1. The Treaty of Maastricht created the European Union. The EC continues to exist as one of the pillars of the EU. The term “EU” will here be used when speaking of recent policy initiatives and when describing general theory, even when those theories intended to explain the development of the EC.

2. Supranationalism and intergovernmentalism have served as the pivot on which the academic debate on European integration hinges. Several recent publications contrast supranationalist or neofunctionalist approaches with intergovernmentalism or neorealism. See for instance Keohane, Robert and Hoffmann, Stanley, “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s,” in Keohane, Robert O. and Hoffmann, Stanley, eds., The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp 1–39Google Scholar; Sandholtz, Wayne and Zysman, John, “1992: Recasting the European Bargain,” World Politics 42 (10 1989), pp. 95–128CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act,” in Keohane and Hoffmann, The New European Community; and Cameron, David R., “The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences,” in Sbragia, Alberta M., ed., Euro-Politics, Institutions, and Policymaking in the “New” European Community (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 23–74Google Scholar.

3. Compare also Milward, Alan S., The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992)Google Scholar; and Taylor, Paul, “The European Community and the State: Assumptions, Theories, and Propositions,” Review of International Studies 17 (04 1991), pp. 109–125CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In the 1970s, scholars spoke of the possibility of a “symbiotic” relationship between the EC and its member states. See Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A., Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (London: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 309Google Scholar. See also Tsoukalis, Loukas, “Looking into the Crystal Ball,” Journal of Common Market Studies 21 (09/12 1982), pp. 229–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4. For an extensive discussion on the definition of integration, see Pentland, C., International Theory and European Integration (London: Faber, 1973)Google Scholar. Compare also Huelshoffs definition in Huelshoff, Michael G., “Domestic Politics and Dynamic Issue Linkage: A Reformulation of Integration Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 38 (06 1994), pp. 255–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5. Haas, Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950–1957 (London: Stevens, 1958)Google Scholar. For an overview of neofunctionalism, see Pentland, International Theory and European Integration.

6. Milward, Alan S. and Sorensen, Vibeke, “Interdependence or integration? A national choice,” in Milward, Alan S. et al. , eds., The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945–1992 (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 4Google Scholar. To the extent that research has given attention to governments, their changing attitudes have been seen as an indication that integration is proceeding. See Lindberg, and Scheingold, , Europe's Would-Be Polity, p. 8Google Scholar.

7. Summarizing this political process, the concept of “political spillover” has been introduced into the neofunctionalist vocabulary. See George, Stephen, Politics and Policy in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 23Google Scholar.

8. Lindberg, and Scheingold, , Europe's Would-Be Polity, p. 282Google Scholar; emphasis original.

9. Haas, , The Uniting of Europe, p. 16Google Scholar.

10. See Pentland, , International Theory and European Integration, pp. 101–6Google Scholar, for a description of the changing neofunctionalist expectations.

