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Domestic politics and international relations are often inextricably entangled, but existing theories (particularly “state-centric” theories) do not adequately account for these linkages. When national leaders must win ratification (formal or informal) from their constituents for an international agreement, their negotiating behavior reflects the simultaneous imperatives of both a domestic political game and an international game. Using illustrations from Western economic summitry, the Panama Canal and Versailles Treaty negotiations, IMF stabilization programs, the European Community, and many other diplomatic contexts, this article offers a theory of ratification. It addresses the role of domestic preferences and coalitions, domestic political institutions and practices, the strategies and tactics of negotiators, uncertainty, the domestic reverberation of international pressures, and the interests of the chief negotiator. This theory of “two-level games” may also be applicable to many other political phenomena, such as dependency, legislative committees, and multiparty coalitions.
1. The following account is drawn from Putnam Robert D. and Henning C. Randall, “The Bonn Summit of 1978: How Does International Economic Policy Coordination Actually Work?” Brookings Discussion Papers in International Economics, no. 531 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 10 1986), and Putnam Robert D. and Bayne Nicholas, Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 62–94.
2. Among interdependent economies, most economists believe, policies can often be more effective if they are internationally coordinated. For relevant citations, see Putnam and Bayne , Hanging Together, p. 24.
3. For a comprehensive account of the Japanese story, see Destler I. M. and Mitsuyu Hisao, “Locomotives on Different Tracks: Macroeconomic Diplomacy, 1977–1979,” in Destler I. M. and Sato Hideo, eds., Coping with U.S.-Japanese Economic Conflicts (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1982).
4. For an excellent account of U.S. energy policy during this period, see Ikenberry G. John, “Market Solutions for State Problems: The International and Domestic Politics of American Oil Decontrol,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988).
5. It is not clear whether Jimmy Carter fully understood the domestic implications of his Bonn pledge at the time. See Putnam and Henning, “The Bonn Summit,” and Ikenberry, “Market Solutions for State Problems.”
6. Waltz Kenneth N., Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
7. Gourevitch Peter, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978), pp. 881–911.
8. I am indebted to Stephan Haggard for enlightening discussions about domestic influences on international relations.
9. Rosenau James, “Toward the Study of National-International Linkages,” in his Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York: Free Press, 1969), as well as his “Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited,” in Wilkenfeld Jonathan, ed., Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics (New York: David McKay, 1973), especially p. 49.
10. Deutsch Karl W. et al. , Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) and Haas Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958).
11. Keohane Robert O. and Nye Joseph S., Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). On the regime literature, including its neglect of domestic factors, see Haggard Stephan and Simmons Beth, “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 491–517.
12. Allison Graham T., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 149.
13. Katzenstein Peter J., ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), p. 4. See also Katzenstein , “International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States,” International Organization 30 (Winter 1976), pp. 1–45; Krasner Stephen D., “United States Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness,” in Katzenstein , Between Power and Plenty, pp. 51–87; and Krasner , Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
14. For example, see Krasner , “United States Commercial and Money Policy,” p. 55: “The central analytic characteristic that determines the abiliiy of a state to overcome domestic resistance is its strength in relation to its own society.”
15. Milner Helen, “Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States during the 1970s,” International Organization 41 (Autumn 1987), pp. 639–65.
16. Gourevitch , “The Second Image Reversed,” p. 903.
17. In their more descriptive work, “state-centric” scholars are often sensitive to the impact of social and political conflicts, such as those between industry and finance, labor and business, and export-oriented versus import-competing sectors. See Katzenstein , Between Power and Plenty, pp. 333–36, for example.
18. Lake David A., “The State as Conduit: The International Sources of National Political Action,” presented at the 1984 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, p. 13.
19. Alt James E., “Crude Politics: Oil and the Political Economy of Unemployment in Britain and Norway, 1970–1985,” British Journal of Political Science 17 (04 1987), pp. 149–99; Evans Peter B., Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Gourevitch Peter, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); Katzenstein Peter J., Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).
20. Walton Richard E. and McKersie Robert B., A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).
21. Strauss Robert S., “Foreword,” in Twiggs Joan E., The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: A Case Study in Building Domestic Support for Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1987), p. vii. Former Secretary of Labor John Dunlop is said to have remarked that “bilateral negotiations usually require three agreements—one across the table and one on each side of the table,” as cited in Raiffa Howard, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 166.
22. Druckman Daniel, “Boundary Role Conflict: Negotiation as Dual Responsiveness,” in Zartman I. William, ed., The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978), pp. 100–101, 109. For a review of the social-psychological literature on bargainers as representatives, see Pruitt Dean G., Negotiation Behavior (New York: Academic Press, 1981), pp. 41–43.
23. Robert Axelrod, “The Gamma Paradigm for Studying the Domestic Influence on Foreign Policy,” prepared for delivery at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association.
24. Snyder Glenn H. and Diesing Paul, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 510–25.
25. Black Max, Models and Metaphors (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 242, as cited in Snidal Duncan, “The Game Theory of International Politics,” World Politics 38 (10 1985), p. 36n.
26. To avoid unnecessary complexity, my argument throughout is phrased in terms of a single chief negotiator, although in many cases some of his responsibilities may be delegated to aides. Later in this article I relax the assumption that the negotiator has no independent preferences.
27. Stoltenberg Gerhardt, Wall Street Journal Europe, 2 10 1986, as cited in Henning C. Randall, Macroeconomic Diplomacy in the 1980s: Domestic Politics and International Conflict Among the United States, Japan, and Europe, Atlantic Paper No. 65 (New York: Croom Helm, for the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1987), p. 1.
28. Takashi Ito, “Conflicts and Coalition in Japan, 1930: Political Groups and the London Naval Disarmament Conference,” in Groennings Sven et al. , eds, The Study of Coalition Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1970); Tatsuo Kobayashi, “The London Naval Treaty, 1930,” in Morley James W., ed., Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928–1932 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 11–117. I am indebted to William Jarosz for this example.
29. This stipulation is, in fact, characteristic of most real-world ratification procedures, such as House and Senate action on conference committee reports, although it is somewhat violated by the occasional practice of appending “reservations” to the ratification of treaties.
30. New York Times,26 September 1986.
31. For the conception of win-set, see Shepsle Kenneth A. and Weingast Barry R., “The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power,” American Political Science Review 81 (03 1987), pp. 85–104. I am indebted to Professor Shepsle for much help on this topic.
32. To avoid tedium, I do not repeat the “other things being equal” proviso in each of the propositions that follow. Under some circumstances an expanded win-set might actually make practicable some outcome that could trigger a dilemma of collective action. See Crawford Vincent P., “A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining,” Econometrica 50 (05 1982), pp. 607–37.
33. The Sunday Times Insight Team, The Falklands War (London: Sphere, 1982); Hastings Max and Jenkins Simon, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: Norton, 1984); Dabat Alejandro and Lorenzano Luis, Argentina: The Malvinas and the End of Military Rule (London: Verso, 1984). I am indebted to Louise Richardson for these citations.
34. Canzoneri Matthew E. and Gray Jo Anna, “Two Essays on Monetary Policy in an Interdependent World,” International Finance Discussion Paper 219 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 02 1983).
35. Axelrod Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Keohane Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), esp. p. 116; and the special issue of World Politics, “Cooperation Under Anarchy,” Oye Kenneth A., ed., vol. 38 (10 1985).
36. Destler I. M., Fukui Haruhiro, and Sato Hideo, The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese American Relations, 1969–1971 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 121–57.
37. Winham Gilbert R., “Robert Strauss, the MTN, and the Control of Faction,” Journal of World Trade Law 14 (09–10 1980), pp. 377–97, and his International Trade and the Tokyo Round (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
38. This discussion implicitly assumes uncertainty about the contours of the win-sets on the part of the Level I negotiators, for if the win-sets were known with certainty, the negotiators would never propose for ratification an agreement that would be rejected.
39. Harrison Geoffrey W., in Campbell John C., ed., Successful Negotiation: Trieste 1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 62.
40. Schelling Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 19–28.
41. I am grateful to Lara Putnam for this example. For supporting evidence, see Kaufman Robert R., “Democratic and Authoritarian Responses to the Debt Issue: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,” International Organization 39 (Summer 1985), pp. 473–503.
42. Habeeb W. Mark and Zartman I. William, The Panama Canal Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1986), pp. 40, 42.
43. Several investigators in other fields have recently proposed models of linked games akin to this “two-level” game. Kenneth A. Shepsle and his colleagues have used the notion of “interconnected games” to analyze, for example, the strategy of a legislator simultaneously embedded in two games, one in the legislative arena and the other in the electoral arena. In this model, a given action is simultaneously a move in two different games, and one player maximizes the sum of his payoffs from the two games. See Denzau Arthur, Riker William, and Shepsle Kenneth, “Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style,” American Political Science Review 79 (12 1985), pp. 1117–34; and Shepsle Kenneth, “Cooperation and Institutional Arrangements,” unpublished manuscript, 02 1986. This approach is similar to models recently developed by economists working in the “rational expectations” genre. In these models, a government contends simultaneously against other governments and against domestic trade unions over monetary policy. See, for example, Rogoff Kenneth, “Can International Monetary Policy Cooperation be Counterproductive,” Journal of International Economics 18 (05 1985), pp. 199–217, and Vaubel Roland, “A Public Choice Approach to International Organization,” Public Choice 51 (1986), pp. 39–57. Tsebelis George (”Nested Games: The Cohesion of French Coalitions,” British Journal of Political Science 18 [04 1988], pp. 145–70) has developed a theory of “nested games,” in which two alliances play a competitive game to determine total payoffs, while the individual players within each alliance contend over their shares. Sharpf Fritz (”A Game-Theoretical Interpretation of Inflation and Unemployment in Western Europe,” Journal of Public Policy 7 , pp. 227–257) interprets macroeconomic policy as the joint outcome of two simultaneous games; in one, the government plays against the unions, while in the other, it responds to the anticipated reactions of the electorate. Alt James E. and Eichengreen Barry (”Parallel and Overlapping Games: Theory and an Application to the European Gas Trade,” unpublished manuscript, 11 1987) offer a broader typology of linked games, distinguishing between “parallel” games, in which “the same opponents play against one another at the same time in more than one arena,” and “overlapping” games, which arise “when a particular player is engaged at the same time in games against distinct opponents, and when the strategy pursued in one game limits the strategies available in the other.” Detailed comparison of these various linked-game models is a task for the future.
44. Romer Thomas and Rosenthal Howard, “Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo,” Public Choice 33 (no. 4, 1978), pp. 27–44.
45. In more formal treatments, the no-agreement outcome is called the “reversion point.” A given constituent's evaluation of no-agreement corresponds to what Raiffa terms a seller's “walk-away price,” that is, the price below which he would prefer “no-deal.” (Raiffa, Art and Science of Negotiation.) No-agreement is equivalent to what Snyder and Diesing term “breakdown,” or the expected cost of war. (Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations.)
46. Bailey Thomas A., Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal (New York: Macmillan, 1945), pp. 16–37.
47. Raiffa notes that “the more diffuse the positions are within each side, the easier it might be to achieve external agreement.” (Raiffa , Art and Science of Negotiation, p. 12.) For the conventional view, by contrast, that domestic unity is generally a precondition for international agreement, see Artis Michael and Ostry Sylvia, International Economic Policy Coordination, Chatham House Papers: 30 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), pp. 75–76.
48. “Meaningful consultation with other nations becomes very difficult when the internal process of decision-making already has some of the characteristics of compacts between quasi-sovereign entities. There is an increasing reluctance to hazard a hard-won domestic consensus in an international forum.” Kissinger Henry A., “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy,” in Rosenau James N., ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 266.
49. See Wilson James Q., Political Organization (New York: Basic Books, 1975) on how the politics of an issue are affected by whether the costs and the benefits are concentrated or diffuse.
50. Another factor fostering abstention is the greater complexity and opacity of monetary issues; as Winham Gilbert R. (“Complexity in International Negotiation,” in Druckman Daniel, ed., Negotiations: A Social-Psychological Perspective [Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977], p. 363) observes, “complexity can strengthen the hand of a negotiator vis-à-vis the organization he represents.”
51. Habeeb and Zartman, Panama Canal Negotiations.
52. Bailey, Wilson and the Great Betrayal.
53. I am grateful to Ernst B. Haas and Robert O. Keohane for helpful advice on this point.
54. Hollick Ann L., U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), especially pp. 208–37, and Sebenius James K., Negotiating the Law of the Sea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), especially pp. 74–78.
55. Raiffa , Art and Science of Negotiation, p. 175.
56. I am indebted to Lisa Martin and Kenneth Shepsle for suggesting this approach, although they are not responsible for my application of it. Note that this construction assumes that each issue, taken individually, is a “homogeneous” type, not a “heterogeneous” type. Constructing iso-vote curves for heterogeneous-type issues is more complicated.
57. I am grateful to Henry Brady for clarifying this point for me.
58. Gilbert R. Winham, “The Relevance of Clausewitz to a Theory of International Negotiation,” prepared for delivery at the 1987 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.
59. Carter Jimmy, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 225.
60. Winham (see note 37); Twiggs, The Tokyo Round.
61. Walton and McKersie , Behavioral Theory of Labor Organizations, p. 321.
62. Artis and Ostry, International Economic Policy Coordination. Of course, whether this is desirable in terms of democratic values is quite another matter.
63. Schelling , Strategy of Conflict, p. 28.
64. Walton and McKersie , Behavioral Theory of Labor Organizations, p. 345.
65. Carter , Keeping Faith, p. 172. See also Raiffa , Art and Science of Negotiation, p. 183.
66. The strategic significance of targeting at Level II is illustrated in Conybeare John, “Trade Wars: A Comparative Study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot Conflicts,” World Politics 38 (10 1985), p. 157: Retaliation in the Anglo-Hanse trade wars did not have the intended deterrent effect, because it was not (and perhaps could not have been) targeted at the crucial members of the opposing Level II coalition. Compare Snyder and Diesing , Conflict Among Nations, p. 552: “If one faces a coercive opponent, but the opponent's majority coalition includes a few wavering members inclined to compromise, a compromise proposal that suits their views may cause their defection and the formation of a different majority coalition. Or if the opponent's strategy is accommodative, based on a tenuous soft-line coalition, one knows that care is required in implementing one's own coercive stretegy to avoid the opposite kind of shift in the other state.”
67. Walton and McKersie , Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, p. 319.
68. Velebit Vladimir, in Campbell , Trieste 1954, p. 97. As noted earlier, our discussion here assumes that the Level I negotiator wishes to reach a ratifiable agreement; in cases (alluded to later) when the negotiator's own preferences are more hard-line than his constituents, his domestic popularity might allow him to resist Level I agreements.
69. Transaction benefits may be enhanced if a substantive agreement is reached, although sometimes leaders can benefit domestically by loudly rejecting a proffered international deal.
