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Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

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Is it possible to integrate states into larger unions without the use of force? Should we think of a continuous “federalizing process” in which economic integration is a first step? Are there certain conditions under which economic integration of a group of nations automatically triggers political unity?

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Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1965

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References

1 SeeFriedrich, C. J., “International Federalism in Theory and Practice,” in Plischke, Elmer (ed.), Systems of Integrating the International Community (Princeton, N.J: Van Nostrand, 1963), pp. 126137Google Scholar.

2 Frey-Wouters, Ellen, “The Progress of European Integration,” World Politics, 04 1965 (Vol. 17, No. 3), p. 461CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 SeeHaas, Ernst B. and Schmitter, Philippe C., “Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections About Unity in Latin America,” International Organization, Autumn 1964 (Vol. 18, No. 4), pp. 705737CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Schmitter, Philippe C. and Haas, Ernst B., Mexico and Latin American Economic Integration (Berkeley, Calif: Institute of International Studies, 1964), pp. 139Google Scholar. The Haas-Schmitter scheme is concerned with that aspect of the spectrum of integration in which increasing interdependence is sufficient to support political institutions. This might also be called unification. To avoid confusion, my usage of “integration” in this article follows theirs. “Federation” refers to a particular institutional form of political union.

4 Background conditions: 1) size of the units, 2) rate of transactions, 3) extent of pluralism, and 4) elite complementarity; conditions at the time of economic union: 5) governmental purposes, 6) powers of union; and process conditions: 7) decision-making style, 8) rate of transaction, and 9) adaptability of governments. See the table on p. 878.

4 Haas, and Schmitter, , International Organization, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 707, 717Google Scholar.

5 See Hoffmann, Stanley, “Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System,” International Organization, Summer 1963 (Vol. 17, No. 3), pp. 521549CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Deutsch, Karl, “Supranational Organization in the 1960's,” Journal of Common Market Studies (Vol. 1, No. 3), pp. 212218CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Burke, Edmund quoted in Zurcher, Arnold, “The European Community—An Approach to Federal Integration,” in Plischke, pp. 8788Google Scholar.

7 For evidence that this is occurring, seeLindberg, Leon N., “Decision Making and Integration in the European Community,” International Organization, Winter 1965 (Vol. 19, No. 1), pp. 5680CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 The content of “high” politics may vary with the context. In some instances, economic problems like location of industry may show more of the aspects of “high” politics than a subject like defense which is usually associated with “high” politics in Europe.

9 The almost impossible problem of avoiding political entanglement is described in detail by Albert Tevoedjre, former Secretary-General of the Union africaine et malgache (UAM), in a forthcoming manuscript.

10 It is possible to conceive of bridges for this institutional gap, for instance, the allowing of key leaders to hold office in their territorial bases and at the new central level simultaneously. However, this may be difficult in practice.

11 See, for instance, the ten variables listed by Deutsch, Karl and others, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 123154Google Scholar. For an example of their limited value in an African context, see Chapter 11 of the excellent study by Foltz, William, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1964)Google Scholar.

12 See Wheare, K. C., Federal Government (3rd ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 37Google Scholar. Although Kenya is involved in a territorial dispute with its northern neighbor, Somalia, Uganda has disproportionately large neighbors to the north and west, and Tanzania harbors refugees from Portuguese East Africa to its south, none of the East African states felt an absolutely compelling need to federate for the sake of defense.

13 Some services and research institutions have headquarters outside Nairobi.

14 For a detailed description of EACSO, the East African common market, and the frictions involved, see Nye, Joseph S. Jr, “East African Economic Integration,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 12 1963 (Vol. 1, No. 4), pp. 475502CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also East Africa: Report of the Economic and Fiscal Commission (Cmd. 1279) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961)Google Scholar; and Massell, Benton, East African Economic Union (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, 1963), pp. 189Google Scholar.

15 In 1963 Erwin Blumenthal of the Deutsche Bundesbank suggested a two-tiered banking system in a report to the Tanganyikan government, but it has not been implemented. See the Present Monetary System and its Future (Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika: Government Printer, 1963)Google Scholar.

16 See Kampala Agreement (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: United Republic Information Service, 1964)Google Scholar.

17 For details on these problems, see Nye, Joseph S. Jr, Pan-Africanism and East African Integration (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 Haas, and Schmitter, , International Organization, Vol. 18, No. 4, p. 711Google Scholar.

19 Schmitter, and Haas, , Mexico and Latin American Economic Integration, p. 33Google Scholar.

20 Foltz, pp. 118–165.

21 See Haas, Ernst B., Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1964), Chapter 1Google Scholar.

22 In November 1963, two political scientists attending a university conference on federation in Nairobi submitted a memorandum which brought to the attention of East African leaders the number of alternatives available. SeeBirch, A. H. and Watts, R. L., Alternative Ways of Distributing Authority Within Federation (Nairobi, mimeographed, 1963)Google Scholar.

23 See Springer, Hugh W., Reflections on the Failure of the First West Indian Federation (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 1962)Google Scholar.

24 See Foltz, , From French West Africa to the Mali Federation, and Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), Chapter 8Google Scholar.

25 See Korbonski, Andrzej, “Comecon,” International Conciliation, 09 1964 (No. 549), pp. 362Google Scholar; and Grzybowski, Kazimierz, The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1964)Google Scholar.

26 Of course I am not arguing that formation under colonial rule is a sufficient condition for success of a political union.

27 C. J. Fricdrich has suggested that “integrating federalism” may call for a “federalizer.” See New Tendencies in Federal Theory and Practice, A Report Given at the Sixth World Congress of the International Political Science Association (Geneva, mimeographed, 1964)Google Scholar.