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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2011
The opening paragraph in Mr. Campbell's excellent article on “American business interests and the Open Door in China, “published in the preceding number of the Quarterly, might leave the casual reader with the impression that the principle of the Open Door in China was no older than the year 1899. Actually, as has been pointed out by numerous authors, the principle of equality of opportunity for all nations in China, which constitutes the meaning of the Open Door in its broadest sense, goes back at least to the most-favored-nation clauses in the supplementary British treaty of 1843 and the American treaty of 1844.
1 Dennett, Tyler, Americans in eastern Asia (New York: Macmillan, 1922), pp. 108–11Google Scholar, 145–71, 634–49; Bau, Mingchien Joshua [Ming-chien Pao], The Open Door doctrine in relation to China (New York: Macmillan, 1923), pp. 1–5Google Scholar and Dennett's introduction; Yen, En Tsung [En-tsung Yen], The Open Door policy (Boston: Stratford, 1923), pp. 28–29Google Scholar; Dennis, A. L. P., Adventures in American diplomacy (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1928), pp. 170–72.Google Scholar
2 It is perhaps debatable as to whether the most-favored-nation clause ever aimed at more than the preservation of equal opportunity in commerce and navigation; for example, that it never aimed to secure equal opportunity for investments. It is certain, however, that it was used in China by various countries to claim privileges for their missionaries which had been granted to other powers (see note 10 below). It is equally certain that, had one nation included in its treaties a general clause granting its nationals the right to loan money to the Chinese government or to Sino-Western firms for the development of China, participation in this privilege would have been claimed by all powers under the most-favored-nation clause. Thus in a general sense it embodied a limitless doctrine of equality of opportunity capable of expansion in many directions.
3 For some discussion of the cooperative nature of the policy see Dennett's comments in the introduction to Bau, , op. cit., pp. xix–xxiii.Google Scholar
4 For an excellent treatment of this whole subject see J. K. Fairbank's article in this issue and Fairbank, J. K. and Teng, S. Y., “On the Ch'ing tributary system,” Harvard journal of Asiatic studies, 6 (June, 1941), 135–246.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
5 Ch'in-ting Ta Ch'ing hui-tien 
as quoted in Fairbank, and Teng, , op. cit., pp. 163–177.Google Scholar
6 Morse, H. B., Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926–1929), vol. 5, pp. 37–44Google Scholar, 94–98; vol. 3, pp. 127–29, 385–88; vol. 4, pp. 44–49, 293–301. Shih-Iiao hsün-k'an 
[Historical materials published every ten days] (Peip'ing: Palace Museum, 1930–31), vol. 9, pp. 307–10.
7 For example, in 1793 when the English obtained a decrease in the charges on traveling from Canton to Macao the Dutch (and presumably other European traders) obtained the same concession. See Pritchard, Earl H., Crucial years of early Anglo-Chinese relations, 1790–1800 (Pullman, Washington: Research studies of the State College of Washington, 1936), p. 323Google Scholar, and Tsiang, T. F. [T'ing-fu Chiang], “The extension of equal commercial privileges to other nations than the British after the treaty of Nanking,” Chinese social and political science review, 15 (Oct., 1931), 423.Google Scholar
8 T'ing-nan, Liang, Yüeh hai-kuan chih 
[Gazetteer of the maritime customs of Kwangtung] (Peip'ing reprint: Kuo-hsüeh wen-k'u 
, 1935) ch. 23, PP. 87–88.Google Scholar Somewhat less literal translations are given in Morse, , Chronicles, vol. 2, p. 248Google Scholar and Backhouse, E. and Bland, J. O. P., Annals and memoirs of the court of Peking (London: Heinemann, 1914), p. 326.Google Scholar
9 See below, the material relating to notes 37 to 39.
10 Bass, Harold J., “The policy of the American State Department toward missionaries in the Far East,” Research studies of the State College of Washington, 5 (1937), 179–90Google Scholar, especially pp. 180, 185; Morse, H. B., International relations ofthe Chinese empire (London: Longmans, 1910–1918), vol. 1, pp. 331–32Google Scholar, 615–16; vol. 2, pp. 222–23; vol. 3, p. 374.
11 Hornbeck, Stanley K., The most-favored-nation clause in commercial treaties. Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, no. 343 (Madison, 1910), pp. 12–13.Google Scholar
12 Morse, , Chronicles, vol. 5, pp. 30, 82.Google Scholar
13 Dalrymple, Alexander, Oriental repertory (London: George Bigg, 1791–1797), vol. 2, p. 313.Google Scholar
14 Pritchard, , op. cit., p. 208.Google Scholar
15 Ibid., pp. 242–43.
16 Morse, , Chronicles, vol. 2, pp. 162Google Scholar, 164–65 and Cathcart's views, p. 158.
17 Ibid., pp. 234, 237, 238.
18 Ibid., pp. 214–15; Pritchard, , op. cit., pp. 275–76.Google Scholar
19 Pritchard, , op. cit., pp. 302–03.Google Scholar
20 MSS. India Office, China factory records, vol. 93, p. 188.
21 Pritchard, , op. cit., pp. 226–30.Google Scholar
22 Morse, , Chronicles, vol. 3, pp. 318–19Google Scholar and vol. 4, pp. 114–17, 170–72, 205–07, 234–47.
23 Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 114–17, 170–72.
