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A Political Re-Examination of SEATO

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

W. Macmahon Ball
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Extract

It is now three years since the Southcast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was rather hastily established after the French military collapse in Indo-China. What is its present effectiveness, and what are its prospects, as a security organization for Southeast Asia? There has never been any doubt or obscurity about SEATO's over-riding purpose to resist the extension, by whatever means, of communist rule in Southeast Asia. At die Manila Conference diere was some clash of opinion on how the purpose of die proposed body should be officially proclaimed. The United States wanted to limit it to resistance against communist aggression, while the United Kingdom and some odier countries diought it would be more politic to refer to aggression in general terms, since this might make SEATO less unpalatable to the Colombo powers. The United States then agreed to refer to aggression in general terms in the body of the Treaty, but announced its "Understanding" that its own military obligations were limited to die resistance of communist aggression. At the same time Australia insisted on its own proviso diat nothing in the Treaty must be construed as an obligation to intervene in any possible conflict between Asian members of the Commonwealth. Australia diereby sought to make it clear that SEATO was in no way concerned with the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. These verbal skirmishes only made it the more evident diat in fact, if not in form, SEATO was concerned solely widi stemming the advance of communism.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , Winter 1958 , pp. 17 - 25
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1958

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References

1 The South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty was signed in Manila on September 8, 1954, and came into force on February 19, 1935, when it had been ratified by the eight signatory governments-Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

2 “In considering all the implications that this Treaty has for Australia we must consider what our position would be in relation to fellow members of the Commonwealth. I have in mind particularly the question of whether under the Treaty Australia might be committed to taking armed action in the event of a dispute between India and Pakistan. I wish to state categorically that the Australian Government would never regard itself as being committed, contractually or morally, to military action agains t any other member of the Commonwealth. I find it impossible to believe that either India or Pakistan would resort to force to settle any problem that may exist between them. The Pakistan Foreign Minister was informed of our position on this point before the treaty was signed.” R. G. Casey, in the Australian House of Representatives, October 27, 1954.

3 1 Under the Protocol of the Treaty, Laos, Cambodia and South Viet Nam are "designated" territories, but no action can be taken by the members on such territories “except at the invitation or with the consent of the Government concerned”. (Article IV, 3.) While the Protocol seems to imply that these three states are excluded from membership, it specifically provides that they “shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures contemplated in Article III”.

4 Prince Abdul Rahman is willing and perhaps eager for some Commonwealth forces to remain in Malaya. The Australian government has stated that its forces will continue to co-operate in the fight against the terrorists, but not otherwise intervene in domestic politics. They will also be part of the Commonwealth strategic reserve. It is generally assumed that this reserve is a component of SEATO forces, but it is a little difficult to visualize Malaya's likely policy if SEATO were involved in war. It is also hard to visualize the political reaction in Singapore.

5 Second Annual Report, March 5, 1957.

6 See Collective Defence in Soutb-East Asia, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1936, p. 13Google Scholar.

7 It is of course possible–and some would say highly probable–that an overt act of communist aggression to Southeast Asia would dispel this reluctance, and that the United States would in practice quickly contribute ground forces where needed.

8 Sydney Morning Herald, March 13, 1957.

9 The Australian government sometimes finds itself in this situation. “Mr. Casey is reported to have told Cabinet that Australia should consider the attitude of the United States before deciding to follow the British policy of trading with China. Mr. Casey told Cabinet that Australia's destiny in the Pacific was closely tied to that of the United States. He referred to the defence picta rich u ANZUS and SEATO which Australia shared wit h America. For this reason any Australian decision to trading with Red China should be delayed, he said. He pointed out that the U.S. was strongly opposed to the British policy of trading with Communist China. An Australian decision to trade with Red China would not be well-received in the U.S.” Melbourne Herald, June 26, 1957.

10 Second Annual Report.

11 There has been some delay and friction in carrying out this agreement. It is hard to assess the present influence of the Ptthet Lao.