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Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins Of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism

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Until recently, historians of American constitutionalism agreed that, except for the infamous Dred Scott decision, the most unfortunate decisions of the Supreme Court were those that incorporated the notion of laissez-faire into the Constitution in the late nineteenth century. These decisions permitted the Court to frustrate efforts to secure a more just economic order in the United States until the 1930s. The intellectual foundations of laissez-faire constitutionalism have been so alien to most legal scholars since the 1930s (and equally unintelligible to many even earlier) that they have found it difficult to believe these decisions were the result of efforts to enforce ‘neutral’ principles of constitutional law, to utilize the terms of Herbert Wechsler's famous analysis. They could not conceive of the Court's rhetoric about liberty and due process as anything but cant, a subterfuge designed to camouflage other purposes.

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1. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

2. Wechsler Herbert, ‘Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law’, 73 Harvard Law Review 135 (1959).

3. McCloskey Robert, The American Supreme Court (Chicago, 1960) 105.

4. Miller Arthur S., ‘Toward a Definition of “the” Constitution’, 8 University of Dayton Law Review 633, 647 (1983).

5. Lerner Max, ‘The Supreme Court and American Capitalism’, 42 Yale Law Journal 669–701, 672 (1933). See Miller Arthur S. and Howell Ronald F., ‘The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication’, 27 University of Chicago Law Review 661–95, 672; Miller Arthur S., The Supreme Court and American Capitalism (New York, 1968) 58, 6061; Roche John P., ‘Entrepreneurial Liberty and the Commerce Power: Expansion, Contraction and Casuistry in the Age of Enterprise’, 30 University of Chicago Law Review 680703 (1963); Swindler William F., Court and Constitution in the Twentieth Century: The Old Legality, 1889–1932 (Indianapolis and New York, 1968) 1838.

6. Frank John P., ‘Review and Basic Liberties’, in Cahn Edmond, ed., Supreme Court and Supreme Law (New York, 1954) 109, 110.

7. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).

8. Hamilton Walton H., ‘The Path of Due Process of Law’, International Journal of Ethics xlviii (1938) 269–96; Kelly Alfred H. and Harbison Winfred A., The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development, 5th ed. (New York, 1976) 468–91; Beth Loren, The Development of the American Constitution, 1877–1917 (New York, 1971); Haines Charles Grove, ‘Judicial Review of Legislation in the United States and the Doctrine of Vested Rights’, 3 Texas Law Review 143 (1924); Corwin Edward S., ‘The Doctrine of Due Process before the Civil War’, 24 Harvard Law Review 366–85. 460–79 (1911); Paul Arnold, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law: Attitudes of Bar and Bench, 1887–1895 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1960) 118.

9. Until recently the traditional interpretation has not been much questioned. The stardard American constitutional history textbook accepted it. Kelly and Harbison, The American Constitution, supra note 8 at 468–91. Likewise leading constitutional law casebooks, such as Mendelson Wallace, The Constitution and the Supreme Court, 2d ed. (New York, 1965) 239–40; Mason Alpheus T. and Beaney William M., American Constitutional Law: Introductory Essays and Selected Cases, 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1978) 356–59; Nowak John E. et al. , Handbook on Constitutional Law (St. Paul, Minn., 1978) 394–97. And standard histories of the Supreme Court, for example McCloskey, American Supreme Court, supra note 3 at 115–35; Rodell Fred, Nine Men: A Political History of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1790–1955 (New York, 1955) 145–51; Schwartz Bernard, A Basic History of the Supreme Court (New York, 1968) 5053; Swindler, Court and Constitution, supra note 5 at 28–29. Also the standard treatment of the rise and fall of laissez-faire notions of American government, Fine Sidney, Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1956) 126–64, and some of the most influential recent work in general American legal history (as distinct from constitutional history), for example Horwitz Morton J., ‘The Rise of Legal Formalism’, American Journal of Legal History 19 (1975) 251–64.

Even Mary Cornelia Porter's recent, seminal re-evaluation of laissez-faire constitutionalism fails to note any connection between the Supreme Court's decisions and liberty. Porter, ‘That Commerce Shall Be Free: A New Look at the Old Laissez-Faire Court’, 1979 Supreme Court Review 135–59.

10. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

11. Rehnquist William H., ‘Observation—The Notion of a Living Constitution’, 54 Texas Law Review 693–706, at 700704 (1976).

12. Ely John Hart, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass., 1980) 14. For other examples of the use of laissez-faire constitutionalism to condemn active judicial promotion of ‘fundamental values’, see the classic Wechsler, ‘Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law’, supra note 2 at 24–26 (1959) and such arguments as Bork Robert H., ‘Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems’, 47 Indiana Law Journal 135, 11 (1971); Berger Raoul, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Cambridge, Mass., 1977) 265–69; Berger , ‘Michael Perry's Functional Justification for Judicial Review’, 8 University of Dayton Law Review 465532, 475–76 (1983); Grano Joseph D., ‘Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic Society’, 28 Wayne Law Review 1–75, 2124 (1981); Symposium—Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory’, 56 New York University Law Review 259–582, 533 (1981); Maltz Earl M., ‘Murder in the Cathedral—The Supreme Court as Moral Prophet’, 8 University of Dayton Law Review 623–31, 625–26 (1983).

