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On the optimal specificity of legal rules

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2007

VINCY FON  and
FRANCESCO PARISI
VINCY FON
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, George Washington University, Washington DC, 20052, USA. Email: vfon@gwu.edu
FRANCESCO PARISI
Affiliation:
School of Law, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA and Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy. Email: parisi@umn.edu
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Abstract:

Lawmakers can choose to craft laws with different levels of detail to guide judges in their decision-making process, incorporating rules or standards into the laws they write. The optimal degree of specificity of legal rules under different environmental conditions and the functionality of these rules or standards are the subjects of the present study. A basic model of optimal specificity of laws is presented, clarifying the relevance of legal obsolescence and volume of litigation in the optimal choice. We then consider the important influence of codification style, judges’ specialization, and complexity of reality on the optimal choice of legislative instrument. The implications of our results are then reexamined in light of the more complex institutional reality that characterizes contemporary legislative processes in various areas of the law.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , August 2007 , pp. 147 - 164
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2007

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