Persian literature has produced few poets who can rival Saʿdi. A powerful personality, an undisputed mastery of his art, a far-reaching influence, and an enchanting sense of humor are only a few on the long list of his widely accepted virtues. His critics have described his personality as “curious” and “captivating,” and his poetry as pure magic. As the undisputed master of eloquence he is commonly referred to as ustād-i sukhan by the lay and the expert alike. To these cherishing remarks one may easily add a multitude of others and yet they reflect little more than admiration. Curiously, the existing critical literature on Saʿdi offers little in the way of clarification or further exploration of these intriguing but ambiguous descriptions. One is tempted to ask why the “curious” and “captivating” personality of Saʿdi has not been the subject of separate studies. Along the same lines, how accessible is the personality of the poet through his poetry? Or more specifically, what would be the outcome of exploring his works in search of the way he envisioned himself? The present paper is a first step toward such an exploration in an attempt to deal mostly with this last question. If the major aim in any biographical study, as Nadel puts it, is to “discern the complexities of being without pretending that life's riddles have been answered” then much light could be shed on the complexities of Saʿdi's personality in this way.

In his Interpreting the French Revolution, François Furet defines political sociability as the “specific mode of organizing the relations between citizens (or subjects) and power, as well as among citizens (or subjects) themselves in relation to power.” According to Furet, shifts from one form of political sociability to another can and do take place, particularly during periods of comprehensive economic, political, and social change. One such period preceded the events of 1789 when, as an unintended consequence of state building and economic development under the ancien régime, a democratic/horizontal political sociability increasingly replaced the hierarchic/ vertical political sociability that had previously ordered French society.

Approximately three-quarters of a century passed between the rise, in 1501, of the Safavid state of Iran under Shah Ismail I and the coming to power of his grandson Ismail II in 1576. The first Ismail had decreed that the Ithna-ʿashari Shiʿi form of Islam and the Jaʿfarī system of law be formally established in the country. When the victorious founder of the new dynasty entered Tabriz, he ordered that the phrase containing the name of Imam ʿAli (the true successor to the Prophet Muhammad according to the Twelver Shiʿi belief) be included in the call to prayer chanted from the minarets of the mosques. Shiʿism was consolidated, especially during the long reign of the intervening monarch, Shah Tahmasb (1524–76), thanks in part to the activities of a powerful mujtahid, ʿAli ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAli al-Karaki (d. 1534). However, according to the majority of the contemporary Safavid sources, when Ismail II came to power, he seems to have had second thoughts about Shiʿism and to have exhibited a proclivity for Sunnism. The Sunni ideas of Ismail II may have been fostered by another politicoreligious figure, a certain Mirza Makhdum Sharifi. The inclination Ismail II had toward Sunnism resulted in a curious episode that is recounted by Safavid historians in detail and in various versions.

In cities like Paris and London in the 19th century, the leading bankers not only supported the developing industrialization but also established practices that determined the nature of their charitable and philanthropic activity and their patronage of the arts. They supported scientific and archaeological research as well. The recurrence of these practices over the century is increasingly recognized and would justify investigation to uncover the underlying rules that governed the activities of bankers outside the financial sphere. In other words, it would justify research in terms of the anthropology of bankers. One aspect that has, so far, received insufficient attention is the impact these bankers had on cities—both in their role as builders and protectors of schools and hospitals and in the imprint they made on the urban landscape. In housing, for example, the Stern, Heine, and Weill families established foundations in Paris for the construction of HBM (habitat bon marché, low-cost housing), and architects adopted by the great banking families, such as William Bouwens, chosen by the banker Henri Germain to build the Parisian headquarters of Crédit Lyonnais, designed the great undertakings of the Parisian Belle Époque.

China is now becoming recognized as a nation with a significant Muslim population. With nearly 18 million Muslims (the recent 1990 census reported 17.9 million, with many Muslims still unaccounted for or refusing to register as members of the primarily Muslim nationalities), China ranks among the most populous Muslim nations. And, although its Muslim population is miniscule when compared with its total population (Muslims account for less than 2% of China's 1.1 billion), or insignificant when one looks at the vast Muslim populations in other Asian nations, such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, nevertheless, this article argues that the Muslims of China play an important role disproportionate to their numbers in influencing China's domestic and international politics.

Although the Western model of education has spread worldwide, traditional Islamic education continues to have a strong influence in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. This article seeks to determine the reason it remains such a vital part of village life in the commune of Bounaamane, located in Morocco's southern Souss valley. Why do so many children attend Qurʾanic schools, even though modern education is available? Because standard sociological methodologies, with their surveys and statistical analyses, were not viable in this social and cultural setting, I approached the problem by using ethnographic and case-study methods. I will first present an overview of traditional Qurʾanic education and then try to explain the low-enrollment rates in modern schools and the relative popularity of traditional Qurʿanic ones in terms of economic factors and culture. We can better understand the continuity of traditional Islamic education if we see it as being closely bound to the popular understanding of Islam. In this respect, the most important elements are the role of the Qurʾanic teacher in the community and the discipline and punishment involved in the course of Qurʾanic training that socialize children into the accepted Islamic code of conduct.