggest that personal ambition for the premiership motivated him in seeking rapprochement with f Germany in 1935. See Treaty-Breakers, p. 88. A. J. P. Taylor does his period as foreign lecretary more justice. None of these historians, however, address themselves seriously to te any detailed consideration of Simon's career. Simon's own wretched memoirs damage his 4 reputation. See Gilbert, Martin and Gott, Richard, The Appeasers (Boston, 1963), 58, passim; Margaret George, The Warped Vision: British Foreign Policy, 1933–1939 (Pittsburgh, 1965), pp. 14, 173–4;Google Scholar Rowse, Appeasement, pp. 15–20; Taylor, English History, p. 372; and Colvin, Ian, Vansittart in Office (London, 1965), p. 21, for comments on Simon, mostly unfavourable.Google Scholar

¹¹ Medlicott, British Foreign Policy since Versailles, ch. iv, discusses some of the origins and motivations of a more sympathetic attitude toward Germany, as does Northedge, Troubled Giant, ch. VII, passim.

¹² For discussion of the political origins of the Defence Requirements Committee, or DRC (officially, the Defence Requirements Sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence), see Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, pp. 761–2. For complete text of the report, see DRC 14(34), ‘Imperial Defence Policy’, 5 Mar. 1934, in CAB 16/110.

¹³ Collections of materials relevant to strategic problems in the Far East and especially to the status of the naval base at Singapore may be found in the papers of several organs of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) concerned with these questions. In particular, the minutes and papers of the Joint Committee for Home and Overseas Defence in CAB 36/3 and 36/8; and papers by the Joint Planning Sub-committee of the chiefs-of staff (COS) dated 23 Feb. and 12 Apr. 1931 in CAB 55/6. CAB II/168 also contains relevant information on the dilemmas posed by the uncompleted condition of the Singapore base.

¹⁴ See DRC 14(34), op cit. The Admiralty's concern to obtain a naval arms limitation agreement with Germany in 1935 arose largely from fears of impending Japanese aggres sion in the East.

¹⁵ Ibid. Also see Howard, Michael, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Turn World Wars (London, 1972), p. 105.Google Scholar

¹⁶ It appears that the development of this position was due largely to the influence of the Treasury's representative on the DRC, Sir Warren Fisher. I am indebted to my colleague, John Lippincott, for allowing me to see the finished draft of his doctoral dissertation (University of Oxford) relating to British defence policy-making in this period.

¹⁷ See Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, pp. 761 ff. for comments on the thinking of Baldwin and the reactions of other key figures in die policy-making process.

¹⁸ Officially designated ‘Disarmament Conference, 1932, Ministerial Committee’, here inafter referred to as DC(M). Chaired by MacDonald, the membership of this committee included Simon, Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, and several other members of the cabinet including the service ministers. Minutes and memoranda of the Disarmament Committee respecting the DRC report may be found in CAB 16/III. For their final report to the cabinet, see C.P. 205(34), July 1934, in CAB 24/250.

¹⁹ See DC(M), minutes for 10 and 17 May, and 25 June 1934 in CAB 16/110; and memorandum by Neville Chamberlain, 20 June 1934, in CAB 16/III.

²⁰ Borrowing or deficit spending was, in Chamberlain's view, ‘the broad road that leads to destruction’. A more traditionalist tory, Lord Hailsham, secretary of state for war, attacked this view as ‘a policy of despair and defeatism’, but the chancellor had the last word on behalf of fiscal orthodoxy. See DC(M), minutes of 25 June 1934, in CAB 16/110. Also see Howard, Continental Committment, pp. 108–10, for a good summary of Chamber lain's views and their impact on defence and foreign policy.

²¹ See the concluding paragraph of C.P. 205(34), 31 July 1934, in CAB 24/250.

²² The Admiralty's indignation regarding Chamberlain's strategic notions was forcefully expressed in a memorandum by Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, ‘Naval Defence Requirements’, DC(M), 125, in CAB 16/III. Eyres-Monsell was supported by Hailsham, who threatened to resign if Chamberlain's proposal was adopted. Even those who heartily shared the chan cellor's fiscal conservatism could not accept his advocacy of a British retreat from world power. See DC(M), minutes for 25 June 1934, in CAB 16/110.

²³ A collection of documents relative to the Anglo-Japanese naval talks of October and November 1934 may be found in CAB 21/404. Also see Simon and Chamberlain, ‘The Future of Anglo-Japanese Relations’, C.P. 233, 16 Oct. 1934 in CAB 24/250; C.P. 238 and C.P. 247 in CAB 24/250. For additional information from an observer, see Kennedy, Malcolm D., The Estrangement of Great Britain and Japan, 1917–1935 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969), pp. 326–30. Perhaps the best account is D. C. Watt, ‘Britain, the United States and Japan in 1934’, in Personalities and Policies, pp. 83–99.Google Scholar

²⁴ Northedge, Troubled Giant, p. 456.

²⁵ Watt, Personalities and Policies, pp. 94–5.

²⁶ The significance of Franco-Italian naval rivalry in the Mediterranean for British policy-making is summarized by Northedge, Troubled Giant, pp. 341–4.

²⁷ Records of the Simon-Barthou talks of 10 and II July may be found in CAB 21/394; also Documents on British Foreign Policy, Second Series, VI, no. 490, pp. 822–5, provides records pertaining to naval affairs. See Simon, memorandum for cabinet on the proposed Eastern Locarno treaty and other matters in C.P. 188, CAB 24/250.

²⁸ See Report of the Chiefs of Staff, November 1934, Appendix: ‘Japanese Naval Preparations’, CID 1154–B in CAB 4/23.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ See Watt, ‘Anglo-German Naval Agreement’, pp. 164–5; Chatfield, Lord, It Might Happen Again (London, 1947), pp. 74–5.Google Scholar

³¹ The entire record of the minutes and memoranda of this short-lived though important committee may be found in CAB 27/572.

³² See memoranda by Sir John Simon, 29 Nov. and 8 Dec. 1934, in CAB 27/572.

³³ Simon, memorandum, 29 Nov. 1934, CAB 27/572.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Committee on German rearmament, minutes for 22 Nov. and II Dec. 1934, in CAB 27/572

³⁶ Committee on German rearmament, minutes for 13 Dec. 1934 in CAB 27/572.

³⁷ Committee on German rearmament, minutes for II and 13 Dec. 1934, in CAB 27/572; Interim Report, sent to the cabinet on II Dec. and approved 12 Dec, was an amended version of Simon's memorandum of 8 Dec. See cabinet minutes, 46(34), conclusion 3, for 12 Dec. 1934 in CAB 23/81

³⁸ See Report of the Committee on German rearmament, 18 Dec. 1934. C.P. 300, CAB 24/251.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.; and C.P. 295(34), II Dec. 1934, in CAB 24/251.

⁴¹ See C.P. 302(34), CAB 24/251, for Simon's report to the cabinet on his conversations with Laval in Paris on December 22.

⁴² See text of the Franco-Italian protocol and comments by the staff of the Foreign Office in F.O./371/18823/C269/15/18.

⁴³ Transcripts and related documents concerning the Anglo-French conversations of 31 Jan. to 3 Feb. 1935 may be found in F.O./371/18824. The French proposed a mutual assistance treaty relative to the air and military staff talks. The latter proposal was unacceptable to the British; the former was turned down after serious consideration owing to the intervention of Sir Maurice Henkey, secretary of the CID, who organized opposition to it. See CID 1161–B, 8 Feb. 1935, and II62–B, II Feb. 1935 in CAB 4/23.

⁴⁴ See Avon, Lord, Facing the Dictators (Boston, 1962), pp. 138–40.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ A collection of documents relating to these naval talks may be found in CAB 28/149.

