Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-p2v8j Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-30T10:14:58.689Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Constraining Coercion? Legitimacy and Its Role in U.S. Trade Policy, 1975–2000

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2010

Krzysztof J. Pelc
Krzysztof J. Pelc
Affiliation:
Princeton University, and the Department of Political Science atMcGill University, in Montreal, Canada. E-mail: kpelc@princeton.edu
Get access

Abstract

The role of legitimacy in international relations is a topic of much debate, yet there is little understanding of the mechanism behind it. Here I address this discrepancy by asking: are state threats perceived as (il)legitimate more or less likely to be successful? By operationalizing illegitimacy as unilateral action in the presence of a multilateral option, I consider the variation in the success of U.S. trade measures from 1975 to 2000. As I show, the (il)legitimacy of threats modifies the nature of the signal sent by concessions to those threats, and this effect can be measured and predicted. I find that, controlling for material pressure, perceived illegitimacy of U.S. trade threats decreases the likelihood of a target conceding by over 34 percent. Moreover, it pays to resist: targets that resist illegitimate unilateral measures from the United States are 25 percent less likely to encounter similar unilateral measures over the following five years.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 64 , Issue 1 , January 2010 , pp. 65 - 96
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Bagwell, Kyle, and Staiger, Robert, 2003. Economic Theory and the Interpretation of GATT/WTO. Working Paper. Available at ⟨http://www.stanford.edu/~rstaiger/econ.theory.gatt.wto.pdf⟩. Accessed 7 October 2009.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bayard, Thomas O., and Elliott, Kimberly Ann. 1994. Reciprocity and Retaliation in U.S. Trade Policy. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.Google Scholar
Bello, Judith Hippler, and Holmer, Alan F.. 1990. The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301. In Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trading Policy and the World Trading System, edited by Bhagwati, Jagdish N. and Patrick, Hugh T., 49–90. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Bhagwati, Jagdish N. 1990. Aggressive Unilateralism: an Overview. In Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trading Policy and the World Trading System, edited by Bhagwati, Jagdish N. and Patrick, Hugh T., 1–45. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bhala, Raj. 2001. The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy). George Washington International Law Review 33:873–978.Google Scholar
Bodansky, Daniel. 2000. What's So Bad About Unilateral Action to Protect the Environment? European Journal of International Law 11 (2):339–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Busch, Marc L. 2000. Accommodating Unilateralism? U.S. Section 301 and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement. Unpublished manuscript, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada.Google Scholar
Busch, Marc L. 2007. Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade. International Organization 61 (4):735–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Busch, Marc L., and Reinhardt, Eric. 2001. Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes. Fordham International Law Journal 24:158–72.Google Scholar
Busch, Marc L., and Reinhardt, Eric. 2006. Three's a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement. World Politics 58 (3):446–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Castel, Jean-Gabriel. 1989. The Uruguay Round and the Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38 (4):834–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1998. The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. World Politics 50 (2):324–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clark, Ian. 2005. Legitimacy in International Society. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Clarke, Michael. 1990. The Control of Insurance Fraud: A Comparative View. British Journal of Criminology 30 (1):1–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Claude, Inis L. Jr. 1966. Collective Legitimatization as a Political Function of the United Nations. International Organization 20 (3):367–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coleman, Katharina P. 2007. International Organizations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davis, Christina L. 2003. Food Fights over Free Trade: How International Institutions Promote Agricultural Trade Liberalization. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Davis, Douglas D., and Holt, Charles A.. 1993. Experimental Economics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Drezner, Daniel W. 2003. The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion. International Organization 57 (3):643–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Drezner, Daniel W. 2007. Regime Proliferation and World Politics: Is There Viscosity in Global Governance? Paper presented at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, Ohio State University, Columbus. Available at ⟨https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/1811/29972/11/Viscosity_of_Global_Governance.pdf⟩. Accessed 7 October 2009.Google Scholar
Franck, Thomas M. 1990. The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hudec, Robert E. 1990. Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil. In Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trading Policy and the World Trading System, edited by Bhagwati, Jagdish N. and Patrick, Hugh T., 113–59. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Hudec, Robert E. 1993. Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System. Salem, N.H.: Butterworth.Google Scholar
Hudec, Robert E. 2000. Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement. In Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues and Lessons from the Practice of Other International Courts and Tribunals, edited by Weiss, Friedl, 345–76. London: Cameron May.Google Scholar
Hurd, Ian. 2005. The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1999–2003. International Organization 59 (3):495–526.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huth, Paul, and Allee, Todd. 2004. Research Design in Testing Theories of International Conflict. In Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations, edited by Sprinz, Detlef F. and Wolinsky-Nahmais, Yael, 193–226. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Jackson, John H. 2004. International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”? The American Journal of International Law 98 (1):109–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jönsson, Christer, and Tallberg, Jonas. 1998. Compliance and Post-Agreement Bargaining. European Journal of International Relations 4 (4):371–408.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahneman, Daniel, Knetsch, Jack L., and Thaler, Richard H.. 1986. Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics. Journal of Business 59 (2):S285–300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
King, Gary, and Zeng, Langche. 2001. Logistic Regression and Rare in Events Data. Political Analysis 9 (2):137–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kreps, Sarah E. 2008. Multilateral Military Interventions: Theory and Practice. Political Science Quarterly 123 (4):573–603.Google Scholar
Lapan, E. Harvey, and Sandler, Todd. 1988. To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That Is the Question. American Economic Review 78 (2):16–21.Google Scholar
Legro, Jeffrey W. 1997. Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the “Failure” of Internationalism. International Organization 51 (1):31–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, Lisa L. 1993. Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions. World Politics 45 (3):406–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mercer, Jonathan. 1996. Reputation and International Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Milner, Helen. 1990, The Political Economy of U.S. Trade Policy: A Study of the Super 301 Provision. In Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trading Policy and the World Trading System, edited by Bhagwati, Jagdish N. and Patrick, Hugh T., 163–80. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Odell, John S. 2000. Negotiating the World Economy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Press, Daryl G. 2005. Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threat. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Putnam, Robert D. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization 42 (3):427–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reinhardt, Eric. 1999. Tying Hands Without a Rope: Rational Domestic Response to International Institutional Constraints. Paper delivered at the Conference on the Interaction of International and Domestic Institutions, June, Boulder, Colo.Google Scholar
Reinhardt, Eric. 2000. Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of GATT/WTO Dispute Initiation, 1948–1998. Paper delivered at the 41st Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, February, Washington, D.C.Google Scholar
Schoppa, Leonard J. 1999. The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining. International Organization 53 (2):307–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, James McCall. 2003. Compliance Bargaining in the WTO: Ecuador and the Bananas Dispute. Paper delivered at the Conference on Developing Countries and the Trade Negotiation Process, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, November, Geneva.Google Scholar
Sykes, Alan O. 1992. Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301. Law and Policy in International Business 23 (2–3):263–330.Google Scholar
Thompson, Alexander. 2006. Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission. International Organization 60 (1):1–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thompson, Alexander. 2008. The Two-level Politics of International Delegation: The United States and WTO Dispute Settlement. Presented at the 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, Calif.Google Scholar
Thucydides. 1883. The History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Jowett, Benjamin. Edited by Peabody, A. P.. Boston: D. Lothrop.Google Scholar
Tomz, Michael, Wittenberg, Jason, and King, Gary. 2003. Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 2.1. Available at ⟨http://gking.harvard.edu⟩. Accessed 7 October 2009.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Voeten, Eric. 2001. Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action. The American Political Science Review 95 (4):845–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Voeten, Eric. 2005. The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force. International Organization 59 (3):527–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Walt, Stephen M. 2005. Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. 3 vols. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Trans. by Ephraim Fischoff. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar