Hostname: page-component-89b8bd64d-7zcd7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-05-12T11:56:14.895Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Groups

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2012

David B. Carter
David B. Carter
Affiliation:
Princeton University, Princeton. E-mail: dbcarter@princeton.edu
Get access

Abstract

Little existing work has systematically examined the factors that help terrorist groups survive or contribute to their failure. State support for terrorist groups is commonly thought to be a factor that helps groups to survive. I demonstrate with newly collected data that state sponsorship is not always helpful to terrorist groups. The resources provided by sponsors increase a group's ability to maintain itself internally. However, when a group has a sponsor that provides it with safe haven, the risk of the group being forcefully eliminated by the target increases. I argue that sponsors that provide safe haven can have incentives to provide information to the target about the groups to avoid potential costs from target military operations within their territory. The key empirical findings suggest that state sponsorship is a less serious problem for target states than many previously thought.

Information

Type
Research Note
Information
International Organization , Volume 66 , Issue 1 , January 2012 , pp. 129 - 151
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

REFERENCES

Asal, Victor, and Rethemeyer, R. Karl. 2008. The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks. Journal of Politics 70 (2):437–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Asprey, Robert B. 1975. War in the Shadows: The Guerilla in History. Vol. 1. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.Google Scholar
Balch-Lindsay, Dylan, and Enterline, Andrew J.. 2000. Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820–1992. International Studies Quarterly 44 (4):615–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bapat, Navin A. 2007. The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns. Conflict Management and Peace Science 24 (4):265–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blomberg, S. Brock, Engel, Rozyln C., and Sawyer, Reid. 2010. On the Duration and Sustainability of Transnational Terrorist Organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (2):303–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., and Jones, Bradford S.. 2004. Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2005. The Quality of Terror. American Journal of Political Science 49 (3):515–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, and Dickson, Eric S.. 2007. The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization. American Journal of Political Science 51 (2):364–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buhaug, Halvard, and Gates, Scott. 2002. The Geography of Civil War. Journal of Peace Research 39 (4):417–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Byman, Daniel. 2005. Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carter, David B. 2011. The Compellence Dilemma: International Disputes with Violent Groups. Unpublished manuscript, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carter, David B., and Signorino, Curtis S.. 2010. Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data. Political Analysis 18 (3):271–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clauset, Aaron, Young, Maxwell, and Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2007. On the Frequency of Severe Terrorist Events. Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (1):58–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2006. How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups. International Security 31 (1):7–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cunningham, David E., Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, and Salehyan, Idean. 2009. It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome. Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (4):570–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
DeRouen, Karl R. Jr., and Sobek, David. 2004. The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome. Journal of Peace Research 41 (3):303–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Enders, Walter, and Sandler, Todd. 1993. The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis. American Political Science Review 87 (4):829–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Enders, Walter, and Sandler, Todd. 1999. Transnational Terrorism in the Post–Cold War Era. International Studies Quarterly 43 (1):145–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Enders, Walter, and Sandler, Todd. 2000. Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening? A Time-Series Investigation. Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (3):307–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evans, Ernest. 1990. Cuban Foreign Policy Toward Latin America. In Cuba: The International Dimension, edited by Fauriol, Georges A. and Loser, Eva, 95–117. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D., and Laitin, David D.. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review 97 (1):75–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, Salehyan, Idean, and Schultz, Kenneth. 2008. Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution 52 (4):479–506.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Wallensteen, Peter, Eriksson, Mikael, Sollenberg, Margareta, and Strand, Håvard. 2002. Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset. Journal of Peace Research 39 (5):615–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. Inside Terrorism. Rev. ed.New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Jamal, Arif. 2009. Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir. Brooklyn, N.Y.: Melville House.Google Scholar
Jones, Seth G., and Libicki, Martin C.. 2008. How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND.Google Scholar
Kalyvas, Stathis N., and Kocher, Matthew A.. 2007. How “Free” Is Free Riding in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem. World Politics 59 (2):177–216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kydd, Andrew H., and Walter, Barbara F.. 2006. The Strategies of Terrorism. International Security 31 (1):49–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lake, David A. 2002. Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. Dialog-IO 1 (1):15–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levitt, Matthew. 2006. Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Li, Quan. 2005. Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents? Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2):278–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maoz, Zeev. 2005. Dyadic MID Dataset. Version 2. Available at ⟨http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/zmaoz/dyadmid.html⟩. Accessed 13 July 2011.Google Scholar
Marcus, Aliza. 2007. Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence. New York: New York University Press.Google Scholar
Mickolus, Edward F. 1989. What Constitutes State Support to Terrorists? Terrorism and Political Violence 1 (3):287–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mishal, Shaul, and Sela, Avraham. 2006. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Olson, Mancur. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Rev. ed.Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Pape, Robert A. 2003. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. American Political Science Review 97 (3):343–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pape, Robert A. 2005. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Piazza, James. 2008. Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism? International Studies Quarterly 52 (3):469–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pillar, Paul R. 2001. Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.Google Scholar
Richardson, Louise. 2006. What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Sandler, Todd. 2004. Too Much of a Good Thing? The Proactive Response Dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (5):657–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salehyan, Idean. 2007. Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups. World Politics 59 (2):217–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salehyan, Idean. 2008. No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict. Journal of Politics 70 (1):54–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schofield, Victoria. 1996. Kashmir in the Crossfire. London: I.B. Taurus.Google Scholar
Schultz, Kenneth A. 2010. The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars. International Organization 64 (2):281–312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shughart, William F. 2006. An Analytical History of Terrorism, 1945–2000. Public Choice 128 (1-2):7–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sricharatchanya, Paisal. 1981. PULO and the Middle East Connection. Far Eastern Economic Review 114 (42):26–29.Google Scholar
Strand, Håvard. 2006. Onset of Armed Conflict: A New List for the Period 1946–2004, with Applications. Unpublished Manuscript, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo, Norway. Available at ⟨http://www.prio.no/upload/983/Onset.pdf⟩. Accessed 13 July 2011.Google Scholar
United States Department of Homeland Security. 2008. Global Terrorism Database. Available at ⟨http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd⟩. Accessed 13 July 2011.Google Scholar
Yousaf, Mohammad, and Adkin, Mark. 2007. The Battle for Afghanistan: The Soviets versus the Mujahideen During the 1980s. Barnsley, U.K.: Pen and Sword.Google Scholar
Zaeef, Abdul Salam. 2010. My Life with the Taliban. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: File

Carter supplementary material

Appendix and Data.zip

Download Carter supplementary material(File)
File 201.3 KB