Even those who defend active judicial protection of ‘fundamental values’ not specifically identified in the constitutional text quaver before ‘the terror of Lochner’. Gerety Thomas, ‘Doing Without Privacy’, 42 Ohio State Law Journal 143–65, 159–60 (1981). See Brest Paul, ‘The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship’, 90 Yale Law Journal 1063–1109, 1086 (1981): ‘Lochner remains an embarrassment for proponents of fundamental rights adjudication and a cause for skepticism about the practice’. A few scholars, such as Perry, are now reluctantly conceding that the laissez-faire decisions are part of the heritage of judicial activism. Perry Michael, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (New Haven, Conn., 1982) 115117; Grey Thomas C., ‘Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?27 Stanford Law Review 703–18, 706–10 (1975); Caine Burton, ‘Judicial Review—Democracy Versus Constitutionality’, 56 Temple Law Quarterly 297350 (1983). They are forced to argue that such evidence of judicial ‘fallability’ should be weighed against the greater benefits of ‘noninterpretivist’ review. Perry, ibid. at 115–17, 125; Tribe Laurence H., ‘Seven Pluralist Fallacies: In Defense of the Adversary Process—A Reply to Justice Rehnquist’, 33 University of Miami Law Review 43–57, 5556 (1978).

For the discomfort with Lochner defenders of judicial activism manifest by trying to distinguish the new judicial activism from the old, see Wright J. Skelly, ‘The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society—Judicial Activism or Restraint?54 Cornell Law Review 1–28, 34 (1968); Freund Paul A., ‘The Supreme Court and Fundamental Freedoms’, in Levy Leonard, ed., Judicial Review and the Supreme Court (New York, 1967) 124–40; Wellington Harry H., ‘Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication’, 83 Yale Law Journal 221–311, 270311 (1973). As one critic has observed, ‘[T]he maintainability of a … line between Roe v. Wade [410 U.S. 113 (1973)] and Lochner … seems critical to thoughtful acceptance of the role they are espousing for the Court’. Estreicher Samuel, ‘Platonic Guardians of Democracy: John Hart Ely's Role for the Supreme Court in the Constitution's Open Texture’, 56 New York University Law Review 547–82, 550, n.12 (1981).

13. Woodard Calvin, ‘Reality and Social Reform: The Transition from Laissez-Faire to the Welfare State’, 72 Yale Law Journal 286–328, 288 (1962).

14. Collingwood R.G., The Idea of History (Oxford, England, 1946) 218–19.

15. Lively Robert A., ‘The American System: A Review Article’, Business History Review, xxix (1955) 8196; Friedman Lawrence M., A History of American Law (New York, 1973) 384402, 311–18 (I think the point will be seen most clearly if the passages are read in the reverse of Friedman's order); Beth Loren P., The Development of the American Constitution, 1877–1917 (New York, 1971), 4142; Semonche John E., Charting the Future: The Supreme Court Responds to a Changing Society, 1890–1920 (Westport, Conn., 1978) 15164 passim; Keller Morton, ‘Business History and Legal History’, Business History Review lii (1979) 297301 (1979); Porter, ‘That Commerce Shall Be Free’, supra note 9; Willard JamesHurst's seminal Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States (Madison, Wis., 1956) is from beginning to end an implicit repudiation of the notion that Americans adhered to laissez-faire doctrines in the 1800s, although he does not attend directly to the contradiction between his conclusions and traditional accounts of late nineteenthcentury judicial decisions.

16. Kelly Alfred H., Harbison Winfred A., and Belz Herman, The American Constitution: Its Origins & Development, 6th ed. (New York, 1983) 398; Jones Alan, ‘Thomas M. Cooley and the Michigan Supreme Court: 1865–1885’, American Journal of Legal History 10 (1966) 97121; Jones , ‘Thomas M. Cooley and “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: A Reconsideration’, Journal of American History liii (1967) 751–71; Walker Peter F., ‘Thomas Cooley: Abolition, Law, and “The Day of Better Things”’, in Walker Peter F., Moral Choices: Memory, Desire, and Imagination in NineteenthCentury American Abolition (Baton Rouge, La., 1978) 330–50; McCurdy Charles W., ‘Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863–1897’, Journal of American History lxi (1975) 9701005; Goedecke Robert, ‘Justice Field and Inherent Rights’, Review of Politics xxvii (1965) 198207; Semonche, Charting the Future, supra note 15, at 102–104; Scott William B., In Pursuit of Happiness: American Conceptions of Property from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century (Bloomington, Ind. and London, 1977) 137–46; Garner Robert E., ‘Justice Brewer and Substantive Due Process: A Conservative Court Revisited’, 18 Vanderbilt Law Review 615–41 (1965). See also David Gold's John Appleton and Responsible Individualism (tentative title) (forthcoming).

17. For the best general discussions of post-Civil War American laissez-faire economic theory, see Dorfman Joseph, The Economic Mind in American Civilization: Volume Three, 1865–1918 (New York, 1959) and Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State, supra note 9 at 3–95.

18. Wayland Francis, The Elements of Political Economy, recast by Chapin Aaron L. (New York, 1878) 3–7, 11–14, 163–74; Wayland , Elements of Political Economy (Boston, 1856) 15–22, 25; Perry Arthur L., Elements of Political Economy (New York, 1876) 56117; Newcomb Simon, Principles of Political Economy (New York, 1886) 3–7, 57–65, 199–226, 248–56; Walker Amasa, The Science of Wealth: A Manual of Political Economy Embracing the Laws of Trade, Currency and Finance (Boston, 1874) 8–17, 77102. Sturtevant Julian M., Economics, or The Science of Wealth: A Treatise on Political Economy (New York, 1877) 5356.

19. Bowen Francis, American Political Economy (New York, 1870) 173204, 125–50; Perry, Elements of Political Economy, supra note 18 at 138–58; Wayland, Elements of Political Economy, supra note 18 at 291–314 (1878); Wayland, Elements of Political Economy, supra note 18, at 166–90 (1856); Walker, Science of Wealth, supra note 18 at 254–63; Walker Francis, The Wages Question: A Treatise on Wages and the Wages Class (London, 1884), 101–108, 128–73. For the classical economists on Malthus, see also Jones Archer, ‘Social Darwinism and Classical Economics: An Untested Hypothesis’, North Dakota Quarterly xlvi (1978) 1931, 22–23.

20. Wayland, Elements of Political Economy, supra note 18 at 282–95 (1878); Perry, Elements of Political Economy, supra note 18 at 249–311; Bowen, American Political Economy, supra note 19 at 237–72; Walker, Science of Wealth, supra note 18 at 126–31; Unger Irwin, The Greenback Era: A Social and Political History of American Finance, 1865–1879 (Princeton, N.J., 1964) 126–31.

21. Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State, supra note 9 at 32–46, has a full discussion of Spencer's views. Fine may have been accurate in calling him ‘the most influential opponent of the state in America’ (p. 32), but that does not tell us just how influential opponents of the state really were. The answer is, not very. Spencer was read widely in America, as are many intellectuals who carry commonly held ideas to logical but absurd conclusions. As R. Jackson Wilson has pointed out, American social scientists—although laissez-faire in outlook—read Spencer mainly to dispute him. Wilson , In Quest of Community: Social Philosophy in the United States, 1860–1920 (New York, 1968) 155. See also Haskell Thomas L., The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority (Urbana, Ill., 1977) and Jones, ‘Social Darwinism and Classical Economies’, supra note 19.

22. For the position of laissez-faire activists on these issues, see Sproat John G., ‘The Best Men’: Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age (New York, 1968); Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State, supra note 9 at 47–91 passim: Dorfman, The Economic Mind, supra note 17 at 49–82 passim.

23. Taussig F.W., The Tariff History of the United States, 8th rev. ed. (New York, 1931) 155283.

24. Sanborn John Bell, Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Railways (Madison, Wis., 1899); Mercer Lloyd J., Railroads and Land Grant Policy: A Study in Government Intervention (New York, 1982) 3267 and passim.

25. Cushing Marshall Henry, The Story of Our Post Office: The Greatest Government Department in All its Phases (Boston, 1893) 34–35, 137–51; Leech D.D.T., The Post Office Department of the United States of America: Its History, Organization, and Working (Washington, D.C., 1879) 24–25, 30–34, 69.

26. Myers Margaret G., A Financial History of the United States (New York & London, 1970) 148222; Unger, Greenback Era, supra note 20.

27. Bland-Allison Silver Purchase Act, 20 Stat. 25 (1878).

28. Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).

29. 26 Stat. 290 (1890).

30. Eight-Hour Day Law, 51 Stat. 77 (1868); Eight-Hour Day Proclamation, 17 Stat. 955 (1872).

31. Kelly and Harbison, The American Constitution, supra note 8, at 513. The most recent edition, prepared by Herman Belz, has eliminated the words but not the perception. Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, The American Constitution, supra note 16 at 380–89.

32. Goodrich Carter, Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800–1890 (New York, 1960), 230–62; Miller George H., Railroads and the Granger Laws (Madison, Wis., 1971).

33. See the presidents’ annual addresses in volumes 2–12 of the Reports of the American Bar Association (1878–1899).

34. Lively, ‘The American System’, supra note 15 at 86. See also Nash Gerald D., State Government and Economic Development: A History of Administrative Policies in California, 1849–1933 (Berkeley, Cal., 1964) 139224.

35. The Butler Canvass’, North American Review civ (1872) 155–56.

36. Sumner William Graham, ‘State Interference’, in Keller Albert G. and Davie Maurice R., eds., Essays of William Graham Sumner (New Haven, Conn., 1934) ii, 149 (originally published in 1887) (hereinafter Sumner, Essays). For laissez-faire reformers' general gloom over the direction of politics and legislation see Sproat, ‘The Best Men’, supra note 22 at 273–81 and passim.

37. Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws, supra note 32 at 19–23,96, 107, 115, 125–31, 154–55, 164–68; Magrath C. Peter, ‘The Case of the Unscrupulous Warehouseman’, in Garraty John A., ed., Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution (New York, 1966), 109; Benson Lee, Merchants, Farmers, and Railroads: Railroad Regulation and New York Politics, 1850–1887 (Cambridge, Mass., 1955); Kolko Gabriel, Railroads and Regulation, 1877–1916 (Princeton, N.J., 1965) 2044; Ari and Hoogenboom Olive, A History of the ICC: From Panacea to Pallative (New York, 1976) 817.

38. Unger, Greenback Era, supra note 20 at 44–67, 220–25, 324–27, 403; Unger , ‘Business Men and Specie Resumption’, Political Science Quarterly lxxiv (1959) 4670; Sharkey Jack P., Money, Class, and Party: An Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstruction (Baltimore, 1967) 141–71; Weinstein Allen, Prelude to Populism: Origins of the Silver Issue (New Haven, Conn., 1970) 47–52, 55, 125–29, 263300 passim; Dorfman, The Economic Mind, supra note 17 at 116–17.

39. See Kirkland Edward C., Dream and Thought in the American Business Community, 1860–1900 (Chicago, 1964) 128.

40. Cochran Thomas C., Railroad Leaders, 1845–1890: The Business Mind in Action (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 181.

41. Munn v. Ill., 94 U.S. 113 (1877).

42. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Paul, 173 U.S. 404 (1899); Minnesota Iron Co. v. Kline, 199 U.S. 593 (1905); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); McLean v. Ark., 211 U.S. 539 (1909).

43. Juillard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884).

44. Stone v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307, 329–30 (1886); Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minn., 134 U.S. 418 (1890).

45. See, for example, Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which overturned a state regulation of bakery workers' hours on the grounds that it could not be justified as a protection of health or safety. The majority of the justices sustained similar regulation of other industries in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) when such a justification could be made out.

46. Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).

47. Spencer Herbert, Social Statics; or, The Conditions of Human Happiness Specified, and the First of Them Developed (New York, 1890) 13, 121.

48. Sumner, ‘State Interference’, supra note 36 at 146. See also Parkman Francis, ‘The Failure of Universal Suffrage’, North American Review cxxvi (1878) 120; Sproat, ‘The Best Men’, supra note 22 at 205–42.

