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Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

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The debate between realists and liberals has reemerged as an axis of contention in international relations theory. Revolving in the past around competing theories of human nature, the debate is more concerned today with the extent to which state action is influenced by “structure” (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus “process” (interaction and learning) and institutions. Does the absence of centralized political authority force states to play competitive power politics? Can international regimes overcome this logic, and under what conditions? What in anarchy is given and immutable, and what is amenable to change?

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1. See, for example, Grieco, Joseph, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 485507CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nye, Joseph, “Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” World Politics 40 (01 1988), pp. 235–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Keohane, Robert, “Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics,” in his collection of essays entitled International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 120Google Scholar; Mearsheimer, John, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” International Security 13 (Summer 1990), pp. 556CrossRefGoogle Scholar, along with subsequent published correspondence regarding Mearsheimer's article; and Emerson Niou and Peter Ordeshook, Realism Versus Neoliberalism: A Formulation,” American Journal of Political Science 35 (05 1991), pp. 481511CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2. See Keohane, Robert, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” International Studies Quarterly 32 (12 1988), pp. 379–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3. Behavioral and rationalist models of man and institutions share a common intellectual heritage in the materialist individualism of Hobbes, Locke, and Bentham. On the relationship between the two models, see Turner, Jonathan, A Theory of Social Interaction (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 2431Google Scholar; and Homans, George, “Rational Choice Theory and Behavioral Psychology,” in Calhoun, Craig et al. , eds., Structures of Power and Constraint (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 7789Google Scholar.

4. On neorealist conceptions of learning, see Tetlock, Philip, “Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy,” in Breslauer, George and Tetlock, Philip, eds., Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 2427Google Scholar. On the difference between behavioral and cognitive learning, see ibid., pp. 20–61; Nye, Joseph, “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 371402CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Haas, Ernst, When Knowledge Is Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 1749Google Scholar.

5. See Krasner, Stephen, “Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables,” in Krasner, Stephen, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 355–68Google Scholar.

6. See Nye, “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes”; Jervis, Robert, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” World Politics 40 (04 1988), pp. 340–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Keohane, Robert, ”International Liberalism Reconsidered,” in Dunn, John, ed., The Economic Limits to Modern Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 183Google Scholar.

7. Rationalists have given some attention to the problem of preference-formation, although in so doing they have gone beyond what I understand as the characteristic parameters of rationalism. See, for example, Elster, Jon, “Sour Grapes: Utilitarianism and the Genesis of Wants,” in Sen, Amartya and Williams, Bernard, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 219–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Cohen, Michael and Axelrod, Robert, “Coping with Complexity: The Adaptive Value of Changing Utility,” American Economic Review 74 (03 1984), pp. 3042Google Scholar.

8. Kratochwil, Friedrich and Ruggie, John, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State,” International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 753–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9. Keohane, “International Institutions.”

10. See Onuf, Nicholas, World of Our Making (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989)Google Scholar.

11. On Science, see Keohane, “International Institutions”; and Keohane, Robert, “International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint,” Millennium 18 (Summer 1989), pp. 245–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On Dissent, see Walker, R. B. J., “History and Structure in the Theory of International Relations,” Millennium 18 (Summer 1989), pp. 163–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ashley, Richard and Walker, R. B. J., ”Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 34 (09 1990), pp. 367416CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an excellent critical assessment of these debates, see Lapid, Yosef, “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era,” International Studies Quarterly 33 (09 1989), pp. 235–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12. The fact that I draw on these approaches aligns me with modernist constructivists, even though I also draw freely on the substantive work of postmodernists, especially Richard Ashley and Rob Walker. For a defense of this practice and a discussion of its epistemological basis, see my earlier article, The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 335–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ian Shapiro and Alexander Wendt, “The Difference That Realism Makes: Social Science and the Politics of Consent,” forthcoming in Politics and Society. Among modernist constructivists, my argument is particularly indebted to the published work of Emanuel Adler, Friedrich Kratochwil, and John Ruggie, as well as to an unpublished paper by Inayatullah, Naeem and Levine, David entitled “Politics and Economics in Contemporary International Relations Theory,” Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y., 1990Google Scholar.

13. See Gecas, Viktor, “Rekindling the Sociological Imagination in Social Psychology,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 19 (03 1989), pp. 97115CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14. Waltz, Kenneth, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 232Google Scholar.

