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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 December 2013
The question as to whether Seleucus was included in the Peace of 311 B.C., when the allied coalition came to terms with Antigonus the One-Eyed, has been frequently discussed. Droysen's opinion that he was not seemed to be confirmed in a conclusive manner by Munro's discovery at the end of the century of the Scepsis inscription, in which Antigonus, in an official letter to the city of Scepsis in the Troad, sets out the terms of the peace treaty and the names of the participants; for, as in the brief passage of Diodorus dealing with the same event, there is no mention of Seleucus. Nevertheless, Beloch and others were unconvinced, and supported their dissenting view by pointing to the fact that the historical record showed no clear trace of fighting between Antigonus and Seleucus immediately after 311. Subsequently, however, it was established that such fighting did take place at that time by the discovery of fragments of a Babylonian chronicle relating to the Successors. This new evidence also made it clearer than ever that Seleucus had not been included in the Peace, by showing that the chief motive of Antigonus in making peace then was the wish to be left free to combat Seleucus, who had just re-established himself as an independent power in the eastern satrapies of the empire. The correct interpretation of the evidence would seem to be that given, for example, by Rostovtzeff: that Seleucus was excluded from the Peace, because Antigonus insisted upon this condition; that Cassander, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus acquiesced; and that war was at once waged against him by Antigonus.
1 Droysen, , Geschichte des Hellenismus II (1877–1878), i, 63Google Scholar; 67.
2 Munro, , JHS (1899), 330 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar = OGIS 5 = Welles, , Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period (1934), no. 1.Google Scholar
3 Diod. XIX 105. 1 (omission by Diodorus could have arisen through his abbreviation of the narrative in Hieronymus, as Beloch points out; see following note).
4 Beloch, , Griechische Geschichte IV (1926–1927), 1, 133Google Scholar; cf. ib. IV, 2, 618.
5 Smith, , Babylonian Historical Texts (1924), 124 ff.Google Scholar; for Smith, much revised historical commentary see Rev. d'Assyriologie (1925), 179 ff.Google Scholar
6 Rostovtzeff, , Soc. Ec. Hist. of the Hellenistic World (1941), 12 ff.Google Scholar; cf. Jouguet, , L'Impérialisme Macédonien (1926), 174 f.Google Scholar; Cary, , History of the Greek World 323–146 B.C. (1932), app. 3, p. 384.Google Scholar
7 Niese, , Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeronea I (1893), 304.Google Scholar
8 Studi ital. di filol. class. VIII (1930), 83 ff.
9 See Corradi, , Studi ellenistici (1929), 16 ff.Google Scholar, where the earlier articles of Costanza and Denicolai are summarised; cf. Bengtson, , Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Keit I (1937), 118 n. 3.Google Scholar
10 Momigliano, loc. cit., p. 86.
11 Diod. XIX 64. 8; ib. 75.6.
12 Diod. XIX 64. 8.
13 Diod. XIX 64. 4 ff.
14 Diod. XIX 75. 6.
15 Diod. XIX 75. 6; the same expression is used in the account of the Peace of 311 in the Scepsis letter: OGIS 5. 10 
and 30 f. 
16 See Bauer, , Die Heidelberger Epitome (1914), pp. 15 ff.Google Scholar, where many examples are given; cf. Schubert, , Die Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit (1914), 272 ff.Google Scholar; Jacoby, , FGrH II BD, 545.Google Scholar
17 OGIS 5. 26–31; consequently the word Πτολεμοπωι in 1. 9f. must be a slip on the part of the stone-cutter. Either he should have written ‘Lysimachus’ (so Cavaignac, , Hist. de l'ant. III (1914), 25Google Scholar), or he inscribed an incorrect form of the name ‘Polemaeus’, Antigonus's nephew, who was at this time operating in Greece against Cassander (so Wilcken and Dittenberger). It does not matter which correction is adopted, or how the mistake is explained, so long as we exclude the possibility that Antigonus could have contradicted himself in an official letter.
18 E.g. by Welles, op. cit. 10.
19 OGIS 5. 42 ff. et al.
20 Cf. Koehler, , SB Berlin (1901), 1059Google Scholar: ‘Den in dem Schreiben enthaltenen thatsächlichen Angaben hat man keine Ursache zu misstrauen; anders verhält es sich mit den Motiven welche den thatsächlichen Angaben zur Erläuterung beigefügt sind.’
21 Diod. XX 37. 1 f.; cf. Beloch, op. cit. IV, i, 145 f.
22 loc. cit. 1061.
23 Cf. Diod. XIX 65. 8.
24 Diod. XIX 56. 1; ib. 80. 3.
25 Ib. 56, 57, 1.
26 As Niese suggests (op. cit. 288 n. 5). It may be inferred from the close collaboration between Lysimachus and Cassander in countering the subsequent threat of Antigonus to invade Europe. Cf. Diod. XX 106. 3.
27 Their help to Asander in Caria had been too little and too late: Diod, XIX 62. 2, 5.
28 Ib. 56. 3.
29 Welles, op. cit., no. 1. 7 f.; see below.
30 Diod. XIX 105. 1. It is impossible to enter here into the many interesting questions concerning the policy of Antigonus and the other Macedonian leaders towards Greek states.
31 Welles, op. cit. no. 1. 1 ff.; 12 ff.; 21 ff.; 42 ff.
32 Theoretically, only until the latter attained to his majority, so that Cassander in this respect was worse off than the others (Diod. XIX 105. 1; cf. Bengtson, op. cit. 89).
33 Diod. XVIII 54. 3; ib. 68. 1.
34 Diod. XIX 61. 1 ff.
35 Diod. XX 110. 2 ff.
38 Diod. XX 106. 1 ff.
37 For allied disunity before Ipsus cf. Justin XV 2. 15.
38 Welles, op. cit., no. 1. 39 ff.
39 Perhaps the concessions referred to in Welles, no. 1. 2 f.
40 Diod. XIX 75. 6.
41 Cf. Heuss, , Hermes (1938), 189 n. 1.Google Scholar
42 Welles, no. 1. 1 ff.
43 On Antigonus's anxiety to win the confidence of the Greek cities by a sincere application of his autonomy policy, see Diod. XIX 74. 1; ib. 78. 2.
44 Welles, no. 1.7 f.
45 This is clearly recognised by Welles (op. cit. 9). Tarn thinks that Ptolemy, intervened (Camb. Anc. Hist. VI (1927), 486)Google Scholar. No doubt he would have hindered a separate peace if he could have done so, but it is hard to believe that such intervention, if it occurred, determined Cassander's decision. Koehler, (SB Berlin (1901), 1060)Google Scholar thinks that friends of Cassander are meant; he does not accept that Ptolemy is meant.
46 See Olmstead, , Class. Phil. (1937), 1 ff.Google Scholar; cf. Parker, and Dubberstein, , Babylonian Chronology 626Google Scholar B.C.–A.D. 45 (Studies in Ancient Oriental Civilisation no. 24 2nd. ed. 1946), 17 f.
47 It was probably a relief to both of them to be separated. A man of Seleucus's calibre could not continue as a subordinate indefinitely, and Ptolemy had a short way of dealing with dangerous men (cf. his treatment of Polemaeus in 309 (Diod. XX 27. 3)).
48 Diod. XX 19. 3 f.
49 Cf. Koehler, loc. cit. 1065.
50 Welles, no. 1. 32 ff.
51 Corradi's, statement (Studi ellenistici (1929), 18)Google Scholar that the allies conducted the war in full accord is at variance with the facts of the separate negotiations on the Hellespont and at Ecregma; when he says that there is no authority for supposing that they concluded peace separately he flatly ignores what is said in Antigonus's letter to Scepsis (reproduced correctly, e.g. by Tarn, , Camb. Am. Hist. VI, 488Google Scholar).
52 As Momigliano does (see above p. 25); cf. Bengtson, op. cit. I, 117 f.; Heuss, , Hermes (1938), 153 n. 2.Google Scholar The whole idea of a secret or silent agreement to protect the interests of Seleucus seems unacceptable for the simple reason that the uncertainty created would have more or less invalidated the treaty from the start. The test case shows that Ptolemy on renewing the war could not plead the violation of any such agreement by Antigonus (see below).
53 Diod. XX 19. 3 f.
54 Ptolemy had made an autonomy proclamation in 315 in imitation of Antigonus (Diod. XIX 62. 1). There is no reason to think that Cassander was consulted then. For Ptolemy, with scarcely any Greek cities in his own territory, it was a cheap tactic.
55 Cf. the penetrating remarks of Rostovtzeff in the same sense, Soc. Ec. Hist, of the Hellenistic World (1941), 13 f. Tarn's view of all these events seems to be similar to that expressed in the present paper, though he is forced to deal only briefly with each development (Camb. Am. Hist. VI (1927), 486–95). Droysen, working without the Scepsis letter or the Babylonian evidence, recognised part of the truth. He believed that the allies had been compelled to make peace on surprisingly unfavourable terms because of their lack of co-operation; he even believed in a separate peace preceding the combined peace, but supposed that it was with Ptolemy (the wrong way round). Above all Droysen has the merit of recognising clearly that Seleucus was not included in the Peace and that Antigonus made peace in order to attack Seleucus (op. cit. II 1. 61 ff.).
