Skip to main content
    • Aa
    • Aa
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 64
  • Cited by
    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Böhmelt, Tobias and Spilker, Gabriele 2016. The interaction of international institutions from a social network perspective. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Vol. 16, Issue. 1, p. 67.

    Davis, Christina L. 2015. The political logic of dispute settlement: Introduction to the special issue. The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 10, Issue. 2, p. 107.

    Maggi, Giovanni and Staiger, Robert W. 2015. Optimal Design of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Renegotiation†. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 7, Issue. 1, p. 109.

    Medina de Souza, Igor Abdalla 2015. An offer developing countries could not refuse: how powerful states created the World Trade Organisation. Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 18, Issue. 2, p. 155.

    Poletti, Arlo De Bièvre, Dirk and Hanegraaff, Marcel 2015. WTO Judicial Politics and EU Trade Policy: Business Associations as Vessels of Special Interest?. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, p. n/a.

    Yoshino, Ryozo Shibai, Kiyohisa Nikaido, Kosuke and Fujita, Taisuke 2015. THE ASIA-PACIFIC VALUES SURVEY 2010-2014: CULTURAL MANIFOLD ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL CHARACTER. Behaviormetrika, Vol. 42, Issue. 2, p. 99.

    Daugbjerg, Carsten and Kay, Adrian 2014. A trade balance: litigation and negotiation in the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement system. Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 68, Issue. 1, p. 105.

    DELIMATSIS, PANAGIOTIS 2014. Transparency in the WTO's Decision-Making. Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, Issue. 03, p. 701.

    Poletti, Arlo and De Bièvre, Dirk 2014. Political mobilization, veto players, and WTO litigation: explaining European Union responses in trade disputes. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 21, Issue. 8, p. 1181.

    Thomas, Martha 2014. Domestic Politics and Non-Compliance in the Andean Community. The Latin Americanist, Vol. 58, Issue. 4, p. 27.

    Bernauer, Thomas Kalbhenn, Anna Koubi, Vally and Spilker, Gabriele 2013. Is there a “Depth versus Participation” dilemma in international cooperation?. The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 8, Issue. 4, p. 477.

    Bobick, Talya and Smith, Alastair 2013. The impact of leader turnover on the onset and the resolution of WTO disputes. The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 8, Issue. 4, p. 423.

    De Bièvre, Dirk Poletti, Arlo and Thomann, Lars 2013. To enforce or not to enforce? Judicialization, venue shopping, and global regulatory harmonization. Regulation & Governance, p. n/a.

    Thomas, Martha 2013. The Logic of Dispute Initiation under NAFTA Chapter 19. Politics & Policy, Vol. 41, Issue. 2, p. 155.

    BEYERS, JAN and KERREMANS, BART 2012. Domestic Embeddedness and the Dynamics of Multilevel Venue Shopping in Four EU Member States. Governance, Vol. 25, Issue. 2, p. 263.

    Bruszt, Laszlo and McDermott, Gerald A. 2012. Integrating rule takers: Transnational integration regimes shaping institutional change in emerging market democracies. Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 19, Issue. 5, p. 742.

    de Ville, Ferdi 2012. Explaining the Genesis of a Trade Dispute: the European Union’s Seal Trade Ban. Journal of European Integration, Vol. 34, Issue. 1, p. 37.

    De Ville, Ferdi 2012. European Union regulatory politics in the shadow of the WTO: WTO rules as frame of reference and rhetorical device. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 19, Issue. 5, p. 700.

    Gray, Julia and Slapin, Jonathan B. 2012. How effective are preferential trade agreements? Ask the experts. The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 7, Issue. 3, p. 309.

    Hanegraaff, Marcel Beyers, Jan and Braun, Caelesta 2012. The Scale of Interest Organization in Democratic Politics.


Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note


If the purpose of legalization is to enhance international cooperation, more may not always be better. Achieving the optimal level of legalization requires finding a balance between reducing the risks of opportunism and reducing the potential negative effects of legalization on domestic political processes. The global trade regime, which aims to liberalize trade, has become increasingly legalized over time. Increased legalization has changed the information environment and the nature of government obligations, which in turn have affected the pattern of mobilization of domestic interest groups on trade. From the perspective of encouraging the future expansion of liberal trade, we suggest some possible negative consequences of legalization, arguing that these consequences must be weighed against the positive effects of legalization on increasing national compliance. Since the weakly legalized GATT institution proved sufficient to sustain widespread liberalization, the case for further legalization must be strong to justify far-reaching change in the global trade regime.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

International Organization
  • ISSN: 0020-8183
  • EISSN: 1531-5088
  • URL: /core/journals/international-organization
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *