Though researchers in the field of abstract computational complexity theory have utilized many of the tools of recursive function theory in the development of their field, the early results obtained (e.g., see [8]) seemed to be rather independent of results in recursion theory (at least to the extent that the results were not uniformly interesting to both varieties of theorists). It seems to have been generally accepted, however, that strong parallels of one form or another must exist between the two fields. Indeed, recent results of Blum and Marques [7], Morris [13], Soare [15] and Bennison [1], [3] have revealed a striking correspondence between complexity theoretic properties and recursion theoretic properties. These results are not contrived, but rather link together interesting properties which had arisen naturally and independently in their respective fields. This paper presents the results of research aimed at finding a recursion theoretic characterization for a complexity theoretic property which had arisen from the study of the speed-up phenomenon.

In abstract computational complexity theory we are concerned with categorizing computable functions or sets according to their relative difficulty of computation. The phrase “difficult to compute” may take on different meanings depending on which criteria (complexity theoretic properties) we use to define what it means for a function or set to be hard to compute. In the abstract setting, however, such criteria should yield the same classes of functions or sets regardless of the underlying abstract complexity measure (in the sense of Blum [4], e.g., tape, time, etc.). In other words, such criteria should be measure-independent. In this paper we will be considering one way of defining “difficult to compute”. Namely, we shall say that a function or set is difficult to compute if it does not have a recursively enumerable complexity sequence as defined by Meyer and Fischer [12]. For a property to have a recursion theoretic characterization it must be measure-independent, for a recursion theoretic property is, by its very nature, measure-independent. It will not be immediately obvious whether or not the property of having an r.e. complexity sequence is measure-independent. We attack this question by first considering an alternative definition of an r.e. complexity sequence, one which is easily seen to be measure-independent.

The properties of small cardinals such as ℵ1 tend to be much more complex than those of large cardinals, so that properties of ℵ1 may often be better understood by viewing them as large cardinal properties. In this paper we show that the existence of a precipitous ideal on ℵ1 is essentially the same as measurability.

If I is an ideal on P(κ) then R(I) is the notion of forcing whose conditions are sets x ∈ P(κ)/I, with x ≤ x′ if x ⊆ x′. Thus a set D R(I)-generic over the ground model V is an ultrafilter on P(κ) ⋂ V extending the filter dual to I. The ideal I is said to be precipitous if κ ⊨R(I)(Vκ/D is wellfounded).

One example of a precipitous ideal is the ideal dual to a κ-complete ultrafilter U on κ. This example is trivial since the generic ultrafilter D is equal to U and is already in the ground model. A generic set may be viewed as one that can be worked with in the ground model even though it is not actually in the ground model, so we might expect that cardinals such as ℵ1 that cannot be measurable still might have precipitous ideals, and such ideals might correspond closely to measures.

An individual-concept, hereinafter “individuation”, is a function from possible worlds to individuals. Constant individuations I will call “subsistents” (the notion will presently be generalized). A “substance”, after Thomason [35], is a subsistent whose value exists for the world at hand. In the systems of quantified modal logic developed over the past twenty years, the tendency has been to restrict the range of quantifiers to substances (often represented technically by the simple individuals that would be the values of the constant individuations), while allowing constant terms (particularly descriptions) to express arbitrary individuations. One result is to invalidate unrestricted universal instantiation (and existential generalization), rather as in free logic. Such systems approximate some features of ordinary usage rather nicely, e.g. the behavior of quantifiers and definite descriptions in tensed discourse. Stalnaker and Thomason's Q3r [34], based on the latter's Q3 [35], [36], is exemplary of this approach.

The suggestion has repeatedly been considered to quantify over individuations in general (Kanger [14], Kaplan [17], Hughes and Cresswell [12, p. 196], Thomason [35, p. 136], Pollock [30]).