15. Ibid., pp. 169–70.

16. Ibid., p. 232. This point is made by Suganami, Hidemi in “Bringing Order to the Causes of War Debates,” Millennium 19 (Spring 1990), p. 34, fn. 11CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17. Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1979)Google Scholar.

18. The neorealist description is not unproblematic. For a powerful critique, see Lumsdaine, David, Ideals and Interests: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949–1989 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

19. Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, pp. 79101Google Scholar.

20. Walt, Stephen, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987)Google Scholar.

21. See, for example, Blumer, Herbert, “The Methodological Position of Symbolic Interactionism,” in his Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 2Google Scholar. Throughout this article, I assume that a theoretically productive analogy can be made between individuals and states. There are at least two justifications for this anthropomorphism. Rhetorically, the analogy is an accepted practice in mainstream international relations discourse, and since this article is an immanent rather than external critique, it should follow the practice. Substantively, states are collectivities of individuals that through their practices constitute each other as “persons” having interests, fears, and so on. A full theory of state identity-and interest-formation would nevertheless need to draw insights from the social psychology of groups and organizational theory, and for that reason my anthropomorphism is merely suggestive.

22. The phrase “distribution of knowledge” is Barnes's, Barry, as discussed in his work The Nature of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988)Google Scholar; see also Berger, Peter and Luckmann, Thomas, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor Books, 1966)Google Scholar. The concern of recent international relations scholarship on “epistemic communities” with the cause-and-effect understandings of the world held by scientists, experts, and policymakers is an important aspect of the role of knowledge in world politics; see Haas, Peter, “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control,” International Organization 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 377404CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ernst Haas, When Knowledge Is Power. My constructivist approach would merely add to this an equal emphasis on how such knowledge also constitutes the structures and subjects of social life.

23. For an excellent short statement of how collective meanings constitute identities, see Berger, Peter, “Identity as a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge,” European Journal of Sociology, vol. 7, no. 1, 1966, pp. 3240CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Morgan, David and Schwalbe, Michael, “Mind and Self in Society: Linking Social Structure and Social Cognition,” Social Psychology Quarterly 53 (06 1990), pp. 148–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In my discussion, I draw on the following interactionist texts: Mead, George Herbert, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934)Google Scholar; Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality; Stryker, Sheldon, Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Version (Menlo Park, Calif.: Benjamin/Cummings, 1980)Google Scholar; Perinbanayagam, R. S., Signifying Acts: Structure and Meaning in Everyday Life (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Hewitt, John, Self and Society: A Symbolic Interactionist Social Psychology (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1988)Google Scholar; and Turner, A Theory of Social Interaction. Despite some differences, much the same points are made by structurationists such as Bhaskar and Giddens. See Bhaskar, Roy, The Possibility of Naturalism (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979)Google Scholar; and Giddens, Anthony, Central Problems in Social Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24. Berger, , “Identity as a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge,” p. 111Google Scholar.

25. While not normally cast in such terms, foreign policy scholarship on national role conceptions could be adapted to such identity language. See Holsti, Kal, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 14 (09 1970), pp. 233309CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Walker, Stephen, ed., Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1987)Google Scholar. For an important effort to do so, see Walker, Stephen, “Symbolic Interactionism and International Politics: Role Theory's Contribution to International Organization,” in Shih, C. and Cottam, Martha, eds., Contending Dramas: A Cognitive Approach to Post-War International Organizational Processes (New York: Praeger, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

26. On the “portfolio” conception of interests, see Hindess, Barry, Political Choice and Social Structure (Aldershot, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1989), pp. 23Google Scholar. The “definition of the situation” is a central concept in interactionist theory.

27. Foote, Nelson, “Identification as the Basis for a Theory of Motivation,” American Sociological Review 16 (02 1951), p. 15CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Such strongly sociological conceptions of interest have been criticized, with some justice, for being “oversocialized”; see Wrong, Dennis, “The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology,” American Sociological Review 26 (04 1961), pp. 183–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For useful correctives, which focus on the activation of presocial but nondetermining human needs within social contexts, see Turner, , A Theory of Social Interaction, pp. 2369Google Scholar; and Gecas, Viktor, “The Self-Concept as a Basis for a Theory of Motivation,” in Howard, Judith and Callero, Peter, eds., The Self-Society Dynamic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 171–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28. In neo-Durkheimian parlance, institutions are “social representations.” See Moscovici, Serge, ”The Phenomenon of Social Representations,” in Farr, Rob and Moscovici, Serge, eds., Social Representations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 369Google Scholar. See also Barnes, The Nature of Power. Note that this is a considerably more socialized cognitivism than that found in much of the recent scholarship on the role of “ideas” in world politics, which tends to treat ideas as commodities that are held by individuals and intervene between the distribution of power and outcomes. For a form of cognitivism closer to my own, see Adler, Emanuel, “Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress,” in Adler, Emanuel and Crawford, Beverly, eds., Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 4388Google Scholar.

29. Berger, and Luckmann, , The Social Construction of Reality, p. 58Google Scholar.

30. See Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory; and Wendt, Alexander and Duvall, Raymond, “Institutions and International Order,” in Czempiel, Ernst-Otto and Rosenau, James, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 5174Google Scholar.

31. Proponents of choice theory might put this in terms of “interdependent utilities.” For a useful overview of relevant choice-theoretic discourse, most of which has focused on the specific case of altruism, see Hochman, Harold and Nitzan, Shmuel, “Concepts of Extended Preference,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 6 (06 1985), pp. 161–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The literature on choice theory usually does not link behavior to issues of identity. For an exception, see Sen, Amartya, “Goals, Commitment, and Identity,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1 (Fall 1985), pp. 341–55Google Scholar; and Higgs, Robert, “Identity and Cooperation: A Comment on Sen's Alternative Program,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3 (Spring 1987), pp. 140–42Google Scholar.

32. Security systems might also vary in the extent to which there is a functional differentiation or a hierarchical relationship between patron and client, with the patron playing a hegemonic role within its sphere of influence in defining the security interests of its clients. I do not examine this dimension here; for preliminary discussion, see Wendt, Alexander, “The States System and Global Militarization,” Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1989Google Scholar; and Wendt, Alexander and Barnett, Michael, “The International System and Third World Militarization,” unpublished manuscript, 1991Google Scholar.

33. This amounts to an “internationalization of the state.” For a discussion of this subject, see Duvall, Raymond and Wendt, Alexander, “The International Capital Regime and the Internationalization of the State,” unpublished manuscript, 1987Google Scholar. See also Walker, R. B. J., “Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice,” in Walker, R. B. J. and Mendlovitz, Saul, eds., Contending Sovereignties (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 159–85Google Scholar.

34. On the spectrum of cooperative security arrangements, see Kupchan, Charles and Kupchan, Clifford, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,” International Security 16 (Summer 1991), pp. 114–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Smoke, Richard, “A Theory of Mutual Security,” in Smoke, Richard and Kortunov, Andrei, eds., Mutual Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 59111CrossRefGoogle Scholar. These may be usefully set alongside Jencks', Christopher “Varieties of Altruism,” in Mansbridge, Jane, ed., Beyond Self-interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 5367Google Scholar.

35. On the role of collective identity in reducing collective action problems, see Fireman, Bruce and Gamson, William, “Utilitarian Logic in the Resource Mobilization Perspective,” in Zald, Mayer and McCarthy, John, eds., The Dynamics of Social Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1979), pp. 844Google Scholar; Dawes, Robyn et al. , “Cooperation for the Benefit of Us–Not Me, or My Conscience,” in Mansbridge, , Beyond Self-Interest, pp. 97110Google Scholar; and Calhoun, Craig, “The Problem of Identity in Collective Action,” in Huber, Joan, ed., Macro-Micro Linkages in Sociology (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1991), pp. 5175Google Scholar.

36. See Risse-Kappen, Thomas, “Are Democratic Alliances Special?” unpublished manuscript, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., 1991Google Scholar. This line of argument could be expanded usefully in feminist terms. For a useful overview of the relational nature of feminist conceptions of self, see England, Paula and Kilbourne, Barbara Stanek, “Feminist Critiques of the Separative Model of Self: Implications for Rational Choice Theory,” Rationality and Society 2 (04 1990), pp. 156–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On feminist conceptualizations of power, see Tickner, Ann, “Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation,” Millennium 17 (Winter 1988), pp. 429–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wartenberg, Thomas, “The Concept of Power in Feminist Theory,” Praxis International 8 (10 1988), pp. 301–16Google Scholar.

37. Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, p. 91Google Scholar.