49. Sumner, ‘The Challenge of Facts’, in Sumner, Essays, supra note 36 at ii, 117; Sumner William Graham, What Social Classes Owe Each Other (New Haven, Conn., 1925); 1112 (originally published in 1883).

50. Walker Francis A., ‘Socialism’, in Walker Francis A., Discussions in Economics and Statistics (New York, 1899) ii, 250 (originally published in 1887).

51. Sumner, ‘State Interference’, supra note 36 at 146; Parkman, ‘The Failure of Universal Suffrage’, supra note 48 at 20.

52. Garfield to Burke A. Hinsdale, Jan. 21, 1875, in Hinsdale Mary L., ed., GarfieldHinsdale Letters: Correspondence Between James Abram Garfield and Burke Aaron Hinsdale (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1949) 314.

53. Richard H. Dana to George P. Marsh, Apr. 23, 1871, Dana Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass.; J. Francis Fisher, quoted in Sterne Simon, On Representative Government and Personal Reputation (Philadelphia, 1871) 74. See Callow Alexander B., The Tweed Ring (New York, 1966) 261–68.

54. Sterne Simon, Suffrage in the Cities (New York, 1878) 26.

55. On both issues, see Sproat, ‘The Best Men’, supra note 22 at 29–44, 244–71, and the laissez-faire organs—the Nation, Harper's Weekly, and the North American Review generally.

56. Perry, Elements of Political Economy, supra note 18 at 158–67; Bowen, American Political Economy, supra note 19 at 110–16; Walker, Wages Question, supra note 19 at 385–408 passim; Walker Francis, ‘Legal Interference with the Hours of Labor’, Lippincott's Monthly Magazine ii (1868) 527–33, esp. 530; Croffut W.A., ‘What Rights Have Laborers?Forum i (1886) 294–96; Sumner, What Social Classes Owe Each Other, supra note 49 at 129–30; Johnson Samuel, Labor Parties and Labor Reform (Boston, 1871); Means D. McGregor, ‘Labor Unions Under Democratic Government’, Journal of Social Science xxi (1886) 7374; The (New York) Nation, May 11, 1866, 594 (1866). See Sproat, ‘The Best Men’, supra note 22 at 228–29.

57. Chapin A.L., ‘The Relations of Labor and Capital’, Transactions of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters i (18701872) 60; Johnson, Labor Parties, supra note 56 at 4–5; Means, ‘Labor Unions’, supra note 56; Wayland, Elements of Political Economy (1878), supra note 18 at 110–11.

58. Wells David A., ‘Rational Principles of Taxation’, Journal of Social Science, vi (1875), 120–33, at 123. See also Wells , ‘The Communism of a Discriminating Income-Tax’, North American Review cxxx (1880) 236–46; Ellis Elmer, ‘Public Opinion and the Income Tax, 1860–1900’, Mississippi Valley Historical Review xxvii (1940) 225–42.

59. Senator Justin S. Morrill in the Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2783 (1866).

60. New York Tribune, quoted in Public Opinion, July 25, 1891, 372–73.

61. The Nation (New York), January 27, 1876, 58; Wells, quoted ibid., October 29, 1874, 282–84; Adams Charles Francis Jr., ‘The Granger Movement’, North American Review, xx (1875) 394424, esp. 406–12. See also Russ W.A., ‘Godkin Looks at Western Agrarianism: A Case Study’, Argicultural History xix (1945) 233–42; Sproat, ‘The Best Men’, supra note 22 at 223–24.

62. Greeley Horace, The Tariff Question: Protection and Free Trade Considered (New York, 1856); Kelley William D., Speeches, Letters, and Addresses on Industrial and Financial Questions (Philadelphia, 1872) 9–84, 322–91; Blaine James G., 'olitical Discussions, Legislative, Diplomatic, and Popular (Norwich, Conn., 1887) 426–28, 443; Peter Cooper, Letters on the Necessity of a Wise Discriminating Tariff to Protect American Labor … (1866); Howe Timothy Otis, The Tariff: Farmers, Iron Workers, and Laborers—The Trinity of the Nation's Strength (Milwaukee, 1881) (speech originally delivered in 1866).

63. Sumner in his preface to Earle Abraham L., Our Revenue System and the Civil Service: Shall They Be Reformed? (New York, 1878) vii.

64. Lieber Francis, Notes on Fallacies of American Protectionists (New York, 1870) 11–15, 17; Atkinson Edward, Revenue Reform: An Essay (Boston, 1871) 29.

65. Earle, Our Revenue System, supra note 63, at 11; Atkinson, Revenue Reform, supra note 64 at 18; See also The (New York) Nation, January 21, 1869, 44; April 28, 1870, 263; December 12, 1872, 374; Perry, Elements of Political Economy, supra note 18 at 380; Wells David A., ‘The Meaning of Revenue Reform’, North American Review cxiii (1871) 104–53, esp. 148; Wells, ‘Rational Principles of Taxation’, supra note 58 at 122; Sumner William Graham, Protectionism: The Ism Which Teaches that Waste Makes Wealth (New York, 1885); Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State, supra note 9 at 64–67.

66. Sturtevant, Economics, supra note 18 at 83; Atkinson to Henry L. Dawes, February 2, 1874, Dawes Mss., Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

67. The (New York) Nation, February 17, 1870, 100.

68. Adams to Carl Schurz, December 3, 1875, Schurz Mss., Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

69. See Sproat, ‘The Best Men’, supra note 22 at 169–203; Unger, Greenback Era, supra note 23 at 120–44.

70. Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State, supra note 9 at 31.

71. Hartz Louis, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution (New York, 1955) 21n, 203–27. See also McCloskey Robert Green, American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass., 1951) 121; Rossiter Clinton, Conservatism in America, 2d ed. (New York, 1955) 128–32, 153–54.