In this series of two papers we wish to discuss two new methods of constructing models for an arbitrary theory T of stationary logic, L(aa). The original work in constructing models for this logic appears in Barwise-Kaufmann-Makkai [BKM] (which we shall refer to as BKM for brevity). In that paper the authors prove completeness, compactness, and omitting types theorems for L(aa) by a technique similar to that used by Keisler [1970] in constructing models of L(Q1), logic with the generalized quantifier “there exist uncountably many”. In this paper we give an alternative method of constructing models using a method of model-theoretic forcing similar to that of Bruce [1978]. In a succeeding paper we will give yet another method of constructing models using definable ultrapowers.

As applications of this new forcing construction we give new proofs of the completeness and omitting types theorems for LB(aa), where LB(aa) is any countable fragment of Lω1ω(aa). We also give new proofs of versions of the Barwise completeness and compactness theorems for LA(aa) where A is a countable admissible set. In proofs of these theorems the model constructions via forcing are used in a way very similar to that of consistency properties in Lω1ω.

Aside from the ease in handling the model theory of Lω1ω(aa) we see two other advantages in this sort of model construction. The first is in the ability to prove versions of theorems relativized to formulas of low complexity (e.g. relativized omitting types theorems). The second is that we have a high degree of control over the construction of standard models and hence have a better knowledge of the structure of the model (see the remarks following the proof of Lemma 3.3), something that should prove useful in constructing more complicated models.

Where a is a Turing degree and ξ is an ordinal < (ℵ1)L1, the result of performing ξ jumps on a, a(ξ), is defined set-theoretically, using Jensen's fine-structure results. This operation appears to be the natural extension through (ℵ1)L1 of the ordinary jump operations. We describe this operation in more degree-theoretic terms, examine how much of it could be defined in degree-theoretic terms and compare it to the single jump operation.

Call a set A of ordinals “definable” over a theory T if T is some brand of set theory and whenever A appears in the standard part of a (not necessarily standard) model of T, A is “definable”. Two kinds of “definability” are considered, for each of which is provided a complete (or almost complete) characterization of the hereditarily countable sets of ordinals “definable” over true finitely axiomatizable set theories: (1) there is a single formula ϕ such that in any model of T containing A, A is the unique solution to ϕ; (2) the defining formula is allowed to vary from model to model. (Note. The restrictions “finitely axiomatizable”, and “true” are largely for the sake of convenience: such theories provably have lots of models.)

There are few allusions to what a model theorist would regard as his subject—the methods coming from recursion theory and set theory; but the treatment is intended to be intelligible to nonspecialists. The referee's criticisms have greatly improved the exposition.

I would like to thank Leo Harrington for several discussions, both helpful and hapless, and especially for a clever and timely proof which rescued this project from a moribund state. (Further thanks are due to the Movshon family, as a result of whose New Year's Eve party it became clear that the only really magic formulas are Σ1 formulas.)

Modal logics are studied in their algebraic disguise of varieties of so-called modal algebras. This enables us to apply strong results of a universal algebraic nature, notably those obtained by B. Jónsson. It is shown that the degree of incompleteness with respect to Kripke semantics of any modal logic containing the axiom □p→P or containing an axiom of the form □mp↔□m+1p for some natural number m is . Furthermore, we show that there exists an immediate predecessor of classical logic (axiomatized by p↔□p) which is not characterized by any finite algebra. The existence of modal logics having immediate predecessors is established. In contrast with these results we prove that the lattice of extensions of S4 behaves much better: a logic extending S4 is characterized by a finite algebra iff it has finitely many extensions and any such logic has only finitely many immediate predecessors, all of which are characterized by a finite algebra.

The concern of this paper is with recursively enumerable and co-recursively enumerable subspaces of a recursively presented vector spaceV∞ over a (finite or infinite) recursive field F which is defined in [6] to consist of a recursive subset U of the natural numbers N and operations of vector addition and scalar multiplication which are partial recursive and under which V∞ becomes a vector space. Throughout this paper, we will identify V∞ with N, say via some fixed Gödel numbering, and assume V∞ is infinite dimensional and has a dependence algorithm, i.e., there is a uniform effective procedure which determines whether or not any given n-tuple v0, …, vn−1 from V∞ is linearly dependent. Various properties of V∞ and its sub-spaces have been studied by Dekker [1], Guhl [3], Metakides and Nerode [6], Kalantari and Retzlaff [4], and the author [7].

Given a subspace W of V∞, we say W is r.e. (co-r.e.) if W(V∞ − W) is an r.e. subset of N and write dim(V) for the dimension of V. Given subspaces V, W of V∞, V + W will denote the weak sum of V and W and if V ⋂ M = {0} (where 0 is the zero vector of V∞), we write V ⊕ Winstead of V + W. If W ⊇ V, we write Wmod V for the quotient space. An independent set A ⊆ V∞ is extendible if there is an r.e. independent set I ⊇ A such that I − A is infinite and A is nonextendible if it is not the case An is extendible. A r.e. subspace M ⊇ V∞ is maximal if dim(V∞ mod M) = ∞ and for any r.e. subspace W ⊇ Meither dim(W mod M) < ∞ or dim(V∞ mod W) < ∞.

Two questions on rings of strictly upper triangular matrices arising from B. Rose's work [5] are answered in this paper. An n × n matrix (αi, j) is strictly upper triangular if αi, j = 0 whenever i ≥ j. The ring of strictly upper triangular n × n matrices with entries from a field F will be denoted by Sn(F). Throughout this paper n will be an integer greater than 2. B. Rose [5] has shown that the complete theory of Sn(F) for an algebraically closed field F is ℵ1categorical. The first main result of this paper is that the rings Sn(F) and Sn(K) for fields F and K are isomorphic or elementarily equivalent if and only if F and K are isomorphic or elementarily equivalent, respectively (Corollary 1.6 and Theorem 2.2). This result shortens the proof of B. Rose's categoricity theorem [5, Theorem 7] by avoiding the co-stability considerations; furthermore, this result yields a proof of the converse of this categoricity theorem. The second main result is that the theory of rings of strictly upper triangular n × n matrices over algebraically closed fields is the model-completion of the theory of rings of strictly upper triangular n × n matrices over arbitrary fields (Theorem 2.5). This answers affirmatively the two conjectures at the end of [5].

In 1922 Skolem delivered an address before the Fifth Congress of Scandinavian Mathematicians in which he pointed out what he called a “relativity of set-theoretic notions”. This “relativity” has frequently been regarded as paradoxical; but today, although one hears the expression “the Löwenheim-Skolem Paradox”, it seems to be thought of as only an apparent paradox, something the cognoscenti enjoy but are not seriously troubled by. Thus van Heijenoort writes, “The existence of such a ‘relativity’ is sometimes referred to as the Löwenheim-Skolem Paradox. But, of course, it is not a paradox in the sense of an antinomy; it is a novel and unexpected feature of formal systems.” In this address I want to take up Skolem's arguments, not with the aim of refuting them but with the aim of extending them in somewhat the direction he seemed to be indicating. It is not my claim that the “Löwenheim-Skolem Paradox” is an antinomy in formal logic; but I shall argue that it is an antinomy, or something close to it, in philosophy of language. Moreover, I shall argue that the resolution of the antinomy—the only resolution that I myself can see as making sense—has profound implications for the great metaphysical dispute about realism which has always been the central dispute in the philosophy of language.

The structure of my argument will be as follows: I shall point out that in many different areas there are three main positions on reference and truth: there is the extreme Platonist position, which posits nonnatural mental powers of directly “grasping” forms (it is characteristic of this position that “understanding” or “grasping” is itself an irreducible and unexplicated notion); there is the verificationist position which replaces the classical notion of truth with the notion of verification or proof, at least when it comes to describing how the language is understood; and there is the moderate realist position which seeks to preserve the centrality of the classical notions of truth and reference without postulating nonnatural mental powers.

In the past 10 years much progress occurred in the direction of unifying the treatment of finitary Lωω and infinitary logic. We have especially in mind the study of countable admissible fragments (of which Lωω is a particular case) initiated by Barwise in [1] (cf. also [2]), the introduction of -recursively saturated structures by Ressayre in [22] (for these were independently introduced in [3]) and game sentences as studied by Vaught in [26] (see also Svenonius [25] and Moschovakis [19], [20]). A good reference for these topics is [17].

In this paper we illustrate the use of these tools for deducing definability theorems. We go beyond the known results as seen from the discussion that follows.

Let L be a language and P a (say, unary) additional predicate. Consider a sentence σ(P) in the language L(P). There are two types of definability theorems: the “Beth type” and the “Svenonius type”. Beth's theorem [4] characterizes the condition:

(i)′ for any ;

while Svenonius' result [24] characterizes:

(i)″ for any , every L-automorphism of is an L(P)-automorphism.

One of the main results of Gödel [4] and [5] is that, if M is a transitive set such that 〈M, Є 〉 is a model of ZF (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory) and α is the least ordinal not in M, then 〈Lα, Є 〉 is also a model of ZF.

In this note we shall use the Jensen uniformisation theorem to show that results analogous to the above hold for certain subsystems of ZF. The subsystems we have in mind are those that are formed by restricting the formulas in the separation and replacement axioms to various levels of the Levy hierarchy.

This is all done in §1. In §2 we proceed to establish the exact order relationships which hold among the ordinals of the minimal models of some of the systems discussed in §1. Although the proofs of these latter results will not require any use of the uniformisation theorem, we will find it convenient to use some of the more elementary results and techniques from Jensen's fine-structural theory of L. We thus provide a brief review of the pertinent parts of Jensen's works in §0, where a list of general preliminaries is also furnished.

We remark that some of the techniques which we use in the present paper have been used by us previously in [6] to prove various results about β-models of analysis. Since β-models for analysis are analogous to transitive models for set theory, this is not surprising.

In studying mathematical logic, Boolean algebras can play an important role in the organization of syntactic properties of first-order theories. In this paper we are concerned with syntactical questions about the complete theories of Boolean algebras, Tarski [12] and Ershov [4]. We give a syntactic characterization of the languages introduced in [4] by Ershov in terms of number of alternations of quantifiers and show that extensions with respect to these natural languages are equivalent to extensions with respect to ∀k(L−1) ⋃ ∃k(L−1) for specified, k. The main motivation for this paper was to examine a generalized notion of model completeness of A. Robinson [14], called k-model completeness, and to find real mathematical structures having these properties in a nontrivial way; this turns out to be realized in the very natural setting of Boolean algebras and our results are very definitive about these notions in that setting. Also, we point out here the connections of these notions with those examined by Chang in [2] and observe that the syntactic properties of the complete theories of Boolean algebras have much in common with those properties enjoyed by ∀n-axiomatizable theories which are categorical for “some” infinite cardinal. Finally, a complete characterization of the model companions of the complete theories of Boolean algebras is given with respect to Ershov's languages [4].

The aim of this paper is to prove strengthenings of three theorems appearing in Jensen [1].

In [K] Keisler introduces a set theoretical relation WO(δ, x), where δ is an ordinal. This relation is characterized in ZF set theory by the following properties:

(1) WO(0, x) if and only if there is a wellordering on x.

(2) For δ > 0, WO(δ, x) if and only if there is a function ƒ with domain an ordinal λ such that:

We denote WO∞ the collection denned by: WO∞(x) = ∃δ WO(δ, x).

In [K] Keisler shows that countable transitive models of ZF + ∃x ¬ WO∞(x) have transitive uncountable elementary extensions with the same ordinals. Moreover for transitive models, satisfying ∃x ¬ WO∞(x) is also a necessary condition for the existence of an elementary extension with the same ordinals. (See [K bis] and also [K-M] where the connection with forcing is analysed.)