38. See Waltz, Man, the State, and War; and Jervis, Robert, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (01 1978), pp. 167214CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39. My argument here parallels Rousseau's critique of Hobbes. For an excellent critique of realist appropriations of Rousseau, see Williams, Michael, “Rousseau, Realism, and Realpolitik,” Millennium 18 (Summer 1989), pp. 188204CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Williams argues that far from being a fundamental starting point in the state of nature, for Rousseau the stag hunt represented a stage in man's fall. On p. 190, Williams cites Rousseau's description of man prior to leaving the state of nature: “Man only knows himself; he does not see his own well-being to be identified with or contrary to that of anyone else; he neither hates anything nor loves anything; but limited to no more than physical instinct, he is no one, he is an animal.” For another critique of Hobbes on the state of nature that parallels my constructivist reading of anarchy, see Landesman, Charles, “Reflections on Hobbes: Anarchy and Human Nature,” in Caws, Peter, ed., The Causes of Quarrel (Boston: Beacon, 1989), pp. 139–48Google Scholar.

40. Empirically, this suggestion is problematic, since the process of decolonization and the subsequent support of many Third World states by international society point to ways in which even the raw material of “empirical statehood” is constituted by the society of states. See Jackson, Robert and Rosberg, Carl, “Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood,” World Politics 35 (10 1982), pp. 124CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

41. Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, pp. 7477Google Scholar.

42. See Morrow, James, “Social Choice and System Structure in World Politics,” World Politics 41 (10 1988), p. 89CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Waltz's behavioral treatment of socialization may be usefully contrasted with the more cognitive approach taken by Ikenberry and the Kupchans in the following articles: Ikenberry, G. John and Kupchan, Charles, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organization 44 (Summer 1989), pp. 283316CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Kupchan and Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe.” Their approach is close to my own, but they define socialization as an elite strategy to induce value change in others, rather than as a ubiquitous feature of interaction in terms of which all identities and interests get produced and reproduced.

43. Regarding individualism, see Ashley, Richard, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International Organization 38 (Spring 1984), pp. 225–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”; and Dessler, David, “What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?International Organization 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 441–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Regarding structuralism, see Walker, R. B. J., ”Realism, Change, and International Political Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 31 (03 1987), pp. 6586CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steven, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989)Google Scholar. The behavioralism evident in neorealist theory also explains how neorealists can reconcile their structuralism with the individualism of rational choice theory. On the behavioral-structural character of the latter, see Latsis, Spiro, “Situational Determinism in Economics,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (08 1972), pp. 207–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44. The importance of the distinction between constitutive and causal explanations is not sufficiently appreciated in constructivist discourse. See Wendt, , “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” pp. 362–65Google Scholar; Wendt, , “The States System and Global Militarization,” pp. 110–13Google Scholar; and Wendt, , “Bridging the Theory/Meta-Theory Gap in International Relations,” Review of International Studies 17 (10 1991), p. 390CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45. See Blumer, , “The Methodological Position of Symbolic Interactionism,” pp. 24Google Scholar.

46. See Grafstein, Robert, “Rational Choice: Theory and Institutions,” in Monroe, Kristen, ed., The Economic Approach to Politics (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 263–64Google Scholar. A good example of the promise and limits of transaction cost approaches to institutional analysis is offered by Keohane, Robert in his After Hegemony (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

47. This situation is not entirely metaphorical in world politics, since throughout history states have “discovered” each other, generating an instant anarchy as it were. A systematic empirical study of first contacts would be interesting.

48. Mead's analysis of gestures remains definitive. See Mead's Mind, Self, and Society. See also the discussion of the role of signaling in the “mechanics of interaction” in Turner's, A Theory of Social Interaction, pp. 7479 and 92–115Google Scholar.

49. On the role of attribution processes in the interactionist account of identity-formation, see Stryker, Sheldon and Gottlieb, Avi, “Attribution Theory and Symbolic Interactionism,” in Harvey, John et al. , eds., New Directions in Attribution Research, vol. 3 (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1981), pp. 425–58Google Scholar; and Crittenden, Kathleen, “Sociological Aspects of Attribution Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 9, 1983, pp. 425–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On attributional processes in international relations, see Rosenberg, Shawn and Wolfsfeld, Gary, “International Conflict and the Problem of AttributionJournal of Conflict Resolution 21 (03 1977), pp. 75103CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

50. On the “stagecraft” involved in “presentations of self,” see Goffman, Erving, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday, 1959)Google Scholar. On the role of appearance in definitions of the situation, see Stone, Gregory, “Appearance and the Self,” in Rose, Arnold, ed., Human Behavior and Social Processes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), pp. 86118Google Scholar.

