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Relationalism about Perception vs. Relationalism about Perceptuals

  • Andrew Stephenson (a1)
Abstract

There is a tension at the heart of Lucy Allais’s new account of Kant’s transcendental idealism. The problem arises from her use of two incompatible theories in contemporary philosophy – relationalism about perception, or naïve realism, and relationalism about colour, or more generally relationalism about any such perceptual property. The problem is that the former requires a more robust form of realism about the properties of the objects of perception than can be accommodated in the partially idealistic framework of the latter. On Allais’s interpretation, Kant’s notorious attempt to balance realism and idealism remains unstable.

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Email: andrew.stephenson@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
References
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Allais, L. (2015) Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stephenson, A. (2015) ‘Kant on the Object-Dependence of Intuition and Hallucination’. Philosophical Quarterly, 65(260), 486508.
Stephenson, A. (forthcoming) ‘Imagination and Inner Intuition’. In Gomes, A. and Stephenson, A. (eds) Kant and the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
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Kantian Review
  • ISSN: 1369-4154
  • EISSN: 2044-2394
  • URL: /core/journals/kantian-review
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