Writing about any constitution is tricky business and that of Zambia is no exception. Four constitutions in 32 years hardly represents a settled state of affairs, and an end, or even a stopping place of long duration, does not appear in sight. This is, however, an interesting, even exciting period in Zambia’s brief constitutional history. The subject cries out for an examination of where the country has been, where it is, and where, at least in the opinion of these observers, it ought to be heading.

We are happy to undertake this brief assessment in the context of recognition of the career of Professor J.S. Read. This able, patient, effective, and thoughtful scholar has been a mentor to generations of African lawyers, including Zambians. To both of us Jim Read has been a warm and generous friend, from time to time a wise counsellor who has contributed much to our own efforts.

The Constitution of Uganda was adopted on 22 September, 1995, and full details of the document will appear in the next issue of the J.A.L. One of the most interesting institutions established is the Uganda Human Rights Commission. Composed of a Chairperson, who must be a judge of the High Court or qualified to hold that office, and not less than three other persons, the Commission will have wide-ranging investigative and promotional functions. However, it is the enforcement powers of the Commission that are unusual. Traditionally, national institutions (offices of the ombudsman and human rights commissions) have no enforcement powers and can only recommend corrective action. In recent years these powers have been enlarged. For example, in Ghana the Commissioner on Human Rights and Administrative Justice has the power to bring proceedings in a competent court for a remedy “to secure the termination of the offending action or conduct” (article 218(d)(iii) Constitution of Ghana).

In the Introduction to this volume, brief reference was made to James Read’s work as General Editor of Law Reports of the Commonwealth. The series includes cases from every part of the Commonwealth, but the purpose of this brief note is to draw particular attention to some recent cases reported from African jurisdictions, some of which have no up-to-date series of law reports of their own.

In a bid to attract foreign investment, the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act, 1994, provided for the establishment of the Investment Promotion Centre to be responsible for the administration of investment activities in Ghana. This has been followed by the Free Zone Act, 1995. This establishes a Free Trade Board consisting ofthe Minister for Trade and Industry (as the chairperson) and eight other persons, four of whom must come from the private sector and two of whom must be women. The function of the Board is to oversee the establishment and operation of free zones. The Act provides for the establishment and development of free zones and free ports and the establishment of enterprises therein by corporations registered under the Companies Act, 1963, or a partnership registered under the Private Partnership Act, 1962. A free zone enterprise has the right to produce any type of goods and services for export except those that are environmentally hazardous.

The Code for the Protection of Children comprises 123 articles and sets out the rights of children. Amongst other things it prohibits their involvement in connection with armed conflicts, organized crime and designated forms of employment. It also provides for the provision of training for physically and mentally disturbed children and their integration into society as well as containing provisions for dealing with juvenile delinquents and their diversion from the criminal justice system.

The Constitutional Court in South Africa in In re Farieda Coetzee v. Government of the Republic of South Africa (unreported, 1995), has held unanimously that the power of a magistrates' court to issue an order to commit to prison a judgment debtor on account of a failure to satisfy a judgment debt violates the right to freedom contained in Chapter 3 of the Constitution. Applying the proviso in section 33 of the Constitution, the court accepted that the goal sought to be achieved, that is the provision of a mechanism for the enforcement of judgment debts, was a legitimate and reasonable governmental objective, but that ultimately the offending provisions in the Magistrates' Court Act were overly broad and thus outside the proviso in that they caught not only those who could pay but were refusing to do so, but also those who were genuinely unable to pay.