72. Quoted in Dorfman, The Economic Mind, supra note 17 at 23–24.

73. Sumner, ‘Democracy and Plutocracy’, in Sumner, Essays ii, 213–19; Sumner, ‘Definitions of Democracy and Plutocracy’, ibid. at 220–25.

74. Sturtevant, Economics, supra note 18 at 242.

75. Adams , ‘Oppressive Taxation and Its Remedy’, Atlantic Monthly xlii (1878) 765.

76. Sumner William Grahamn, ‘Shall Americans Own Ships?North American Review cxxxii (1881) 559.

77. Atkinson Edward, ‘The Inefficiency of Economic Legislation’, Journal of Social Science iv (1871) 123; Earle, Our Revenue System, supra note 63 at 12–13.

78. Ibid. 11; Sumner, Protectionism, supra note 65 passim and esp. 111; Lieber, Fallacies of Protectionists, supra note 64 at 6; Perry, Elements of Political Economy, supra note 18 at 379–81; Godwin Parke, ‘Our Political Degeneracy’, Putnam's Monthly v (new series) (1870) 602603; Wells David A., The Creed of Free Trade (Boston, 1875) 17; Laughlin Lawrence, ‘Protection and Socialism’, International Review vii (1879) 427; Atkinson, Revenue Reform, supra note 64 at 18.

79. Atkinson, ‘The Inefficiency of Economic Legislation’, supra note 77 at 129.

80. Laughlin, ‘Protection and Socialism’, supra note 78 at 427; Earle, Our Revenue System, supra note 63 at 22.

81. Sumner preface to ibid, at x.

82. Sumner, ‘The Challenge of Facts’, supra note 49 at 117. See also Newcomb Simon, ‘The Let-Alone Principle’, North American Review cx (1870) 133.

83. Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State, supra note 9 at 29–31, 32–164 passim; Rossiter, Conservatism, supra note 71 at 146–51; Gabriel Ralph, The Course of Democratic Thought, 2d ed. (New York, 1956) 162–63.

84. As J.E. A. Jolliffee described in his classic Constitutional History of Medieval England from the English Settlement to 1485 (New York, 1961; originally published 1927) 183: ‘[T]he crown of England was honorial and its lands and rights were the demesne of the king'. For the personal origins of royal government in England, see ibid, at 139–201; Poole Austin Lane, From Domesday Book to Magna Carta, 1087–1216 (Oxford, England, 1951) 810. A reading of Cunningham W., The Growth of English Commerce and Industry During the Early and Middle Ages, 4th ed. (Cambridge, England, 1905) 148237 indicates how closely taxation, supervision, and economic promotion were related to the king's feudal rights. See also Barlow Frank, The Feudal Kingdom of England, 1042–1216 (London, 1955) 107–13 and passim.

85. See Lipson E., An Introduction to the Economic History of England (London, 1920) 238–60, 1270–1390; Cheyney Edward P., An Introduction to the Industrial and Social History of England (London, 1901) 5971, 154–58; LeRossignol J., Monopolies Past and Present (New York, 1901) 4164; Cunningham, Growth of English Commerce, supra note 84, at 206–11, 341–43, 445–47; Unwin George, The Gilds and Companies of London, 4th ed. (London, 1963); Carr Cecil T.. ed., Select Charters of Trading Companies, A.D. 1530–1707 (London, 1913) xiv–xvii, lv–lxii; on fairs and markets: Jones Franklin D., ‘Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition’, 35 Yale Law Journal 905–38 (1926); Lipson, Economic History of England, supra at 201–12; Cheyney, Industrial and Social History of England, supra note at 75–79.

86. Unwin, Gilds and Companies of London, supra note 85, at 293–328; Cunningham W., The Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times: The Mercantile System (Cambridge, England, 1903) 214–49 passim, 285–94; Davies Godfrey, The Early Stuarts, 1603–1660, 2d ed. (Oxford, England, 1959) 331–35; Select Charters, supra note 85 at lxii–lxxxi.

87. Judson Margaret, The Crisis of the Constitution: An Essay in Constitutional and Political Thought in England, 1603–1645 (New York, 1964; originally published in 1949) 37.

88. Commons John R., Legal Foundations of Capitalism (Madison, Wis., 1968; originally published 1924) 183–84.

89. Quoted in Judson, Crisis of the Constitution, supra note 87 at 291. On the idea of ‘commonwealth’, see ibid, at 274–300; Jones Whitney R.D., The Tudor Commonwealth, 1529–1559 (London, 1970) passim and esp. 13–23.

90. Judson, Crisis of the Constitution, supra note 87 at 278, 290–92; Davies, The Early Stuarts, supra note 86 at 24–25; Foster Elizabeth Read, ‘The Procedure of the House of Commons Against Patents and Monopolies’, in Aiken William Appleman, ed.. Conflict in Stuart England: Essays in Honor of Wallace Notestein (New York, 1960) 57; Unwin, Gilds and Companies of London, supra note 85 at 293–343; Cunningham, Growth of English Commerce, supra note 86 at 218; Select Charters, supra note 85, at lxii–lxxxi. White Stephen D., Sir Edward Coke and ‘The Grievances of the Commonwealth’, 1621–1628 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979) 95141.

91. Davenant v. Hurdis, Trin. 41 Eliz., Moor, 72 Eng. Rep. 576 (K.B. 1599); Darcy v. Allen, 11 Coke 84 (K.B. 1602); Case of Monopolies, 11 ibid. 86, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602); Case of the Tailors of Ipswich, 11 Coke 53, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1614). For a brief discussion, see Conant Michael, ‘The Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughterhouse Cases Re-Examined’, 31 Emory Law Journal 785–831, 792–97 (1982).

92. Case of the Tailors of Ipswich, 11 Coke 53, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1614). Davies Godfrey, ‘Further Light on the Case of Monopolies’, 48 Law Quarterly Review 394414 (1932); Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, supra note 88 at 225–31.

93. Richard Martin, A Speech Delivered to the King's Most Excellent Majestie, quoted in Judson, Crisis of the Constitution, supra note 87 at 41. Of course with the emergence of parliamentary supremacy at the end of the seventheenth century, Parliament was able to grant monopolies, and it did so regularly to promote trade. Nonetheless this had to be justified on the grounds that the public received a benefit and therefore the grant increased rather than diminished the commonwealth. Cunningham, Growth of English Commerce, supra note 86 at 214–18 passim.

94. See generally Robbins Caroline, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman: Studies in the Transmission, Development and Circumstance of English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies (New York, 1968; originally published 1959); Banning Lance, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, N.Y. 1978) 2169.

95. Wood Gordon, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (New York, 1972; originally published in 1969) 53–65; Banning, Jejfersonian Persuasion, supra note 94, passim; Handlin Oscar and Handlin Mary Flug, Commonwealth—A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774–1861, rev. ed. (Boston, 1969) 2831.

96. Lowi Theodore J., ‘American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory’, World Politics xvi (1964) 677715; McCormick Richard L., ‘The Party Period and Public Policy: An Exploratory Hypothesis’, Journal of American History lxvi (1979) 279–98; Lively, ‘The American System’, supra note 15; Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth, supra note 95 at 28–31, 51–181; Scheiber Harry N., Ohio Canal Era: A Case Study of Government and the Economy, 1820–1861 (Athens, Ohio, 1969) 8894, 355.

97. Ibid, at 92.

98. Goodman Paul, ‘The First American Party System’, in Chambers William N. and Burnham Walter Dean, eds., The American Party System: Stages of Political Development (New York, 1967) 5689, 69.

99. Madison James, ‘A Candid State of Parties’, in Hunt Gaillard, ed., The Writings of James Madison (New York, 19001910) vi, 176–79. Recent studies of the Jeffersonian Republican party at the state level suggest that it was ‘a diverse coalition… against entrenched interests… who thwarted the desires of newcomers and outsiders, rising merchants and ambitious office seekers, religious dissenters and landless yeomen eager to share access to authority and to broaden social opportunities’. They perceived the Federalists to stand ‘for monopoly of local office, charter privileges… and the religious, institutional and professional life of the community’. Goodman Paul, The Democratic-Republicans of Massachusetts: Politics in a Young Republic (Cambridge, Mass., 1964) xi, 76. Thus their opposition to special privileges secured through legislation was part of a general attack upon ‘aristocracy’. See ibid, at 70–127; Buel Richard Jr., Securing the Revolution: Ideology in American Politics, 1789–1815 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1972) 7790. This understanding is implicit, I think, in Lance Banning's notion that the Jeffersonian Republicans were a ‘country party’ opposing what they saw as a ‘court party’. Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, supra note 95.

100. Parrington Vernon L., Main Currents in American Thought (New York, 1917) i, 347–62.

101. See Grampp William D., ‘A Re-Examination of Jeffersonian Economies’, Southern Economic Journal xii (1946) 263–82; Bruchey Stuart, The Roots of American Economic Growth (New York, 1965) 114–22; Williams William Appleman, The Contours of American History (Cleveland, 1961) 181–91; Wiltse Charles M., The Jeffersonian Tradition in American Democracy (New York, 1960; first published in 1935) 145–50.

102. Richards James D., ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C., 18961899) ii, 590.

103. Stephen J. Field read law in the office of his brother, Field David Dudley. Swisher Carl Bent, Stephen J. Field, Craftsman of the Law (Chicago, 1969; originally published in 1930) 21. For the influence of Leggett and other radical Democrats on Cooley, see Jones, ‘Cooley and “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”’, supra note 16 at 753; Jones , ‘The Constitutional Conservatism of Thomas McIntyre Cooley: A Study in the History of Ideas’ (Unpublished dissertation, University of Michigan, 1960) 2026.

104. Jones, ‘Cooley and “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”’, supra note 16 at 755.

105. Sedgwick Theodore, ed., Political Writings of William Leggett (New York, 1840), i, 6667.

106. Ibid. 145.

107. Godwin Parke, The Life of William Cullen Bryant (New York, 1883) i, 253–54.

108. Messages and Papers of the Presidents, supra note 102 at ii, 590. For Jacksonian hostility to privilege and commitment to equal rights, see Meyers MarvinThe Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief (New York, 1960) 185233; Schlesinger Arthur M. Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston, 1945) 306–21. However, Schlesinger's argument that Jacksonism was a working-class movement is untenable. Jacksonians opposed class legislation of any sort, not only that which benefitted the wealthy.

109. For the principles and influence of the ‘locofoco’ wing of the Democratic party, see Trimble William, ‘The Social Philosophy of the Loco-Foco Democracy’, American Journal of Sociology xxvi (1921) 705–15; Hofstadter Richard, ‘William Leggett: Spokesman of Jacksonian Democracy’, Political Science Quarterly lviii (1943) 581–94; Rayback Joseph G., A History of American Labor (New York, 1959) 7592; Schlesinger, Age of Jackson, supra note 108, at 190–209.

110. Joshua F. Cox, quoted in Hartz Louis, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776–1860 (Cambridge, Mass., 1948) 77.

111. Ibid. For political controversies in which competitors used the rhetoric of ‘equal rights’ and ‘special privileges’, see Van Deusen Glyndon G., ‘Some Aspects of Whig Thought and Theory in the Jacksonian Period’, American Historical Review lxiii (1958) 305–22; Benson Lee, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case (Princeton, N.J., 1961) 86109; Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth, supra note 95, at 182–228 (the Handlins do not discuss the relationship of the breakdown in commonwealth ideas to parties but recognize the consequent drive against ‘special privilege’); Sharp James R., The Jacksonian versus the Banks: Politics in the State After the Panic of 1837 (New York, 1970); Levine Peter D., Behavior of State Legislative Parties in the Jacksonian Era: New Jersey, 1829–1844 (Rutherford, N.J., 1977) 112–78.