24 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 244.
25 Dennett, , op. cit., p. 99.Google Scholar
26 Ibid., pp. 92, 95–97.
27 Morse, , International relations, vol. 1, p. 630.Google Scholar
28 Ibid., p. 300 and for Pottinger's instructions p. 663.
29 Chinese repository, 10 (Jan. 1841), 63; Morse, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 271–72.Google Scholar The British government disavowed Elliot's preliminary agreement with the Chinese because he had disregarded part of his instructions and failed to get certain essential concessions and not because he announced that England was not seeking special privileges as some writers like to insinuate.
30 Chinese repository, 10 (June, 1841), 350; Morse, , op. cit., vol. 1, p. 275.Google Scholar
31 Tsiang, , op. cit., pp. 426–29. Memorials of I-li-pu and Ch'i-ying to the throne in January, 1843, advising most-favored-nation treatment.Google Scholar
32 Kearny, Thomas, “The Tsiang documents,” CSPSR, 36 (April, 1932), 79.Google Scholar Thomas Kearny's claim that his forebear had obtained a promise of most-favored-nation treatment from the Chinese before the treaty of Nanking (pp. 77–78, 81) is not supported by any reliable historical facts and is adequately refuted in Professor Tsiang's rejoinder, ibid., pp. 105–06.
33 Ibid., pp. 80–81.
34 Tsiang, , op. cit., pp. 425–26.Google Scholar
35 Ibid., pp. 426–32; Tsiang, T. F., “New light on Chinese diplomacy, 1836–49,” Journal of modem history, 3 (Dec, 1931), 588–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
36 Kearny, , op. cit., pp. 85–88.Google Scholar
37 Chinese repository, 12 (Aug., 1843), 443–44.
38 Dennett, , op. cit., pp. 108–10.Google Scholar
39 Kuo, Ping Chia [Ping-chia Kuo], “Caleb Cushing and the treaty of Wanghia, 1844,” Journal of modem history, 5 (1933), 35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
40 Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China and foreign states (Shanghai, 1908), vol. 1, p. 201.
41 Tsiang, , op. cit., pp. 436–37.Google Scholar A version as given in the Chinese repository, 13 (March, 1844), 145, would imply that at the time of the signing of the treaty of Nanking the Chinese had decided to grant the same privileges to all powers. For various versions of this article see Kearny, , op. cit., pp. 97–100.Google Scholar
42 Tsiang, , op. cit., p. 442.Google Scholar
43 Miller, Hunter (ed.), Treaties and other international acts of the United States of America (Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1934), vol. 4, p. 560.Google Scholar For Webster's instructions see pp. 640–41.
44 Treat, P. J., The Far East (New York: Harpers, 1935), p. 323.Google Scholar Convention of June 20, 1895.
45 The powers claimed and were given first opportunity in the development of specific geographical areas or spheres of influence and were granted leaseholds and railway and mining concessions, which once given to one power it was physically impossible to grant to some other power or for other powers to claim them under the most-favored-nation clause. Concessions like these automatically destroyed equal investment opportunities and were potentially capable of destroying equal trading rights. This exclusive development might have been combatted by insisting that China invalidate the concessions because they violated the most-favored-nation clause of existing treaties, but this was not done, probably because of the necessity of backing it up by force. The easier way was to claim compensating agreements which only instituted a veritable scramble for exclusive concessions. Still a third possibility, the one finally followed by the United States, was to re-state the most-favored-nation doctrine in such a way that it could be applied to the sphere of influence in a limited manner for the protection of commerce.
46 Griswold, A. W., The Far Esatern policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, 1938), pp. 36–85Google Scholar; McCordock, R. S., British Far Eastern policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931)Google Scholar, chap. 5; Joseph, Philip, Foreign diplomacy in China, 1894–1900 (London: George Allen, 1928)Google Scholar, chaps. 15–18; Bau, op. cit., chaps. 1–2; Dennis, , op. cit., pp. 170–196.Google Scholar
47 Dennett in the introduction to Bau, , op. cit., p. xx and chap. 4.Google Scholar
48 Clyde, Paul H., A history of the modem and contemporary Far East (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937), pp. 497–501.Google Scholar
49 Bau, , op. cit., pp. 221–24Google Scholar, on the Nine Power Treaty, and pp. 176–82, on the new consortium.
50 Statements by the American and British governments in July, 1940, and May, 1941, make it clear that they are willing to negotiate a relinquishment of special privileges in China as soon as the war is over and China's participation in the present war as an ally of the United States and Britain will assure her equal treatment after the war (See Contemporary China (June 25, 1941), no. 3 and Jones, S. S. and Myers, D. P., Documents on American foreign relations (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941), vol. 3, pp. 240–41).Google Scholar
