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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 February 2018
In this paper I discuss four ways in which Schulting’s phenomenalist interpretation of Kant faces the challenge of accounting for the possibility of objective cognition. First, I ask whether objective cognition requires the understanding to be a faculty of absolute, not merely relative spontaneity. Second, is objectivity compatible with thinking of the transcendental ‘I’ as an indexical? Third, does objectivity require that the objects have being independently of the understanding? Finally, is it a threat to objectivity if objects can be given to me in sensibility without standing under the categories?
1 Translations from the first Critique will be those of Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); from Metaphysik L1, cited further on, the translation is from Lectures on Metaphysics, trans. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