51. This discussion of the role of possibilities and probabilities in threat perception owes much to Stewart Johnson's comments on an earlier draft of my article.

52. On the role of “reassurance” in threat situations, see Lebow, Richard Ned and Stein, Janice Gross, “Beyond Deterrence,” Journal of Social Issues, vol. 43, no. 4, 1987, pp. 572CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

53. On “reciprocal typifications,” see Berger, and Luckmann, , The Social Construction of Reality, pp. 5458Google Scholar.

54. Coulter, Jeff, “Remarks on the Conceptualization of Social Structure,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 12 (03 1982), pp. 4243CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

55. The following articles by Noel Kaplowitz have made an important contribution to such thinking in international relations: Psychopolitical Dimensions of International Relations: The Reciprocal Effects of Conflict Strategies,” International Studies Quarterly 28 (12 1984), pp. 373406CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies: Psychopolitical Dimensions of International Relations,” Political Psychology 11 (03 1990), pp. 3982CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

56. These arguments are common in theories of narcissism and altruism. See Kohut, Heinz, Self-Psychology and the Humanities (New York: Norton, 1985)Google Scholar; and Hoffmann, Martin, “Empathy, Its Limitations, and Its Role in a Comprehensive Moral Theory,” in Kurtines, William and Gewirtz, Jacob, eds., Morality, Moral Behavior, and Moral Development (New York: Wiley, 1984), pp. 283302Google Scholar.

57. See Alexander, C. Norman and Wiley, Mary Glenn, “Situated Activity and Identity Formation,” in Rosenberg, Morris and Turner, Ralph, eds., Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives (New York: Basic Books, 1981), pp. 269–89Google Scholar.

58. Stryker, Sheldon, “The Vitalization of Symbolic Interactionism,” Social Psychology Quarterly 50 (03 1987), p. 93CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

59. On the “maturity” of anarchies, see Buzan, Barry, People, States, and Fear (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983)Google Scholar.

60. A similar intuition may lie behind Ashley's effort to reappropriate classical realist discourse for critical international relations theory. See Ashley, Richard, “Political Realism and Human Interests,” International Studies Quarterly 38 (06 1981), pp. 204–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

61. Waltz has himself helped open up such a debate with his recognition that systemic factors condition but do not determine state actions. See Waltz, Kenneth, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in Keohane, Robert, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 322–45Google Scholar. The growing literature on the observation that “democracies do not fight each other” is relevant to this question, as are two other studies that break important ground toward a “reductionist” theory of state identity: Bloom's, WilliamPersonal Identity, National Identity and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Lumsdaine's Ideals and Interests.

62. See Berger, and Luckmann, , The Social Construction of Reality, p. 89Google Scholar. See also Maynard, Douglas and Wilson, Thomas, “On the Reification of Social Structure,” in McNall, Scott and Howe, Gary, eds., Current Perspectives in Social Theory, vol. 1 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1980), pp. 287322Google Scholar.

63. See Ashley, Richard, “Social Will and International Anarchy,” in Alker, Hayward and Ashley, Richard, eds., After Realism, work in progress, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, and Arizona State University, Tempe, 1992Google Scholar.

64. See Turner, Ralph, “Role-Taking: Process Versus Conformity,” in Rose, , Human Behavior and Social Processes, pp. 2040Google Scholar; and Howard, Judith, “From Changing Selves Toward Changing Society,” in Howard, and Callero, , The Self-Society Dynamic, pp. 209–37Google Scholar.

65. On the relationship between commitment and identity, see Foote, “Identification as the Basis for a Theory of Motivation”; Becker, Howard, “Notes on the Concept of Commitment,” American Journal of Sociology 66 (07 1960), pp. 3240CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Stryker, Symbolic Interactionism. On role salience, see Stryker, ibid.

66. On threats to identity and the types of resistance that they may create, see Breakwell, Glynis, Coping with Threatened Identities (London: Methuen, 1986)Google Scholar; and Northrup, Terrell, “The Dynamic of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict,” in Kreisberg, Louis et al. , eds., Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1989), pp. 5582Google Scholar. For a broad overview of resistance to change, see Kuran, Timur, “The Tenacious Past: Theories of Personal and Collective Conservatism,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 10 (09 1988), pp. 143–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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69. This is the intersubjective basis for the principle of functional nondifferentiation among states, which “drops out” of Waltz's definition of structure because the latter has no explicit intersubjective basis. In international relations scholarship, the social production of territorial space has been emphasized primarily by poststructuralists. See, for example, Ashley, Richard, “The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics,” Alternatives 12 (10 1987), pp. 403–34Google Scholar; and Dalby, Simon, Creating the Second Cold War (London: Pinter, 1990)Google Scholar. But the idea of space as both product and constituent of practice is also prominent in structurationist discourse. See Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory; and Gregory, Derek and Urry, John, eds., Social Relations and Spatial Structures (London: Macmillan, 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

70. See Ruggie, John, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” World Politics 35 (01 1983), pp. 261–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In Mind, Self, and Society, p. 161, Mead offers the following argument: “If we say ‘this is my property, I shall control it,’ that affirmation calls out a certain set of responses which must be the same in any community in which property exists. It involves an organized attitude with reference to property which is common to all members of the community. One must have a definite attitude of control of his own property and respect for the property of others. Those attitudes (as organized sets of responses) must be there on the part of all, so that when one says such a thing he calls out in himself the response of the others. That which makes society possible is such common responses.”

71. For a definition and discussion of “social closure,” see Murphy, Raymond, Social Closure (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988)Google Scholar.

72. See Ashley, Richard, “Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique,” Millennium 17 (Summer 1988), pp. 227–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Those with more modernist sensibilities will find an equally practice-centric view of institutions in Blumer's observation on p. 19 of ”The Methodological Position of Symbolic Interactionism”: “A gratuitous acceptance of the concepts of norms, values, social rules and the like should not blind the social scientist to the fact that any one of them is subtended by a process of social interaction–a process that is necessary not only for their change but equally well for their retention in a fixed form. It is the social process in group life that creates and upholds the rules, not the rules that create and uphold group life.”

73. See, for example, Ayoob, Mohammed, “The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?International Studies Quarterly 33 (03 1989), pp. 6780CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

74. See Coplin, William, “International Law and Assumptions About the State System,” World Politics 17 (07 1965), pp. 615–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

75. See Smith, Anthony, “States and Homelands: The Social and Geopolitical Implications of National Territory,” Millennium 10 (Autumn 1981), pp. 187202CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

76. This assumes that there are no other, competing, principles that organize political space and identity in the international system and coexist with traditional notions of sovereignty; in fact, of course, there are. On “spheres of influence” and “informal empires,” see Triska, Jan, ed., Dominant Powers and Subordinate States (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; and Robinson, Ronald, “The Excentric Idea of Imperialism, With or Without Empire,” in Mommsen, Wolfgang and Osterhammel, Jurgen, eds., Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 267–89Google Scholar. On Arab conceptions of sovereignty, see Barnett, Michael, ”Sovereignty, Institutions, and Identity: From Pan-Arabism to the Arab State System,” unpublished manuscript, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1991Google Scholar.

77. Strang, David, “Anomaly and Commonplace in European Expansion: Realist and Institutional Accounts,” International Organization 45 (Spring 1991), pp. 143–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

78. On “dynamic density,” see Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity”; and Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics.” The role of interdependence in conditioning the speed and depth of social learning is much greater than the attention to which I have paid it. On the consequences of interdependence under anarchy, see Milner, Helen, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique,” Review of International Studies 17 (01 1991), pp. 6785CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

79. See Taylor, Michael, Anarchy and Cooperation (New York: Wiley, 1976)Google Scholar; and Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984)Google Scholar.

80. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society.

81. Strictly speaking, this is not true, since in iterated games the addition of future benefits to current ones changes the payoff structure of the game at Tl, in this case from prisoners' dilemma to an assurance game. This transformation of interest takes place entirely within the actor, however, and as such is not a function of interaction with the other.

82. In fairness to Axelrod, he does point out that internalization of norms is a real possibility that may increase the resilience of institutions. My point is that this important idea cannot be derived from an approach to theory that takes identities and interests as exogenously given.

83. On “European identity,” see Buzan, Barry et al. , eds., The European Security Order Recast (London: Pinter, 1990), pp. 4563Google Scholar.

84. On “embeddedness,” see Ruggie, John, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in a Postwar Economic Order,” in Krasner, , International Regimes, pp. 195232Google Scholar.

