^{page 281 note 1} As used here the term ‘militarising’ refers to the process of increasing the share of central governmental expenditures allocated to military purposes. This may or may not be a manifestation of ‘militarism’ which, according to Alfred Vagts, pertains to any resource allocation, emphasis upon martial values, or ritual celebration of use of military force which is not necessary for the external defence of the state; A History of Militarism (New York, 1959)Google Scholar.

^{page 283 note 1} For an incisive critique of this so-called modernising military rôle in the African context, see Adekson, J. Bayo, ‘On the Theory of Modernizing Soldier: a critique’, in Current Research on Peace and Violence (Tampere, Finland), I, 1978, pp. 28–31Google Scholar.

^{page 283 note 2} In addition to rejecting a posture of deference towards large property-owning upper-class sectors through controls and enlargement of the public sector to the point of dominance, radical or state capitalist régimes typically pursue most of the following policies: (1) redistributive agrarian and other social reforms: (2) price controls and subsidies for basic mass necessities; (3) imposition of foreign-exchange controls; (4) encouragement of trade unions, co-operatives, and other mass organisations; (5) tolerance or co-optation of Marxists; (6) attempts to organise mass parties to support régime mobilisational efforts; (7) broadening of relationships with state socialist systems; and (8) the adoption of a non-aligned foreign policy. By way of contrast, antithetical policies are imposed by ‘open-door’ or monopoly capitalist élites.

State socialist régimes are ruled by a non-consumerist political class whose developmental strategies are generally distinguished by elimination of the private employing class, directive central planning, full employment, a cadre party system which effectively stimulates mass participation in resource mobilisation, and institutional military subordination.

The socio-economic and political performances of these régimes are outlined in Wolpin, Miles D., ‘Militarism, Socialism and Civilian Rule in the Third World: a comparison of development costs and benefits’, in Instant Research on Peace and Violence (Tampere, Finland), VIII, 3–4, 1977, pp. 105–33Google Scholar.

^{page 283 note 3} See, for example, ‘Amid Oil Riches, Mexico's Poor Fare Badly’, in New York Times, 19 November 1979, p. A3.

^{page 283 note 4} George, Susan, Feeding the Few (Washington, 1978)Google Scholar.

^{page 284 note 1} Wolpin, Miles D., ‘Contemporary Radical Third World Regimes: prospects for their survival’, American Political Science Association, 09 1977Google Scholar.

^{page 285 note 1} Wolpin, Miles D., ‘Dependency and Conservative Militarism in Mali’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), XIII, 4, 12 1975, pp. 585–620Google Scholar.

^{page 285 note 2} Wolpin, Miles D., ‘Egalitarian Reformism in the Third World vs the Military: a profile of failure’, in Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), XV, 2, 1978, pp. 89–107Google Scholar.

^{page 286 note 1} Rondos, Alexander G., ‘Mali: what kind of handover?’, in Africa Report (New York), 01–02 1979, p. 39Google Scholar.

^{page 286 note 2} Between 1961 and 1970, Malian military expenditure declined by 38 per cent – the entire reduction occurring during 1965–1966. During the same decade those of Upper Volta, Niger, and Chad rose by 433 per cent, while such spending for the seven lowest G.N.P. per capita countries in Africa, including Mali, rose by 299 per cent. As a percentage of G.N.P., Mali's military expenditure declined by 55 per cent from 4·2 to 1·9 between 1961 and 1968, while for Africa as a whole it increased by 64 per cent from 1·14 to 2·2. U.S. Department of Defense, Arms Control and Disarmament, World Military Expenditures, 1971 (Washington, 1972), pp. 20–1Google Scholar.

While it is important to recognise that U.S. military aid is not always publicly disclosed, official sources reveal that between the fiscal years 1961 and 1965, Mali received more than $1.6 million in M.A.P. deliveries. The level in 1966 was $451,000, increased to $700,000 in 1967. A lapse then occurred until 1970, when deliveries were resumed at the level of $38,000, supplemented by $84,000 in military sales. Although there was a sharp drop during 1971 in both these categories, the following year Mali received $48,000 in directly financed military sales.

With respect to the training of Malian officers, the U.S. has allocated $883,000 prior to 1969, with larger amounts going to only four other African countries, Thereafter, the annual figures through to 1973 were: $1,000, $45,000, $6,000, $43,000, and $4,000. The number of students technically and often politically indoctrinated by 1968 was 49 (the sixth highest in Africa), with an additional 18 by 1973. Although commercial arms exports from the U.S. occurred between 1973 and 1977, no M.A.P. aid was reported.

Sources: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Military Assistance and Foreign Sales, March 1972 (Washington, 1972), pp. 7, 9, and 17Google Scholar and U.S. Department of Defense, Security Assistance Agency, Data Management Division, Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, December 1978 (Washington, 1978)Google Scholar.

^{page 286 note 3} Bebler, Anton, Military Rule in Africa: Dahomey, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Mali (New York, 1972), p. 149Google Scholar.

^{page 286 note 4} ‘Interview with Philip Agee’, in Playboy (Chicago), 08 1975, pp. 49–70, passimGoogle Scholar.

^{page 287 note 1} As regards the mass dismissals of workers and other aspects of intra-régime policy conflicts during the initial years, see the incisive analysis of Bennett, Valerie Plave, ‘Military Government in Mali’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, XIII, 2, 06 1975, pp. 249–65, esp. pp. 255–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^{page 287 note 2} Rondos, loc. cit. p. 41.

^{page 287 note 3} Bebler, op. cit. Thus, for example, 89 per cent of state revenues in the 1976 budget was allocated to salaries; Legum, Colin (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record: annual survey and documents, 1975–76 (New York, 1976), p. B758Google Scholar.

^{page 288 note 1} At least since 1975, according to Legum (ed.), ibid. 1975–1976, French military aid has been resumed; and following the 1978 purge that probably has also been true for U.S. military training. According to Rondos, loc. cit. p. 41, ‘in recent statements President Traoré has indicated that the next regime will encourage the development of private Malian and foreign investment’.

^{page 288 note 2} Africa Confidential (London), XX, 12, 6 06 1979 pp. 4–5Google Scholar.

^{page 288 note 3} Gastil, Raymond D., ‘The Comparative Survey of Freedom – IX’, in Freedom at Issue (New York), 49, 01–02 1979, pp. 3–14Google Scholar.

^{page 289 note 1} Raymond D. Gastil, ‘The Map of Freedom’, in ibid. 17, January–February 1973, pp. 3–5 and 20–3.

^{page 289 note 2} Sources: McLaughlin, Martin M., The United States and World Development Agenda, 1979 (New York, 1979), pp. 156 and 166Google Scholar; and World Bank Atlas (Washington, 1978), p. 126Google Scholar.

^{page 289 note 3} World Military Expenditures, 1971.

^{page 290 note 1} Rondos, loc. cit.

^{page 290 note 2} Bennett, loc. cit. p. 257.

^{page 290 note 3} Africa Confidential, XX, 12, 6 June 1979, pp. 2–3.

^{page 290 note 4} Ibid. p. 2.

^{page 291 note 1} Legum (ed.), op. cit. 1978–1979, p. B708.

^{page 291 note 2} Wolpin, ‘Militarism, Socialism and Civilian Rule in the Third World’, loc. cit.

^{page 292 note 1} Source: World Bank Atlas (Washington, 1979), pp. 28–9 and 36–7Google Scholar.

^{page 293 note 1} Source: Sivard, Ruth Leger, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1979 (Leesburg, Virginia, 1979), pp. 32–3Google Scholar.

^{page 294 note 1} Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968–1977 (Washington, 1979)Google Scholar.

^{page 294 note 2} Africa Confidential, XX, 12, 6 June 1979, p. 5.