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DEFINING THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW: DEFYING GRAVITY?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 February 2016

Robert McCorquodale*
Affiliation:
Director, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Professor of International Law and Human Rights, University of Nottingham, and Barrister, Brick Court Chambers, London, r.mccorquodale@biicl.org.

Abstract

This article aims to offer a definition of the international rule of law. It does this through clarifying the core objectives of a rule of law and examining whether the international system could include them. It demonstrates that there can be a definition of the international rule of law that can be applied to the international system. This definition of the international rule of law is not dependent on a simplistic application of a national rule of law, as it takes into account the significant differences between national and international legal systems. It seeks to show that the international rule of law is relative, rather than absolute, in its application, is not tied to the operation of the substance of international law itself, and it can apply to states, international organizations and non-state actors. It goes further to show that the international rule of law does exist and can be applied internationally, even if it is not yet fully actualized.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2016 

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