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Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 October 2011

Emilie M. Hafner-Burton ,
Laurence R. Helfer  and
Christopher J. Fariss
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego. E-mail: ehafner@ucsd.edu
Laurence R. Helfer
Affiliation:
Duke University School of Law, Durham, N.C. E-mail: helfer@law.duke.edu
Christopher J. Fariss
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego. E-mail: cjf0006@gmail.com
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Abstract

Several prominent human rights treaties seek to minimize violations during emergencies by authorizing states to “derogate”—that is, to suspend certain civil and political liberties—in response to crises. The drafters of these treaties envisioned that international restrictions on derogations, together with international notification and monitoring mechanisms, would limit rights suspensions during emergencies. This article analyzes the behavior of derogating countries using new global data sets of derogations and states of emergency from 1976 to 2007. We argue that derogations are a rational response to domestic political uncertainty. They enable governments facing serious threats to buy time and legal breathing space from voters, courts, and interest groups to confront crises while signaling to these audiences that rights deviations are temporary and lawful. Our findings have implications for studies of treaty design and flexibility mechanisms, and compliance with international human rights agreements.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 65 , Issue 4 , October 2011 , pp. 673 - 707
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2011

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