⁴⁶ The Foreign Office wished to avoid alarming the French by giving the appearance of a dalliance with Berlin; it also wished to prevent French interference with Anglo-German negotiations, should these seem desirable. The British therefore played down their intention to sound Germany regarding German naval plans. See R. L. Craigie, memorandum, A1712 in F.O./371/18732; and Sir J. Simon to Sir George Clark, 21 Feb. 1935, A1713 in F.O./371/18732. The British received indications as early as Nov. 1934 that Germany intended to renounce the naval as well as the military and air restrictions of Versailles. See Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series c, III, no. 360, p. 685, and no. 416, p. 789.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See minutes of the cabinet, 27 Feb. 1935, Cabinet 12(35), in CAB 23/82.

⁴⁸ Eden, memorandum of a conversation with the first lord of the admiralty, A2877 in F.O./371/18732.

⁴⁹ The first mention of 35 per cent ratio came in a conversation between Hitler and Sir Eric Phipps on 27 Nov. 1934. On 25 Jan. Hider repeated this percentage in a talk with MacDonald's private emissary, Lord Allen of Hurtwood. Documents on German Foreign Policy, C, III, nos. 358, 463.

⁵⁰ See R. L. Craigie, memoranda of 7 Mar. 1935, A2843 in F.O./371/18731, and A2878 in F.O./371/18732.

⁵¹ See Craigie, memorandum, 7 Mar. 1935, A2843, op. cit.: and Vansittart's minutes respecting A2878, op. cit.

⁵² It is clear that Hider had set a high premium on obtaining a naval agreement with Britain and that he was upset by the fear that British rearmament might preclude his achieving this goal. The ablest accounts of Hitler's motives are those by Weinberg, Gerhard, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933–1936 (Chicago and London, 1970), pp. 210–12;Google Scholar and Jacobsen, Hans-Adolph, Nationalsozialistische Aussen-politik, 1933–1939 (Frankfort, 1968), pp. 413–16.Google Scholar Haraszti also agrees that Hider desired an agreement with Britain, but offers somewhat conflicting interpretations; Hider wanted a stable relationship or even an alliance with the British (Treaty-Breakers, pp. 93–4), but German naval strategists planned naval expansion in expectation of future conflict with Britain (ibid. pp. 67–71). Also see André Francois-Poncet, Souvenirs d'une ambassade à Berlin, Septembre 1931–Octobré 1938 (Paris, 1946), p. 226. Hitler's ‘cold’ having postponed the foreign secretary's visit to Berlin, the German government agreed to rearrange the visit when requested to do so by the British on 12 Mar.; 25 and 26 of March were designated. See Documents on German Foreign Policy, C, III, no. 526, p. 995; Avon, Facing the Dictators, pp. 139–140; and Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, pp. 795–7.Google Scholar

⁵³ See Francois-Poncet, Souvenirs, pp. 226–7; Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 142; Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, pp. 798–9.

⁵⁴ A failure which Eden condemned. See Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 142. Sir Eric Phipps, apparendy on his own initiative, delivered a verbal protest to Hider during the course of an interview on 16 Mar. in which Hider indicated his objectives of air parity with Britain and France (‘a regular triangle’), and 35 per cent of British naval strength. See Phipps to Foreign Office, 16 Mar. 1935, A2878 in F.O./371/18732. Also see minutes to C2309 and C2310 in F.O./371/18831

⁵⁵ See Simon, memorandum, 17 Mar. 1935, C.P. 63(35), in CAB 24/254; and Phipps to Foreign Office, 21 Mar. 1935, C2334 in F.O./371/18831

⁵⁶ Foreign Office minutes respecting C2296 in F.O./371/18831.

⁵⁷ See Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 799; Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 145.

⁵⁸ See Avon, Facing the Dictators, pp. 146–7; memorandum and telegram from Eden to Foreign Office, 23 Mar. 1935, C2483 and C2458 in F.O./371/18831; and Sir George Clark to Foreign Office, and minutes by the Foreign Office staff, C2459 in F.O./371/18831.

⁵⁹ The British transcripts of the Berlin talks may be found in C.P. 69(35), CAB 24/254. A translation of the German transcript may be found in Documents on German Foreign Policy, C, III, no. 555, pp. 1043–80.

⁶⁰ See C.P. 69(35), CAB 24/254, conversation on the afternoon of 26 Mar.

⁶¹ Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 209.

⁶² Ibid. pp. 158–9. Also, Eden, memorandum, 8 Apr. 1935, C2962 in F.O./371/18834.

⁶³ Eden's view that Britain should take a firmer line towards Germany was shared by Vansittart, Ralph Wigram, head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, and indeed by many of the permanent staff. His view that closer Russian-British ties could play a role in strengthening European security was not shared in the Foreign Office. Neither Eden nor the permanent staff of the Foreign Office offered objections to the naval negotiations with Germany nor to the Agreement of 18 June. See Vansittart, Lord, The Mist Procession (London, 1958), p. 527.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ One person who saw the Franco-Soviet tie in a positive light was the British ambassador in Paris, Sir George Clerk. See Clerk to Foreign Office, 28 Mar. 1935, C2656, in F.O./371/18833.

⁶⁵ Ibid, note by Simon on Clerk's telegram: collective security, Simon proclaimed was the ‘real answer…There is no other way, and we must now face facts and Europe as they are…’

⁶⁶ Documents relating to Eden's conversations in Moscow, Warsaw and Prague can be found in F.O./371/18834; see especially C2930 and C2892. Also, Avon, Facing the Dictators, pp. 160–82, 183–7.

⁶⁷ See Simon to Clerk, 8 Apr. 1935, C2960 in F.O./371/18834.

⁶⁸ Craigie, memorandum, 29 Mar. 1935, C2960 in F.O./371/18732.

⁶⁹ Ibid.; and Eyres-Monsell to Simon, 9 Apr. 1935, A3324 in F.O./371/18732

⁷⁰ See Sir Eric Drummond to Vansittart, 3 Apr. 1935, and Sir George Clerk to Vansittart, A3202 and A3323 in F.O./371/18732. In a minute to the latter message, Craigie stated, ‘I hope…we shall not allow the French to deflect us from our purpose’

⁷¹ The introduction into the policy-making process of the consciousness of Britain's extreme vulnerability to air attack and the deficiencies of the RAF came about as a result of the DRC Report of March 1934. It was at this time that the possibility of reducing British liabilities through international agreement limiting the size of air forces and prohibiting bombing of civilian targets was first raised by Baldwin. See Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 794. In the Disarmament Committee's consideration of the DRC report, Simon had been a principal spokesman for an air treaty. See DC(M), minutes for 17 May 1934 in CAB 16/110. Hider's statement that the German air force had achieved parity with the RAF in March 1935 raised the issue once again in an acute form. This claim also touched off an acrimonious debate between the Foreign Office and Air ministry as to the accuracy of the German statement. See Vansittart, memorandum of April 1935, C3228, and accompanying minutes in F.O./371/18836; and Avon, Facing the Dictators, pp. 204–5, 207.

⁷² See Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, pp. 814–18; Northedge, Troubled Giant, pp. 387–8.

⁷³ Avon, Facing the Dictators, pp. 258–9.

⁷⁴ I am indebted to John Lippincott for permitting me to use a summary in his possession taken from a set of notes made by Simon en route from Stresa to Geneva. The original document is in the Simon Papers, and I regret that I have been unable to examine first-hand this material which seems to shed much light on Sir John's perceptions of European affairs at this crucial time. Also, Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 814.

⁷⁵ Foreign Office, memorandum, 16 Apr. 1935, A3734 in F.O./371/18733; Vice-Admiral C. J. C. Little to R. L. Craigie, 4 May 1935, A4333, in F.O./371/18733.

⁷⁶ COS, Annual Review, Apr. 1935, CID 1181–B, in CAB 4/23.

⁷⁷ This is the view taken by Papp, ‘Anglo-German Naval Agreement’, pp. 170 ff., 199, 205. Also by Bloch, ‘La Grande-Bretagne face au rearmement Allemand’, p. 55. The Foreign Office, though generally hostile to the Soviet Union, was not really opposed to the Franco-Russian pact, and, in any case, the pact was irrelevant to the Admiralty's motives for desiring an Anglo-German naval agreement. See Clerk to Foreign Office, 28 Mar. 1935 and accompanying minutes, C2656 in F.O./371/18833.

⁷⁸ See Clive's message with enclosure from the British naval attaché in Tokyo, 3 May 1935, A4086, in F.O./371/18733. Also C.P. 80(35) in CAB 24/254.

⁷⁹ Vice-Admiral Little to Craigie, 4 May 1935, A4333 in F.O./371/18733.

⁸⁰ See COS, ‘Memorandum by Naval Staff’, 6 May 1935, no. 370 in CAB 53/24; Vansittart, The Mist Procession, pp. 525–7; and Charles C. Bright, ‘Britain's Search for Security, 1930–1936: The Diplomacy of Naval Disarmament and Imperial Defence’, unpublished doctoral dissertation (Yale, 1970), pp. 352–3.Google Scholar

⁸¹ See Documents on German Foreign Policy, C, IV, no. 52, p. 89; no. 54, p. 91; no. 55, p. 93; no. 58, p. 97; no. 59, p. 99. The most perplexing issue connected with the Anglo-German naval agreement was the British Admiralty's willingness to allow Germany to acquire submarines. This was based on an opinion strongly held in the Admiralty and circulated throughout policy-making circles that owing to developments in detection equipment and other technological improvements the submarine was no longer a menace. See Marder, Arthur J.. ‘The Influence of History on Sea Power: The Royal Navy and the Lessons of 1914–1918’, in Pacific Historical Review, XLI (11. 1972), pp. 419–21.Google Scholar

⁸² It appears obvious from German documents that Hitler's speech was a carefully staged attempt to prepare the way for talks. German records indicate that on at least two occasions prior to 21 May British encouragement was given. See the reports of the German ambas-sador in London, von Hoesch, on 8 and 10 May following interviews with MacDonald and Simon respectively. Documents on German Foreign Policy, C, IV, no. 79, p. 139; no. 82, p. 144.

⁸³ Northedge, Troubled Giant, p. 389.

⁸⁴ Phipps to Foreign Office, 23 May 1935, Af661 in F.O./371/18733.

⁸⁵ Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 526. Haraszti's attempts to present Vansittart in the guise of anti-appeaser hero have distorted her view of the fact that the permanent undersecretary consistently sanctioned the negotiations leading up to the naval agreement. See Treaty Breakers, pp. 114–15.

⁸⁶ See Documents on German Foreign Policy, C, IV, no. 104, p. 195

⁸⁷ See conversation of 4 June 1935, in CAB 29/150.

⁸⁸ See Air ministry, memorandum, ‘Air Parity in Western Europe’, 31 May 1935, C.P. 116(35) in CAB 24/255; and Report to the Cabinet on the Proposed Aeriel Convention, 3 June 1935, C.P. 114(35) in CAB 24/255. Both these documents stress the urgency of attempting to use diplomacy to secure relief for Britain's strategic vulnerability in the air.

⁸⁹ See Cabinet Minutes 32(35), conclusions 2 and 4,5 June 1935 in CAB 23/81; and Simon's statement in the minutes of the Anglo-German conversations of 6 June 1935 in CAB 29/150.

⁹⁰ Conversations continued for as late as 20 June on some aspects of the technical issues and on the question of exchange of information between the British and German Admiralties. All official conversations may be found in CAB 29/150, although informal meetings appear to have been the means to settling several issues in the final agreement. Apart from verbal statements by Simon on 7 June (his last day as foreign secretary) to the American, Italian, French and Japanese embassies regarding the intentions of the British government, there appears to have been no attempt to warn other major naval powers of what was about to transpire between Britain and Germany. See C.P. 119(35), 7 June 1935, in CAB 24/255.