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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2016
The early years of Irish independence were years of precedent-setting decisions that shaped and moulded the new state. In a country just emerging from a struggle for independence and a devastating civil war, the army was one of the most vital and central institutions; and the relationship between the military and the elected civilian government was crucial. In fact, at the end of the civil war, a strong possibility existed that, unless the government acted quickly to establish its control, the army could remain the dominant force in Irish politics for years to come. The response to the Irish army mutiny of 1924, however, upheld and affirmed the supremacy of constitutional rule in Ireland.
1 See Nowlan, Kevin B., ‘Dáil Éireann and the army: unity and division’ in Williams, Desmond (ed.), The Irish struggle, 1916-1926 (London, 1966), pp 67–77.Google Scholar
2 Mulcahy, Richard, ‘The Irish Volunteer convention, 27 October 1917’ in Capuchin Annual, 1967, pp 400-10.Google Scholar
3 Ibid.
4 University College, Dublin, Department of Archives (hereinafter cited as U.C.D. A.), Mulcahy papers, P7/C/96.
5 Dáil Éireann proc. 1919–21, pp 46–7.
6 Nowlan, ‘Dáil Éireann and the army’, p. 71.
7 O’Donoghue, Florence, No other law (Dublin, 1954), p. 200 Google Scholar; Breen, Dan, My fight for Irish freedom (Dublin, 1944), pp 191-2.Google Scholar
8 Dáil Éireann treaty deb., pp 289–90 (6 Jan. 1922, Seamus Robinson).
9 O’Donoghue, No other law, p. 196.
10 Quoted in Macardle, , Ir. republic (Corgi ed., London, 1968), p. 773.Google Scholar
11 For example, during the treaty debates one deputy remarked that he was supporting the treaty because what was good enough for Michael Collins was good enough for him (Dáil Éireann treaty deb., p. 81). A number of army officers were known to have chosen the ‘Free State side’ out of personal loyalty to men like Collins and Mulcahy.
12 Professor Hogan’s testimony before the army inquiry committee (U.C.D.A., Mulcahy papers, P7/C/25). The Army Council consisted of General Sean MacMahon, chief of staff; Lt.-General Gearóid O’Sullivan, adjutant-general; and Lt.-General Sean Ó Murthuile, quartermaster-general. There is some indication that the Tobin-Dalton group had been a problem even before Collins’s death. See Report, army inquiry committee, 1924 (R. 30), p. 6.
13 MacMahon’s testimony before the army inquiry committee (U.C.D.A., Mulcahy papers, P7/C/35).
14 O’Sullivan’s testimony before the army inquiry committee (U.C.D.A., Mulcahy papers, P7/C/12).
15 Report, army inquiry committee, 1924. Copy in U.C.D.A., Mulcahy papers, P7/C/32.
16 Ó Murthuile’s testimony before the army inquiry committee (U.C.D.A., Mulcahy papers, P7/C/32).
17 The truth about the army crisis, with a foreword by Major-General Liam Tobin, issued by the Irish Republican Army Organisation, Summerhill, Dublin ([Dublin, 1924?]), p. 12.
18 During the crisis 49 officers resigned from the army in sympathy with the mutineers, including 3 major-generals, 5 colonels, 17 commandants, 12 captains and 12 lieutenants. Fifty officers absconded with war material which included 11 Lewis guns, 21 rifles, 1 grenade rifle, 1 revolver, 41 grenades, 35,400 rounds of .303 ammunition. (Tobin mutiny file, U.C.D.A., Mulcahy papers, P7/C/196).
19 Dáil Éireann deb., vi, 1896 (11 Mar. 1924).
20 Irish Independent, 19 May 1924.
21 Dáil Éireann deb., vi, 1897(11 Mar. 1924).
22 Irish Independent, 19 May 1924.
23 The truth about the army crisis, p. 14.
24 Dáil Éireann deb., vi, 1971.
25 The truth about the army crisis, p. 14.
26 Dáil Éireann deb., vi, 1996–7 (12 Mar. 1924).
27 Ibid., col. 2370 (26 Mar. 1924).
28 Broin, Leon Ó, Revolutionary underground: the story of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, 1858–1924 (Dublin, 1976), p. 212.Google Scholar
29 Interview with Col. Dan Bryan, Dublin, 18 Mar. 1975.
30 S.P.O., Cabinet minutes, Cab. 2/68.
31 Interview with Gen. Patrick Mulcahy, Dublin, 12 July 1981.
32 Irish Times, 20 Mar. 1924, p. 6.
33 The truth about the army crisis, p. 15.
34 Dáil Éireann deb., vi, 2363 (26 Mar. 1924).
35 Ibid., cols 2215–17 (19 Mar. 1924).
36 Ibid., col. 2217.
37 Kevin O’Higgins’s testimony before the army inquiry committee (U.C.D.A., Mulcahy papers, P7/C/23).
38 Dáil Éireann deb., vi, 2228–31 (19 Mar. 1924).
39 Ibid., col. 2231.
40 Ibid., col. 2230.