85. See Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation.”

86. On the difficulties of creating cooperative security regimes given competitive interests, see Jervis, Robert, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, , International Regimes, pp. 173–94Google Scholar; and Lipson, Charles, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” World Politics 37 (10 1984), pp. 123CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

87. See Mead, Mind, Self, and Society. For useful discussions of this distinction and its implications for notions of creativity in social systems, see Cronk, George, The Philosophical Anthropology of George Herbert Mead (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), pp. 3640Google Scholar; and Howard, ”From Changing Selves Toward Changing Society.”

88. Turner, “Role-Taking.”

89. On “character planning,” see Elster, Jon, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 117CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For other approaches to the problem of self-initiated change, see Frankfurt, Harry, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy 68 (01 1971), pp. 520CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sen, Amartya, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (Summer 1977), pp. 317–44Google Scholar; and Schelling, Thomas, “The Intimate Contest for Self-Command,” The Public Interest 60 (Summer 1980), pp. 94118Google Scholar.

90. For useful overviews of New Thinking, see Gorbachev, Mikhail, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper & Row, 1987)Google Scholar; Kubalkova, Vendulka and Cruickshank, Albert, Thinking New About Soviet “New Thinking” (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1989)Google Scholar; and Lynch, Allen, Gorbachev's International Outlook Intellectual Origins and Political Consequences (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989)Google Scholar. It is not clear to what extent New Thinking is a conscious policy as opposed to an ad hoc policy. The intense theoretical and policy debate within the Soviet Union over New Thinking and the frequently stated idea of taking away the Western “excuse” for fearing the Soviet Union both suggest the former, but I will remain agnostic here and simply assume that it can be fruitfully interpreted “as if” it had the form that I describe.

91. For useful overviews of these factors, see Snyder, Jack, “The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?World Politics 12 (Winter 19871988), pp. 93121Google Scholar; and Meyer, Stephen, “The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security,” International Security 13 (Fall 1988), pp. 124–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

92. See Bar-Tal, Daniel et al. , “Conflict Termination: An Epistemological Analysis of International Cases,” Political Psychology 10 (06 1989), pp. 233–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an unrelated but interesting illustration of how changing cognitions in turn make possible organizational change, see Bartunek, Jean, “Changing Interpretive Schemes and Organizational Restructuring: The Example of a Religious Order,” Administrative Science Quarterly 29 (09 1984), pp. 355–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

93. See Cox, Robert, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” in Keohane, , Neorealism and Its Critics, pp. 204–55Google Scholar. See also Fay, Brian, Critical Social Science (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987)Google Scholar.

94. Markus, Hazel and Nurius, Paula, “Possible Selves,” American Psychologist 41 (09 1986), pp. 954–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

95. See Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life; Weinstein, Eugene and Deutschberger, Paul, “Some Dimensions of Altercasting,” Sociometry 26 (12 1963), pp. 454–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Earle, Walter, “International Relations and the Psychology of Control: Alternative Control Strategies and Their Consequences,” Political Psychology 7 (06 1986), pp. 369–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

96. See Boge, Volker and Wilke, Peter, “Peace Movements and Unilateral Disarmament: Old Concepts in a New Light,” Arms Control 7 (09 1986), pp. 156–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Maoz, Zeev and Felsenthal, Daniel, “Self-Binding Commitments, the Inducement of Trust, Social Choice, and the Theory of International Cooperation,” International Studies Quarterly 31 (06 1987), pp. 177200CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Sakamoto, V., “Unilateral Initiative as an Alternative Strategy,” World Futures, vol. 24, nos. 1–4, 1987, pp. 107–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

97. On rewards, see Milburn, Thomas and Christie, Daniel, “Rewarding in International Politics,” Political Psychology 10 (12 1989), pp. 625–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

98. The importance of reciprocity in completing the process of structural transformation makes the logic in this stage similar to that in the “evolution of cooperation.” The difference is one of prerequisites and objective: in the former, ego's tentative redefinition of self enables it to try and change alter by acting “as if” both were already playing a new game; in the latter, ego acts only on the basis of given interests and prior experience, with transformation emerging only as an unintended consequence.

99. Ferguson, Yale and Mansbach, Richard, “Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive Suggestions for Future International Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 35 (12 1991), p. 375CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

100. For excellent discussions of this tension, see Walker, “Sovereignty, Identity, Community”; and Walker, R. B. J., “Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics,” Alternatives 15 (Winter 1990), pp. 327CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On institutional path dependencies, see Krasner, Stephen, “Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies 21 (04 1988), pp. 6694CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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