11. Ernst B. Haas, one of the founders of neofunctionalism, criticized the theory along several lines: its neglect of the resistance of national bureaucracies, its false assumption that the EC as a form of political governance is on a scale large enough to cover the process of internationalization, and its optimistic expectations about the willingness to transfer resources. See Haas, Ernst B., The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1975)Google Scholar. The new argument in the 1980s added a geographical interpretation of the spillover effect and theorized that successive rounds of enlargement have stimulated further integration. This line of reasoning does not seem convincing when it is noted that only in the cases of Portugal and Spain did entry coincide with a new round of integration. For another recent reappraisal of neofunctionalism, see Burley, Anne-Marie and Mattli, Walter, “Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration,” International Organization, 47 (Winter 1993), pp. 41–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12. Keohane, and Hoffmann, , “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s,” p. 19Google Scholar. See also Cornett, Linda and Caporaso, James A., “‘And Still It Moves!’ State Interests and Social Forces in the European Community,” in Rosenau, James N. and Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, eds., Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 219–49 and p. 232 in particularCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13. This fact was also recognized in the 1970s. See, for instance, Hansen, Roger D., “European Integration: Forward March, Parade Rest, or Dismissed?” International Organization, 27 (Spring 1973), pp. 225–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14. Scharpf, Fritz W., “The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration,” Public Administration 66 (Autumn 1988), pp. 239–78 and p. 266 in particularCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15. There seems little ground for the assumption that interest groups would have a pro-European attitude. See Philip, Alan Butt, “Pressure Group Power in the European Community,” Intereconomics 22 (11/12 1987), pp. 282–89 and p. 287 in particularCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16. On politics and policy, see, for instance, George, Stephen, Politics and Policy in the European Community, pp. 228–29Google Scholar. On the social dimension, see Rhodes, Martin, “The Social Dimension of the Single European Market: National Versus Transnational Regulation,” European Journal of Political Research 19 (03/04 1991), pp. 245–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Rhodes, Martin, “The Future of the “Social Dimension—: Labour Market Regulation in Post-1992 Europe,” Journal of Common Market Studies 30 (03 1992), pp. 23–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17. For a similar criticism, see Hoffmann, Stanley, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” International Spectator 21 (1967), pp. 253–316Google Scholar; Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory; and Webb, Carole, “Theoretical Perspectives and Problems,” in Wallace, Helen et al. , eds., Policy Making in the European Community, 2d ed. (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1983), pp. 1–41Google Scholar.

18. Critics have pointed out that, ironically, neofunctionalism has failed to recognize that the emergence of the EC coincided with the rapid evolution of the welfare state. See Milward and Sorensen, “Interdependence or integration?”

19. A broad interpretation of neofunctionalism also includes supranationalism as discussed here. Here supranationalism is considered an analytically separate branch of integration because of its focus on state actors. Supranationalism, which combines an emphasis on state interests with a systemic-level analysis of institutions, is consistent with neoliberal institutionalism. For application of neoliberal institutionalism to the analysis of the EC, see Cornett, and Caporaso, , “‘And Still It Moves!’” pp. 232–36Google Scholar.

20. Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity. See also Weber, Shlomo and Wiesmeth, Hans, “Issue Linkage in the European Community,” Journal of Common Market Studies 29 (03 1991), pp. 255–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The latter authors classify issue linkage and package deals as intergovernmental, because decision making rests with the states.

21. See Keohane, and Hoffmann, , “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s,” pp. 13–15Google Scholar; Cornett, and Caporaso, , “‘And Still It Moves!’” pp. 232–36Google Scholar; and Peters, B. Guy, “Politics and the Institutions of the EC,” in Sbragia, , Euro-Politics, Institutions, and Policymaking in the “New” European Community, pp. 75–122 and pp. 113–15 in particularGoogle Scholar.

22. See, for example, Lodge, Juliet, “Institutional Considerations,” in Lodge, Juliet, ed., The European Community and the Challenge of the Future (London: Pinter, 1989), pp. 26–57Google Scholar.

23. Schneider, Gerald and Cederman, Lars-Erik, “The Change of Tide in Political Cooperation: A Limited Information Model of European Integration,” in International Organization 48 (Autumn 1994), pp. 633–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Schneider and Cederman designate the asymmetric dispersion of information among participants in negotiations as the main explanatory concept. Another clue is given by Ludlow. He suggests that leadership of the European Commission is an important factor in explaining the success or failure of negotiations. See Ludlow, Peter, “The European Commission,”Google Scholarin Keohane, and Hoffmann, , The New European Community, p. 121Google Scholar. This argument, however, is not convincing: leadership has not changed significantly over last eight years, and yet a period of stagnation has followed the progress made during the second half of the 1980s.

24. The quotation is drawn from pp. 65–66 of Wallace, William, “Europe as a Confederation: The Community and the Nation-State,” Journal of Common Market Studies 21 (09/12 1982), pp. 57–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Hoffmann, Stanley, “Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today,” Journal of Common Market Studies 21 (09/12 1982), pp. 21–37 and pp. 33–35 in particularCrossRefGoogle Scholar. During the 1960s, scholars advocated analyzing the conduct of states and the domestic resistance to integration. See, for example, Hoffmann, , “Obstinate or Obsolete?” pp. 267–68Google Scholar.

25. As Stanley Hoffmann writes, “the state acts … as a shaper capable of moulding its own domestic support, of choosing among national interests and external constraints.” See Hoffmann, , “Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today,” p. 27Google Scholar, emphasis original.

26. Cornett, and Caporaso, , “‘And Still It Moves!’” pp. 229–31Google Scholar.

27. See Keohane, and Hoffmann, , “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s,” pp. 23–25Google Scholar; and Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act.”

28. Negotiation analysis has shown that the outcome matches the preferences of the dominant (most powerful) states. Moravscik sees the Single European Act (SEA) as the result of the convergence of the preferences of Britain, France, and Germany, while Garrett finds that the regulations agreed upon in the context of the internal-market program meet first and foremost the demands of Germany and, to a lesser extent, those of France. See Garrett, Geoffrey, “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community's Internal Market,” International Organization 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 533–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act.”

29. Moravscik, , “Negotiating the Single European Act,” pp. 72–74Google Scholar.

30. For the former argument, see Gourevitch, Peter, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986)Google Scholar.

31. See Hoffmann, , “Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today,” pp. 33–35Google Scholar; and Keohane, and Hoffmann, , “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s,” pp. 22–23Google Scholar.

32. See Cameron, David R., “The Expansion of Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 72 (12 1978), pp. 1243–61)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Katzenstein, Peter J., Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

33. Moravcsik concludes his analysis by a plea for domestic analysis. See “Negotiating the Single European Act,” p. 74. The domestic politics approach, as applied to the EC, was formalized by Bulmer and further developed by Bulmer and Paterson. See Bulmer, Simon, “Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-making,” Journal of Common Market Studies 21 (06 1983), pp. 349–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Bulmer, Simon and Paterson, William, The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community (London: Allen and Unwin, 1977)Google Scholar.

34. The domestic politics approach is consistent with approaches in international relations scholarship that focus on domestic structures to explain foreign policy or international relations. See Waltz, Kenneth N., Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967)Google Scholar; and Katzenstein, Peter J., “International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States,” International Organization 30 (Winter 1976), pp. 1–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Compare also Putnam, Robert D., “Diplomatic and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 43 (Summer 1988), pp. 427–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

35. Bulmer, , “Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-making,” p. 351Google Scholar.

36. Recent research has demonstrated that the EC was founded at a time when governments were coming to realize how limited their capacity to manage national societies actually was. See Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State.

37. The exception is Moravscik, who, recognizing the limits of intergovernmentalism, transforms his approach into “intergovernmental institutionalism” and reviews developments on the level of the EC. However, he finds no convincing argument at the EC level. See Moravscik, “Negotiating the Single European Act.”

38. Moravcsik conceives the EC as an intergovernmental regime but extends the analysis to domestic societal pressures. See Moravcsik, Andrew, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach,” in Bulmer, Simon and Scott, Andrew, eds., Economic and Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global Context (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994)Google Scholar. Huelshoff has provided an interesting synthesis that links domestic policymaking models and government strength to bargaining positions in the Council of Ministers. See Michael G. Huelshoff, “Domestic Politics and Dynamic Issue Linkage.”

39. Cameron draws this conclusion in his analysis of the 1992 initiative. See Cameron, , “The 1992 Initiative,” pp. 64–65Google Scholar. Compare Sandholtz, Wayne, “Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht,” International Organization 47 (Winter 1993), pp. 1–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Although he favored intergovernmentalism, Moravscik, in “Negotiating the Single European Act,” stresses the impact of supranational factors.

40. Compare Wendt, Alexander, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 335–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

41. The distinction is not always clear. For instance, the principle of equal treatment (of nationals and nonnationals or of men and women) may be labeled as positive since they contain an obligation; equally, it may be conceived of as negative, since it prohibits discrimination.

42. This observation has been made by Tsoukalis, Loukas and Strauss, Robert, “Crisis and Adjustment in European Steel: Beyond Laisser-Faire,” Journal of Common Market Studies 22 (03 1985), pp. 207–28 and p. 213 in particularCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

43. On policy competition, see Cooper, Richard N., The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968)Google Scholar; and Geelhoed, L. A., “De semi-soevereine staat” (The semisovereign state), Socialisme en Democratie 47 (02 1990), pp. 40–47Google Scholar.

44. Compare Sandholtz and Zysman's emphasis on the failure of national policies in their “1992.” Frieden mentions avoiding competitive currency devaluations as a motive for coordination. See Frieden, Jeffry A., “Invested Interest: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance,” International Organization 45 (Autumn 1991), pp. 425–451 and p. 449 in particularCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45. For reasons of convenience and in accordance with common usage, the institutions of the EU are sometimes referred to simply as “the EU.”

46. For a discussion of the competency and independency of the European Commission, see Felder, Michael, “Die Krises des EG-Systems und Perspektiven seiner Weiterentwicklung in den neunziger Jahren” (Perspectives on the development of the EC in the 1990s), in Deppe, Frank and Felder, Michael, Zur Post-Maastricht-Krise der Europaischen Gemeinschaft (EG), Arbeitspapier der Forschungsgruppe Europäische Gemeinschaften (FEG), no. 10 (Marburg, Germany: 1993), pp. 63–82Google Scholar.

47. The interaction among actors is considered to be structured or patterned. Structure, thus, does not refer to encompassing “systems” or “wholes.” For other interpretations of structure, see Wendt, , “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” p. 356Google Scholar; and Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve, “Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations,” Review of International Studies 17 (10 1991), pp. 393–410 and p. 397 in particularCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48. Several authors have argued that integration has different effects for different groups. For an analysis of the distributional effects, see Scheingold, Stuart A., “Domestic and International Consequences of Regional Integration,” in Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A., eds., Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 374–98Google Scholar. For an analysis from a Marxist perspective, see Gorz, André, Strategy for Labour: A Radical Proposal (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967)Google Scholar. On the distributional effect of financial integration, see Frieden, “Invested Interest.”

49. Compare Pierson, Paul, “When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change,” World Politics 45 (07 1993), pp. 595–628CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Pierson argues that policy changes may create niches for interest groups who want to take advantage of new policies. To some extent, policies or policy changes shape interest groups.

50. Compare Katzenstein's analysis of democratic corporatism in small and open states. See Katzenstein, Peter J., Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987)Google Scholar.

51. The idea that integration may constitute a “conspiracy” of governments against their citizens has been put forward both from a Marxist point of view and from a public choice perspective. See Vaubel, R., Internationale samenwerking een “public choice” benadering (International cooperation, a “public choice” approach) (Rotterdam: Stichting Monetaire Studies, 1986)Google Scholar. For empirical arguments supporting this idea from the field of energy policy, see Padgett, Stephen, “The Single European Energy Market: The Politics of Realization,” Journal of Common Market Studies 30 (03 1992), pp. 53–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

52. Compare Olson, Mancur, The Rise and Decline of Nations, Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982)Google Scholar. Olson claims that the success of the EC is not to be ascribed to the removal of tariffs as such, but to the weakening of vested interests which has followed the decision to integrate.

53. Compare Streeck, Wolfgang and Schmitter, Philippe C., “From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism: Organized Interests in the Single European Market,” chap. 7 in Streeck, Wolfgang, Social Institutions and Economic Performance: Studies of Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalist Economies (London: Sage, 1992)Google Scholar.

54. For an example of such a middle course, see Schmitter, Philippe C., “The European Community as an Emergent and Novel Form of Political Domination,” paper presented at Juan March Institute, Madrid, 16 05 1991Google Scholar. Schmitter, among others, expects different results for each policy field.

55. Haas, E. B., The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, p. 74Google Scholar.

56. See Cecchini, Pablo et al. , The European Challenge 1992 (Aldershot, England: Gower, 1988)Google Scholar; and Buigues, P., Ilzkovits, F., and Lebrun, J.-F., “The Impact of the Internal Market by Industrial Sector: The Challenge for the Member States,” European Economy I Social Europe, special edition, 1990Google Scholar.

57. The commission even mentioned a “conspiracy” of member states to evade the competition rules. See the Commission of the EC report, Gemeenschappen, Commissie van de Europese, Tiende verslag over Mededingsbeleid (Tenth report on competition policy) (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1981)Google Scholar. For the attitude of governments, see Allen, David, “Managing the Common Market: The Community's Competition Policy,” in Wallace, H., Policy Making in the European Community, pp. 209–36Google Scholar.

58. See Junne, Gerd, “Der strukturpolitische Wettlauf zwischen den kapitalistischen Industrielandern” (The structural and political rivalry among the capitalist industrial countries), Politische Vierteljahresschrift 25 Jahrgang, Heft 2 (06 1984), pp. 134–55Google Scholar, for a report of a subsidy race aimed at improving the position of domestic industries.

59. On democratic corporatism, see Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets. On the case of Britain, see Roberts, B. C., “United Kingdom,” in Collective Bargaining in Industrialised Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1987), pp. 281–300Google Scholar.

60. Cameron, , “The 1992 Initiative,” p. 38Google Scholar. Sandholtz and Zysman mention policy failure at the national level as one of the factors explaining the 1992 initiative. See Sandholtz and Zysman, “1992.”

61. In 1985, the Dutch government decided that it was of no use to subsidize unprofitable industry, shipbuilding in particular. Since that time it has advocated European regulation. See Hobbelen, Wouter, “Industrial Policy,” in Wolters, Menno and Coffey, Peter, eds., The Netherlands and EC Membership Evaluated (London: Pinter, 1990), pp. 33–40Google Scholar.

62. Cecchine et. al describe this situation described as economic incest. See their The European Challenge 1992.

63. Gourevitch, , Politics in Hard Times, p. 196–97Google Scholar.

64. Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act.”

65. For a discussion of the German way of handling the steel crisis, see Esser, Josef and Fach, Wolfgang, “Crisis Management ‘Made in Germany’: The Steel Industry,” in Katzenstein, Peter J., ed., Industry and Politics in West Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 221–48Google Scholar. The authors stress that the EC has functioned as an authority on which blame can be laid whenever national authorities have wished to do so.

66. The governments included those of Britain, France, and Germany, among others. See Vollenberg, Ad, “The European Steel Industry: Model for European Cooperation?” in Macmillan, Malcolm et al. , eds., European Integration and Industry (Tilburg, Netherlands: Tilburg University Press, 1987), p. 222Google Scholar.

67. Gilchrist, Joseph and Deacon, David, “Curbing Subsidies,” in Montagnon, Peter, ed., European Competition Policy (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990), pp. 31–51Google Scholar.

68. For a discussion of Article 100A(4), see Wyatt, D. and Dashwood, A., European Community Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1993), pp. 363–68Google Scholar.

69. Both formal and informal mechanisms can be used to protect markets. Some interest groups are pressing to eliminate products considered to be environmentally harmful from their national markets. These pressures may serve or may be used as an instrument of trade policy. German consumer organizations, for instance, have campaigned against chemically cultivated Dutch flowers. The Dutch ministry of agriculture has pointed out that the campaign served only to revive the ailing German horticultural sector. See de Volkskrant, 24 February 1993. Using a legal right, the Danish government argued that tin packaging causes environmental damage and thus managed to uphold the ban on the sale of beer in tin, although Danish producers have been allowed to use tin for export markets.

