Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-564cf476b6-4htn5 Total loading time: 0.223 Render date: 2021-06-19T09:15:20.428Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true }

Institutions first

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 February 2011

PETER BOETTKE
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA
ALEXANDER FINK
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA
Corresponding
E-mail address:

Abstract:

Ha-Joon Chang, in his article ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’, raises doubts about the effects of institutions on economic development and questions the positive effects of entirely free markets based on secure private property rights. We respond by stressing that institutions structure the incentives underlying individual action, secure private property rights are indispensable for prosperity, institutions have a first-order effect whereas policies only have a second-order effect, successful institutional change comes from within a society, and, given the status quo of developing countries, first-world institutions are likely not to be available to them.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below.

References

Acemoglu, D. and Johnson, S. (2005), ‘Unbundling Institutions’, Journal of Political Economy, 113 (5): 949995.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. (2001), ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’, American Economic Review, 91 (5): 13691401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. (2002), ‘Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (4): 12311294.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baumol, W. J. (1990), ‘Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive’, Journal of Political Economy, 98 (5): 893921.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berggren, N. (2003), ‘The Benefits of Economic Freedom: A Survey’, Independent Review, 8 (2): 193211.Google Scholar
Boettke, P. J. (2010), ‘Is the Only Form of “Reasonable Regulation” Self Regulation?: Lessons from Lin Ostrom on Regulating the Commons and Cultivating Citizens’, Public Choice, 143: 283291.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boettke, P. J. and Coyne, C. J. (2009), ‘Context Matters: Institutions and Entrepreneurship’, Foundations and Trends in Entrepreneurship, 5 (3): 135209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boettke, P. J., Coyne, C. J., and Leeson, P. T. (2008), ‘Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics’, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 67 (2): 331358.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boettke, P. J., Coyne, C. J., Leeson, P. T., and Sautet, F. (2005), ‘The New Comparative Political Economy’, Review of Austrian Economics, 18 (3/4): 281304.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J. M. (1980), The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Buchanan, J. M. (1987), ‘The Constitution of Economic Policy’, American Economic Review, 77 (3): 243250.Google Scholar
Buchanan, J. M. (2008), ‘Same Players, Different Game: How Better Rules Make Better Politics’, Constitutional Political Economy, 19: 171179.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chang, H. (2011), ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’, Journal of Institutional Economics, 7 (4): doi:10.1017/S1744137410000378.Google Scholar
Coyne, C. J. (2006), ‘Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy’, Foreign Policy Analysis 2: 343361.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coyne, C. J. (2008a), After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy, Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Coyne, C. J. (2008b), ‘The Politics of Bureaucracy and the Failure of Reconstruction.’ Public Choice, 135 (1–2): 1122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Easterly, W. (2002), The Elusive Quest for Growth, Cambridge: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
Easterly, W. (2006), The White Man's Burden, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Easterly, W. (2009), ‘Can the West Save Africa?’, Journal of Economic Literature, 47 (2): 373447.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, R. and Jones, C. (1999), ‘Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (1): 83116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hay, J. R. and Shleifer, A. (1998), ‘Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform’, American Economic Review, 88 (2): 398403.Google Scholar
Leeson, P. T. (2007), ‘Better Off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government Collapse’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 35 (4): 689710.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leeson, P. T. and Williamson, C. R. (2009), ‘Anarchy and Development: An Application of the Theory of Second Best’, Law and Development Review, 2 (1): 7596.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrom, E. (2005), Understanding Institutional Diversity, Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., and Trebbi, F. (2004), ‘Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development’, Journal of Economic Growth, 9 (2): 131165.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scully, G. (1988), ‘The Institutional Framework and Economic Development’, Journal of Political Economy, 96 (3): 652662.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shleifer, A. (2009), ‘The Age of Milton Friedman’, Journal of Economic Literature, 47 (1): 123135.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
The Fund For Peace (2010), Failed State Index Scores 2010, http://www.fundforpeace.org (accessed 26 November 2010).Google Scholar
Williamson, C. R. (2009), ‘Informal Institutions Rule: Institutional Arrangements and Economic Performance’, Public Choice, 139 (3–4): 371387.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
26
Cited by

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Institutions first
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

Institutions first
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

Institutions first
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *