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Crafting analytical tools to study institutional change

  • ELINOR OSTROM (a1) (a2) and XAVIER BASURTO (a3)
Abstract
Abstract:

Most powerful analytical tools used in the social sciences are well suited for studying static situations. Static and mechanistic analysis, however, is not adequate to understand the changing world in which we live. In order to adequately address the most pressing social and environmental challenges looming ahead, we need to develop analytical tools for analyzing dynamic situations – particularly institutional change. In this paper, we develop an analytical tool to study institutional change, more specifically, the evolution of rules and norms. We believe that in order for such an analytical tool to be useful to develop a general theory of institutional change, it needs to enable the analyst to concisely record the processes of change in multiple specific settings so that lessons from such settings can eventually be integrated into a more general predictive theory of change.

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Copyright
Corresponding author
*Email: ostrom@indiana.edu
**Email: xavier.basurto@duke.edu
Linked references
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C. Gibson , K. Andersson , E. Ostrom , and S. Shivakumar (2005a), The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

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E. Ostrom (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, New York: Cambridge University Press.

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V. Ostrom (1997), The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerability of Democracies: A Response to Tocqueville's Challenge, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

A. Poteete , M. Janssen , and E. Ostrom (2010), Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons, and Multiple Methods in Practice, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

W. G. Runciman (2009), The Theory of Cultural and Social Selection, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

A. A. Schmid (2004), Conflict and Cooperation: Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Malden, MA: Blackwell.

S. Wasserman and K. Faust (1994), Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

F. Weissing and E. Ostrom (1991), ‘Irrigation institutions and the games irrigators play: rule enforcement without guards’, in R. Selten (ed.), Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals, and Markets, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 188262.

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Journal of Institutional Economics
  • ISSN: 1744-1374
  • EISSN: 1744-1382
  • URL: /core/journals/journal-of-institutional-economics
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