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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2008
On 11 November 1965, the Government of Rhodesia, firm in its resolve to maintain minority racial rule by persons of European descent, abrogated the colonial constitution then in effect and declared its independence of Great Britain. The works under review in this essay examine the dilemmas of Zambian leaders, on the one hand, and loyalist members of the Rhodesian judiciary as well as the loyalist governor of Rhodesia, on the other.
1 Documents Relating to the Negotiations between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian Governments, November 1963–November 1965 (London, 1965), Comnd. 2807, p. 124. This quotation paraphrases Harold Wilson's own words.Google Scholar
2 Wilson, Harold, The Labour Government, 1964–70: a personal record (Harmondsworth, 1974), pp. 256–7.Google Scholar
3 This finding disconfirms an hypothesis previously advanced in Brecher, Michael, Decisions in Crisis: Israel 1967 and 1973 (Berkeley, 1980), which fostered a decision- making, rather than a systemoriented, approach to the study of international crises. Anglin's publication is part of the International Crisis Behaviour Project, which sponsors studies that ‘employ a common framework of analysis developed by its director, Michael Brecher’ (p. 4). The flexibility of Brecher's model, as it is described in this work, is conducive to its application to the varying circumstances of countries throughout the world. Anglin has enriched the scientific study of international relations with an African case history that will be consulted widely for its methodological significance as well as its historic importance.Google Scholar
4 Tordoff, William, ‘Kenneth Kaunda’, in Glickman, Harvey (ed.), Political Leaders of Contemporary Africa South of the Sahara: a biographical dictionary (Westport, CT, and London, 1992), pp. 104–5.Google Scholar
5 Although Anglin perceives substantial continuity in the process of foreign policy decisionmaking for the Zambian Government during the quarter of a century following the crisis analysed in his book, that assessment, he cautions, ‘has yet to be properly tested empirically’ (p. 253).
6 Leo Baron was imprisoned for 17 months and released on condition that he leave Rhodesia. He ‘became a judge and later deputy chief justice of Zambia’ (Goldin, pp. 145 and 147), as well as a constitutional advisor to the Patriotic Front, the coalition of Zimbabwean nationalist political parties, formed in 1976 to co-ordinate an armed struggle. Eventually, the Front negotiated a settlement of the conflict leading to democratic elections and the birth of the Republic of Zimbabwe, in 1980, at which time Baron was appointed to the Appellate Division of the High Court.
7 Goldin's memoir is sympathetic to both the Governor and the Chief Justice, despite his profound disagreement with Beadle's eventual acceptance of the UDI régime's claim of sovereignty. He remarks laconically on their joint ‘efforts, hopes, and frustrations while they resided at Government House’, terminating ‘in failure and separation’, as ‘an interesting and unusual facet of the revolution’ (p. 122). He is also indebted to Beadle's widow and son-in-law for having had unrestricted access to the late Chief Justice's diaries and papers, which are quoted frequently and at length in this work.
8 HaroldWilson's scornful portrayal of the political rôle of the Chief Justice contrast strikingly with his always respectful references to the Governor. For instance, the only specific information that Wilson imparts from his private stroll in the garden with the Zambian President in January 1966 is his being ‘ a little shocked to hear Kenneth Kaunda described Sir Humphrey Gibbs as a racialist’ (Wilson, op. cit. p.257). Like Ian Smith, Gibbs was a gentleman farmer; even after UDI, it was their habit to discuss farming problems, as well as political questions, when they met. The Governor's son, who managed the family farm, communicated with his father by sending phone message via Smith, whose official residence was across the road from Government House, where the telephones were disconnected (Goldin, p. 74).
9 In 1971, a Conservative government negotiated a settlement with the white Rhodesian leaders that would have conceded independence on terms that were acceptable to the Smith régime. However, the Conservative, Labour, and Liberal parties were all firmly committed to the principle, enunciated in 1965, that ‘the British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole’. Lord Pearce was appointed to chair a British commision that would make the crucial determination. After consulting widely and intensively with community leaders throughout Rhodesia, the Pearce Commission reported that an overwhelming majority of Africans rejected the proposed settlement, which the British Government acknowledged.