70. On average only 2 percent of public purchases are awarded to foreign firms. See Campbell, Jim et al. , “Implementing the Internal Market,” in Crouch, Colin and Marquand, David, eds., The Politics of 1992 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 138–56 and p. 145 in particularGoogle Scholar. On Britain and Germany, see Woolcock, Stephen, Hodges, Michael, and Schreiber, Kristen, Britain, Germany, and 1992: The Limits of Deregulation (London: Pinter, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991)Google Scholar.

71. See Woolcock, , Hodges, , and Schreiber, , “The Limits of Deregulation,” p. 36Google Scholar; and Campbell, et al. , “Implementing the Internal Market,” p. 148Google Scholar.

72. For an example of interest groups' persuading governments to safeguard adjacent areas, see Padgett, “The Single European Energy Market.”

73. Commission of the European Communities, First Survey on State Aids in the European Communities (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1988), p. 7Google Scholar.

74. Netherlands, Tweede Kamer, Brief van de minister van economische zaken dd 13–3–1991: Steun en concurrentievervalsing (Letter from the Minister of Economic Affairs, 13 March 1991, doc. 21501–12-no. 8 (Industrieraad). Aid and distorsion of competition). The German government in particular is said to have intervened more actively during the last few years.

75. Commission of the European Communities, 19c Verslag mededingingsbeleid (Nineteenth report on competition policy) (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990), p. 143Google Scholar.

76. Commission of the European Communities, Second Survey on State Aids in the European Community in the Manufacturing and Certain Other Sectors (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990)Google Scholar.

77. Ibid.

78. de Volkskrant, 4 February 1993.

79. Compare Schmitter, Philippe C. and Streeck, Wolfgang, “Belangenorganisaties en het Europa van 1992” in Beleid & Maatschappij 6 (1991), pp. 261–78Google Scholar. Translated from Schmitter, Phillippe C. and Streeck, Wolfgang, “Organized Interests and the Europe of 1992,” American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1990Google Scholar.

80. ETUC resolution 11–12 February 1988: Making work of the social dimension, European social programme.

81. See Financial Times, 4 December 1991; Handelsblatt, 30 April 1992; and The Times, 18 May 1992.

82. The German delegation in particular has prevented decision making. See Financial Times, 11 June 1992. However, the British government did gain the sympathy of the Irish and Portuguese delegations. Indeed, there seems to be some ground for the British claim to be the spokesperson for the southern countries. Its argument that EC regulation will be harmful to industry in countries with low standards and labor costs is often supported by the southern countries. See Rhodes, , “The Social Dimension of the Single European Market,” p. 262Google Scholar.

83. The British, Irish, and Portuguese governments in particular strongly opposed wage regulation. See The Irish Times 6 November 1989. Proposals on atypical contracts were dropped from the agenda.

84. Baglioni, Guido and Crouch, Colin, eds., European Industrial Relations: The Challenge of Flexibility (London: Sage, 1990)Google Scholar.

85. Although in some respects it can still be argued that the state is “disengaging,” intervention is now an important means of introducing wage flexibility, either by amending legislation (Germany) or by initiating profit-sharing schemes (Britain, France, Greece, and Spain) and tax incentives (Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, and Ireland). See Vaughan-Whitehead, D., “Wage bargaining in Europe,” In: Social Europe, supplement 2/90 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990), pp. 1–32Google Scholar.

86. In the Netherlands, the method has been to delink wages and welfare payments. See Slomp, Hans, Labor Relations in Europe: A History of Issues and Developments (New York: Greenwood, 1990)Google Scholar. Recently, the Dutch government has threatened to use its legal instruments to enforce a wage freeze. In Ireland, this has been done through consultation with the social partners. See the Irish “Program for Economic and Social Progress,” January 1991. In Spain, the government has encouraged a “competitiveness pact.” See Murcia, J.G., “Social bargaining in Spain,” in Dercksen, W.J., ed., The Future of Industrial Relations in Europe: Conference Documents ('s-Gravenhage: The Netherlands Scientific Council for Governments Policy, 1990), pp. 105–11Google Scholar.

87. In Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands, in particular, the 1992 process has coincided with a reinforcement of collective bargaining on the central and sector levels, resulting in formal agreements or better relations between the parties. Around 1990, national interprofessional agreements were set up in Ireland and the Netherlands, the first in some ten years. In 1988, a national EC dialogue began in the former West Germany, both on the sector and the central level.

88. On Ireland, see Patricia O'Donovan, “Make Europe Work For Us: Our Response to Maastricht.” Address to the Irish Congress of Trade Unions national conference, 12 May 1992. In Germany, the social partners and the governments have agreed upon a nine-point program for European regulation. See Rhodes, “The Social Dimension of the Single European Market”; and Han delsblatt, 3 November 1989. For the Netherlands, see de Volkskrant, 7 November 1991.

89. Campbell, et al. , “Implementing the Internal Market,” p. 145Google Scholar.

90. Moreover, member states retained the right to suspend contract award procedures. Further, disadvantaged suppliers must bring cases of infringement to national courts. Compliance with the directive depends on aggrieved suppliers being prepared to sue potential customers.

91. See Woolcock, , Hodges, , and Schreiber, , “The Limits of Deregulation,” p. 36Google Scholar; and Campbell et al., “Implementing the Internal Market.” For an Irish perspective, see Keegan, Owen and Hennessy, George, “Building and Construction,” in Anthony Foley and Michael Mulreany, The Single European Market and the Irish Economy (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1990), pp. 292–306 and p. 305 in particularGoogle Scholar.

92. No figures are available on the nationality of contractors, but of the twenty-three published results of procurement procedures of the Netherlands, only one contract was awarded to a contractor residing in a foreign country (Germany). See Elisabetta Manunza, “Effectiviteit van de nieuwe communautaire regelgeving inzake overheidsopdrachten voor de uitvoering van werken” (Effectiveness of the new European regulation on procurement of public works). Report prepared for EG-Beraad voor de Bouw, te Den Haag, Netherlands, 1993.

93. Malsot, Jean, “Construction,” European Economy I Social Europe vol. 3, 1993, pp. 313–37 and p. 328 in particularGoogle Scholar.

94. Woolcock, , Hodges, , and Schreiber, , “The Limits of Deregulation,” p. 28Google Scholar.

95. See Com (89) 141 final-syn 71 of 4 April 1989, Article 22a and 22b, pp. 36–37.

96. Donders, P., “De lobby rond aanbestedingen en veiligheid” (The lobby around procurement and safety), in van Schendelen, M. P. C. M., ed., Nederlandse lobby's in Europa ('s-Gravenhage, Netherlands: SDU Uitgeverij, 1993), pp. 167–82Google Scholar.

97. The principle of nondiscrimination made international migration more attractive for workers though not for employers. Cross-border migration within the EC fell dramatically. For an interesting analysis, see Holloway, John, Social Policy Harmonisation in the European Community (Westmead, England: Gower, 1981), especially pp. 263–72Google Scholar. On the increase in workers posted from non-EC countries, see Ritmeijer, W. S. R., “Posting of Workers in the Construction Industry,” in Köbele, Bruno and Cremers, Jan, eds., European Union: Posting of Workers in the Construction Industry (Bonn: Witterschlick, 1994) pp. 169–228Google Scholar.

98. In Denmark, where collective agreements are not generally applicable, the federation of trade unions (LO) and the federations of employers (DA) agreed to force foreign firms to join the DA, thus ensuring that collective agreements will apply to workers posted from foreign firms. See Mellem Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening og Landsorganisationen i Danmark: Aftale om udenlandske arbejdgiveres udstationering af arbejdstagere i Danmark (Agreement on foreign employers posting workers into Denmark), Kobenhavn, 20 November 1992.

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100. Another example may be found in European regional policies. The establishment of the European Regional Development Fund coincided with safeguarding the national policies against any EC authority over regional spending. The EC subsidies have created an incentive for national governments to withdraw from poor regions and concentrate on promising regions. These policies were in a later stage subject to integration.