70. Snyder and Diesing , Conflict Among Nations, pp. 516, 522–23. Analogous misperceptions in Anglo-American diplomacy are the focus of Neustadt Richard E., Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
71. Synder and Diesing , Conflict Among Nations, p. 517.
72. I am grateful to Robert O. Keohane for pointing out the impact of uncertainty on the expected value of proposals.
73. Zartman I. William, The 50% Solution (Garden City, N.J.: Anchor Books, 1976), p. 14. The present analysis assumes that constituents are myopic about the other side's Level II, an assumption that is not unrealistic empirically. However, a fully informed constituent would consider the preferences of key players on the other side, for if the current proposal lies well within the other side's win-set, then it would be rational for the constituent to vote against it, hoping for a second-round proposal that was more favorable to him and still ratifiable abroad; this might be a reasonable interpretation of Senator Lodge's position in 1919 (Bailey, Wilson and the Great Betrayal). Consideration of such strategic voting at Level II is beyond the scope of this article.
74. Hillman John R., “The Mutual Influence of Italian Domestic Politics and the International Monetary Fund,” The Fletcher Forum 4 (Winter 1980), pp. 1–22. Spaventa Luigi, “Two Letters of Intent: External Crises and Stabilization Policy, Italy, 1973–77,” in Williamson John, ed., IMF Conditionality (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1983), pp. 441–73, argues that the unions and the Communists actually favored the austerity measures, but found the IMF demands helpful in dealing with their own internal Level II constituents.
75. Hiss Dieter, “Weltwirtschaftsgipfel: Betrachtungen eines Insiders [World Economic Summit: Observations of an Insider],” in Frohn Joachim and Staeglin Reiner, eds., Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1980), pp. 286–87.
76. On cognitive and communications explanations of international cooperation, see, for example, Haas Ernst B., “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes,” World Politics 32 (04 1980), pp 357–405; Cooper Richard N., “International Cooperation in Public Health as a Prologue to Macroeconomic Cooperation,” Brookings Discussion Papers in International Economics 44 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986); and Zartman, 50% Solution, especially Part 4.
77. Henning , Macroeconomic Diplomacy in the 1980s, pp. 62–63.
78. This is the approach used to analyze the Anglo-Chinese negotiations over Hong Kong in de Mesquita Bruce Bueno, Newman David, and Rabushka Alvin, Forecasting Political Events: The Future of Hong Kong (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
79. For overviews of this literature, see Moe Terry M., “The New Economics of Organization,” American Journal of Political Science 28 (11 1984), pp. 739–77; Pratt John W. and Zeckhauser Richard J., eds., Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1985); and Barry M. Mitnick, “The Theory of Agency and Organizational Analysis,” prepared for delivery at the 1986 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. This literature is only indirectly relevant to our concerns here, for it has not yet adequately addressed the problems posed by multiple principals (or constituents, in our terms). For one highly formal approach to the problem of multiple principals, see Bernheim R. Douglas and Whinston Michael D., “Common Agency,” Econometrica 54 (07 1986), pp. 923–42.
80. Hillman, “Mutual Influence,” and Spaventa, “Two Letters of Intent.”
81. This power of the chief negotiator is analogous to what Shepsle and Weingast term the “penultimate” or “ex post veto” power of the members of a Senate-House conference committee. (Shepsle and Weingast, “Institutional Foundations of Committee Power.”)
82. Bailey , Wilson and the Great Betrayal, quotation at p. 15.
83. Strong Robert A. and Zeringue Marshal, “The Neutron Bomb and the Atlantic Alliance,” presented at the 1986 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, p. 9.
84. Zartman I. William, “Reality, Image, and Detail: The Paris Negotiations, 1969–1973,” in Zartman , 50% Solution, pp. 372–98.
85. Brzezinski Zbigniew, Power and Principle (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), p. 136, as quoted in Habeeb and Zartman , Panama Canal Negotiations, pp. 39–40.
86. Harrison in Campbell , Trieste 1954, p. 67.
87. Huntington Samuel P., “Transnational Organizations in World Politics,” World Politics 25 (04 1973), pp. 333–68; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence; Neustadt, Alliance Politics.
88. Crane Barbara, “Policy Coordination by Major Western Powers in Bargaining with the Third World: Debt Relief and the Common Fund,” International Organization 38 (Summer 1984), pp. 399–428.
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