It is the thesis of this paper that the Communist Uprisings of 1926–27 in Indonesia were neither “proto-nationalist” nor a “revolution of hope”, as they have been called by two historians. I shall try to show that there were decidedly nationalist characteristics in the demands which the Communists made, in the objects against which the revolt was directed, and in the makeup of the Communist leadership at both the highest and secondary levels; furthermore, that, despite the era of prosperity which the colony was enjoying, the situation of the peasant was worsening.

The limitation of this essay seems obvious if we take modern Indonesian history to have started in 1870 and consider the word “recent” in the above title adequately covered by the years since 1940. The date 1870 is the starting-point of Western modern imperialism — a world-wide phenomenon — as well as of the so-called Liberal Period in the restricted Indonesian context. Thus the heyday of Dutch colonialism, the emergence of Indonesian nationalism, the downfall of the Netherlands Indies and the first decades of Indonesian independence fall within the scope of this survey. The choice of 1940, too, can be explained easily: it is the first year of the period which ultimately led not only to the political separation of the Indies and the Netherlands but also to a new approach in Dutch history-writing on Indonesia. This is not to sav that opinions critical of colonialism had not found their way into Dutch literature on Indonesia before 1940, or that opposition to the so-called Europe-centric attitude is to be noticed only after the Second World War: Stokvis and Van Leur, to mention only one for each case, are evidence that this was not so. Nor is it true that colonial apologists are extinct since 1940. But the Second World War nevertheless contributed to a significant change in the general trend of Dutch history-writing on Indonesia.

After four years in eclipse, a new political party is emerging from, the shadows of military rule in Burma. It is part of the revolution set in motion by the men who seized power in March 1962. In the four years following that event, the military rulers have persisted in their determination to remake Burma along the lines set forth in their ideological stafement, Burmese Way To Socialism (BWS). Thus far, the coup leaders show no signs of growing tired and desiring to return to the barracks. However, to insure the completion of their revolution and to anticipate the day when they will step out of office, they are in the process of recruiting, training and organizing a new elite of soldiers and civilians who are loyal to their ideas, dedicated to their programs and pledged to carry on when they are given the opportunity.

Relations between Australia and Indonesia became strained within months of Indonesia's attainment of independence, deteriorating as conflict developed first on the question of West Irian and then as a result of Indonesia's hostility towards Malaysia. For many years, it seemed ironical that Australia should have played a major part in the emergence of a neighbour whose external policies and internal trends endangered rather than safeguarded Australian interests. But there is more involved here than historical irony in the context of Australian-Indonesian relations. Sufficient time has now elapsed for Australian policy on the Indonesian independence question to be seen in the wider context of the whole postwar phenomenon of decolonisation. For it is not merely of interest that Australia should have assisted neighbouring Asian rebels against a European colonial Power (remembering that Australia herself was, and is, a European colonial Power) and should then have been embarrassed by the activities of the rebels coming to office. It is of greater interest that, of the immense number of colonial issues anxiously engaging the attention of international society in the 1940s and 1950s, the years which saw the virtual demise of western colonialism, this was the one issue on which Australia took up the rebel cause. Throughout this period and irrespective of the complexion of the parties in power in Canberra, Australia persistently jeopardised her regional objective of friendly relations with anti-colonial Asia by opposing strongly and, at times, bitterly the anti-colonial cause in the United Nations. If nothing else, the United Nations has provided a forum in which each year Australia and other members have been forced to declare themselves on colonial questions. And, until the 1960s when Australia switched policy, Australia fought against all the anti-colonial Powers' largely successful attempts to have developed a system of international control over colonies under the authority of Chapter XI (“Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories”) of the United Nations charter, to tighten the trusteeship system of supervision erected under Chapters XII and XIII of the charter, and to involve the United Nations in particular disputes so as to meet alleged threats to peace — all of them being attempts, however indirectly, to hasten the attainment of independence by dependent territories. Thus, Australia supported South Africa on South-West Africa, the Netherlands on West New Guinea, the British on Southern Rhodesia and Oman, the Portuguese on their African territories, the French on Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. But Australia opposed the Netherlands on the Indonesian question.

Although much has been written on China's relations with her neighbours to the north, west and east, relatively little has been done on those to the south. Such studies could provide many valuable contrasts and comparisons and should be of considerable assistance in assessing China's historic role as well as her present intentions in Southeast Asia.

The main characteristics of the Philippine political party system since the achievement of Philippine independence in 1946 have been the following:

1. It is a two party system. Two major parties, the Nacionalistas and the Liberals, dominate the scene. Their nation-wide combined vote at the six post-war presidential elections held since 1946 averaged 94 per cent of the votes cast. At both the eleven senatorial elections and the six elections for members of the House of Representatives held during the same period, the combined two-party vote was also 94 per cent. At the five gubernatorial elections held since 1947, the corresponding figure was 97 per cent.* In none of these election years did the combined two-party vote for any of these offices fall below 70 per cent.1 While minor parties have appeared from time to time, few have remained active for an extended period of years, and none has seriously threatened to replace either of the two existing major parties as the governing party or as the principal party of the opposition.

In this article an attempt is made to trace back as far as possible a history of Bang Chan, a rice-growing village in the central plains of Thailand. Documents existed which might have offered some clues, but help could not be expected from court records, land registration deeds or the census. All that existed lay in bundles in the District Office store rooms, a bit mouldy and perhaps chewed by silverfish. It would take a year at least to dig out the relevant papers, and then since family names do not appear until about 1915 and place names changed frequently, one would never know whether the case of Chan vs. Chya referred to incidents in Bang Chan or some other part of the district.

It would be easy, and not altogether inaccurate, to begin and end an article on Cambodian politics with the observation that Prince Sihanouk's leadership of the country has rendered political parties unnecessary. Since the establishment of the Sangkum Reastr Niyurn, the People's Socialist Community, in 1955, this political movement — the distinction is one made by its founder — has dominated Cambodian politics and succeeded in eclipsing the parties which existed up to 1955, with one minor exception. This exception is the Pracheachon, a partly clandestine front party for the Cambodian Communist Party. Its importance is negligible in a country in which social grievances, in contrast to so much of the rest of Asia, are limited, particularly in the countryside, where the peasant is normally a land-holder unencumbered by major problems of land indebtedness or land shortage.

Writing about political parties in Indonesia makes one suddenly aware of how little research has been done on the subject. With the decline of the parliamentary system since 1957, interest has shifted away from the party order towards the forces of Guided Democracy: President Soekarno, the army, and the Communists. Among the parties, only the Communists have received a great deal of specific attention.

An individual observing the varied complex course of Laotian events since the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina can well appreciate the frustrations experienced by Alice as she watched the animals run their caucus race. From 1954 to 1957, Laos followed a generally pro-Western foreign policy but government leaders would occasionally extol the virtues of the five Panscheel principles of peaceful coexistence. From November 1957 to July 1958, Laos was governed by a coalition that included two members of the Communist Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS), the political arm of the Pathet Lao. The Royal army and right wing political factions opposed the coalition, removed it from power and established a new government, one that was avowedly anti-Communist. By 1961, the major cold war protagonists had become so deeply and dangerously involved in Laotian politics that some observers feared and expected a major escalation in the Laotian conflict. Instead of fighting the major powers decided to convene a second Geneva conference. They debated the issues for more than a year and then agreed to neutralize Laos and recreate the coalition government. Today Laos is officially neutral but the fighting continues as it has since 1954. The Pathet Lao have withdrawn from the coalition and they continue to rely on military means for the realization of major objectives. In Alice in Wonderland, the caucus race has a happy ending: all the animals are declared winners. In Laos there have been no winners; the struggle continues and its outcome will affect the future of mainland Southeast Asia.

Burma, like so many other former British colonies, embarked upon its independence period with the stated aim of establishing a representative government of the parliamentary type. From 1949 to 1962, with the single interruption of General Ne Win's caretaker regime (1958–1960), Burma conducted in practice what its leaders conceived as a Parliamentary system. Concepts of government were “democratic” and emphasized the need for open discussion, political competition, and some real sense of political representation.

The Geneva Agreement of 1954 in effect divided Vietnam into two mutually independent states, aligned internationally with hostile power blocs owing allegiance to competitive ideological systems. In the North a fully committed Communist regime has maintained political and administrative hegemony, entrusting control of the governing process and of social change and economic planning to the Dang Lao Dong, the Workers' (Communist) Party of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

The difficulties inherent in the systematic and comprehensive acquisition of materials published in the Philippines are matched by their variety and value. The current volume of Philippine titles probably remains unduplicated elsewhere in Southeast Asia. In 1951, for example, “Manila was producing more serial publications than any other center in Southeast Asia.” English remains the predominant language of most scholarly publications. The usefulness of these materials, therefore, is increased for institutions who lack research needs for Philippine language resources but desire a solid student and teaching collection.

Following the initialing of the Treaty of Hue in 1884 ceding Tonkin and Annam to France as “protectorates”, the Vietnamese Emperor Ham Nghi led a nationalist imperial party against consummation of the colonialists gains. This Nguyen imperial party, a regional guerrilla and terrorist faction based only in the north central section of the nation and operating from highland fiefs, relied upon violence, the personality of its leader, the mystic of his cause and the mystic of nationalism. This combative “party,” while hardly a party in the strictest sense of the term and perhaps not even a movement in the strictest sense of that term, was defeated with the capture of its leader in 1888. Yet this party has continued to serve in miniature as the model for subsequent political party activities in Vietnam. Nearly all of the numerous Vietnamese parties have more or less emulated the patterns of behavior of the first anti-colonial party and few in South Vietnam have gone much beyond modifying the tactics of that vanguard group.

One of the major problems in the writing of Philippine history stems from inadequate knowledge of historical conditions in the rural Philippines. The problem is further complicated by a tendency to treat society as a monolithic structure susceptible to outside influence and change at a uniform rate. Consequently, it has proved difficult to judge accurately the impact on Philippine society of such phenomena as colonialism, the Revolution of 1896 and national politics in the twentieth century.

Whatever impact the formation of Malaysia had on the areas involved, the merger, in 1963, of mainland Malaya with Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah (North Borneo) — and the separation of Singapore in 1965 — has been a complication in the life of the political analyst in the midst of efforts to formulate generalizations about the country's political life. Obviously adjustments are being made in the whole range of political affairs as the various components of the enlarged federation are in the course of integration into a single operating political system. Yet, differences remain, and there is still much to be learned by considering the component parts as separate entities. Distortions will result from such a procedure, but as long as the researcher and his audience are alerted to the distortions, and no claim of completeness made, the built-in error need not be too misleading.

The political life in Sarawak has been characterised by confusion, disunity, and repeated crisis. As a primitive hinterland permeated by relatively sophisticated forms of political conflicts, it offers a rare phenomenon to political analysts. Several insightful articles have recently appeared concerning various aspects of its party system. I hope to concentrate on some aspects that I have not seen previously discussed.