112. For studies indicating that early nineteenth-century voters divided along religious and cultural lines, see Kelley Robert, The Cultural Pattern of American Politics: The First Century (New York, 1979) 109–40, 160–84; Formisano Ronald P., The Birth of Mass Political Parties: Michigan, 1827–61 (Princeton, N.J., 1972); Benson, Concept of Jacksonian Democracy, supra note 111; Shade William G., Banks or No Banks: The Money Issue in Western Politics, 1832–1865 (Detroit, 1972) passim. That political parties themselves became ‘positive references'—sources of attitudes and values—for voters is generally accepted in the political science literature. See Lane Robert E., Political Life: Why and How People Get Involved in Politics (New York, 1965) 299303; Campbell Angus et al. , The American Voter (New York, 1960) 128–36.

113. Va. Const. (1776), Bill of Rights, sec. 4; N. C. Const. (1776), Dec. of Rights, sec. 3; Ky. Const. (1792), art. XII; Miss. Const. (1817), art. I, sec. 1; Ala. Const. (1819), art. I, sec. 1; Tex. Const. (1845), art. I, sec. 2.

114. N.H. Const. (1784), art. I, sec. 10. See also Pa. Const. (1776), Dec. of Rights, art. V; Vt. Const. (1777), Dec. of Rights, art. VI.

115. N.C. Const. (1776), Dec. of Rights, sec. 22; S.C. Const. (1776), art. IX, sec. 5; N.H. Const. (1784), art. I, sec. 9; Pa. Const. (1790), art. IX, sec. 24; Ky. Const. (1792), art. XII; Del. Const. (1792), art. I, sec. 19; Tenn. Const. (1796), art. XI, sec. 30; Ohio Const. (1802), art. VII, sec. 24; Ind. Const. (1816), art. I, sec. 22; Miss. Const. (1817), art. I, sec. 26; Conn. Const. (1818), art. I, sec. 20; Ala. Const. (1819), art. I, sec. 26; Me. Const. (1820), art. I, sec. 23; Mo. Const. (1820), art. XIII, sec. 20; Fla. Const. (1838), art. I, sec. 25; Md. Const. (1851), art. I, sec. 40; Kan. Const. (1859), art. I, sec. 19.

116. N.C. Const. (1776), Dec. of Rights, sec. 23; Tenn. Const. (1796), art. XI, sec. 23; Ark. Const. (1836), art. II, sec. 19; Fla. Const. (1838), an. I, sec. 24; Tex. Const. (1845), art. I, sec. 18; Md. Const. (1851), art. I, sec. 39.

117 Iowa Const. (1846), art. I, sec. 6; Ind. Const. (1851), art. XXIII; Ore. Const. (1857), art. I (Bill of Rights), sec. 21.

118. La. Const. (1845), art. CXXXIII; N.Y. Const. (1846), art. VIII, sec. 1,4; Ill. Const. (1848), art. X, sec. 1, (permitted exceptions at legislative discretion); Mich. Const. (1850), art. XV, sec. 1; Md. Const. (1851), art. III, sec. 47: Ohio Const. (1851), art. XIII (Corporations), sec. 1, 2; Minn. Const. (1857), art. X, sec. 2; Ore. Const (1857), art. XI (Corporations), sec. 2; Nev. Const. (1864), art. VIII, sec. 1; Mo. Const. (1865), art. VIII, sec. 4; Neb. Const. (1866), art. II (Corporations), sec. 1, 2; Ark. Const. (1868), art. I, sec. 48; S.C. Const. (1868), art. XII (Corporations), sec. 1; Tenn. Const. (1870), art. XI, sec. 8; W. Va. Const. (1872), art. XI, sec. 1.

119. Ill. Const. (1848), art. III, sec. 38; Pa. Const, (amended 1857), art. XI, sec. 5–7; Fla. Const. (1868), art. XIII, sec. 8; Ga. Const. (1868), art. III, sec. 6; Va. Const. (1870), art. X, sec. 12–15.

120. N.J. Const. (1844), art. VI, sec. 6(3); La. Const. (1845), art. CXXI; Ky. Const. (1850), art. II, sec. 33; Mich. Const. (1850), art. XIV, sec. 6, 8; Ohio Const. (1851), art. VIII, sec. 4; Minn. Const. (1857), art. IX, sec. 10; Mo. Const. (1865), art. XI, sec. 13; Miss. Const. (1868), art. XII, sec. 5.

121. Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19 (1856); California State Telegraph Co. v. Alta Telegraph Co., 22 Cal. 398 (1863); City of Memphis v. Memphis Water Co., 5 Heisk. (52 Tenn.) 1495 (1871); State v. Milwaukee Gaslight Co., 29 Wis. 454 (1872); Grant v. City of Davenport, 36 Iowa 396 (1873).

122. Beekman v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige 45 (N.Y. Ch. 1831); Raleigh & Gaston R.R. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & Batt. 451 (N.C. 1837). See Scheiber Harry N., ‘The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts’, in Fleming Donald and Bailyn Bernard, eds., Law in American History (Cambridge, Mass., 1971) 362–73.

123. Iowa ex rel. Burlington & Mo. R.R. Co. v. County of Wapello, 13 Iowa 388 (1862); People v. Twp. Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (1870).

124. Corwin Edward S., ‘The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law’, 12 Michigan Law Review 247–76 (1914). Besides Corwin's essays, the best discussions of the doctrine of vested rights are Haines Charles Grove, ‘Judicial Review of Legislation and the Doctrine of Vested Rights and of Implied Limitations on Legislatures’, 2 Texas Law Review 257–90 (1924); Mendelson Wallace, ‘A Missing Link in the Evolution of Due Process’, 10 Vanderbilt Law Review 125–37 (1956).

125. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, at 388 (1798).

126. For example, Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199 (1818); Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 272 (1804); Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477 (N.Y. 1811).

127. Corwin, ‘Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law’, supra note 124, at 248–55.

128. 7 Johns. 447, 500–512.

129. Ibid, at 493.

130. Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Denio 128 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).

131. Ogden v. Sounders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).

132. Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 169(1853). In a powerful dissent, one of Black's colleagues denied that a railroad subsidy was a ‘public use’ of tax money, arguing it was an unconstitutional instance of special legislation, in violation of the constitutional guarantee that one's property could be taken only by the judgment of one's peers or by the law of the land. The dissent, not recorded in the report, may be found in 2 American Law Register 85–112 (18531854). The citation to the ‘law of the land’ clause of the Pennsylvania state constitution is ibid, at 105.

133. Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 73 (N.Y. Ch. 1831). See the cases cited in Cooley Thomas M., A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union, 3d ed. (Boston, 1874) 622.

134. People ex rel. Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklin, 9 Barb. 535, 548 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850). See Diamond Stephen, ‘The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation: Special Assessments in Nineteenth-Century America’, 12 Journal of Legal Studies 201–40, 214–18 (1983), for a discussion of opposition to special assessments in New York in the 1830s and 1840s.

135. For the incorporation of the doctrine of vested rights into the concept of ‘due process of law’ before the Civil War, see especially Mendelson, ‘Missing Link’, supra note 124; Corwin, ‘Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law’, supra note 124 and Corwin, ‘The Doctrine of Due Process’, supra note 8 at 460 are very useful for the information they contain, but Corwin dismisses far too casually the degree to which ante-bellum lawyers and jurists had come to accept what we would recognize as a ‘substantive’ notion of due process.

136. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 557–58.

137. Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202, 212 (1854).

138. This was true of the Dartmouth College case, where the newly elected Republican legislature of New Hampshire sought to replace the old, Congregationalist board of trustees with one drawn from the entire religious community. Richard N. Current, ‘The Dartmouth College Case’, in Garraty, ed., Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution, supra note 37, at 15–29; Stites Francis W., Private Interest and Public Gain: The Dartmouth College Case, 1819 (Amherst, Mass., 1972) 1238. In the famous Charles River Bridge case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837), Bostonians had sought to undermine the monopoly over bridge traffic between Harvard and Cambridge held by the Charles River Bridge Company, much of the stock of which was owned by Congregationalist Harvard University. Kutler Stanley I., Privilege and Creative Destruction: The Charles River Bridge Case (Philadelphia, 1971) 1834. Darling Arthur B., ‘Jacksonian Democracy in Massachusetts, 1824–1848’, American Historical Review xxix (1924) 271–87. In University v. Foy, 5 N.C. 58 (1805), perhaps the first decision to cite a ‘law of the land’ clause of a state constitution in overturning special legislation, Jeffersonian Republican legislators had repealed a land grant to the Episcopalian-dominated University of North Carolina. Broussard James H., The Southern Federalists, 1800–1816 (Baton Rouge, La., 1978) 323–26.

139. By the outbreak of the Civil War the linkage had received judicial articulation in North Carolina, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, New York, and the Supreme Court of the United States. University v. Foy, 5 N.C. 58 (1805); Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. 1 (1833); Vanzant v. Waddell, 10 Tenn. 270 (1829); Sheppard v. Johnson, 21 Tenn. 285 (1841); Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 167 (1853); Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202 (1854); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (24 How.) 539 (1852); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1856). It had also been developed in Anonymous, ‘The Security of Private Property’, 1 American Law Magazine 318–47, 335ff. (1843).

140. See the cases, infra notes 147 and 148.

141. See the cases, infra notes 149 and 150.

142. See the cases, infra notes 155–157.

143. Lowell v. Boston, 110 Mass. 454 (1873).

144. See the cases, infra note 154.

145. See the cases, infra notes 158–160.

146. Toledo, Wabash, & Western Ry. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37 (1873); Munn v. Illinois, 69 Ill. 80 (1873); Loan Association v. Topeka, 5 F. Cas. 737 (C.C.D. Kans. 1874) (No. 2734); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Iowa, 5 F. Cas. 594 (C.C.D. Iowa 1875) (No. 2666).

147. Wynehamer v. New York, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856); Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855).

148. Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328 (1854); Goddard v. Jacksonville, 15 Ill. 589 (1854); State v. Gallagher, 4 Gibbs 244 (Mich. 1856); Fisher v. McGuirr, 1 Gray 1 (Mass. 1854); State v. Paul, 5 R.I. 185 (1858).

149. State v. Noyes, 10 Foster 279 (N.H. 1855); Metropolitan Bd. of Health v. Heister, 37 N.Y. 661 (1868); Inhabitants of Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315 (1872).

150. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).

151. Supplemental Brief for Plaintiffs, Fagan v. State of Louisiana [The Slaughterhouse Cases], Kurland Philip B. and Casper Gerhard, eds., Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law (Arlington, Va., 1975) vi, 580.

152. Brief for Plaintiffs, ibid. 537.

153. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 114–16, 118 (1873) (Bradley, dissenting).

154. Thompson v. Inhabitants of Pittston, 59 Me. 545, 556 (1871) (Dickerson concurring). See also Perkins v. Inhabitants of Milford, 59 Me. 315 (1871) and Freeland v. Hastings, 92 Mass. 570 (1865). The New Jersey courts decided that such laws did serve a public purpose and therefore did not amount to special, or class, legislation. But they clearly were troubled by the case and took pains to articulate the principle that ‘the power of taking one man's property and vesting it in another, is in no sense a legislative power; and… a law which attempted to do this under the name of a tax would be wholly unauthorized and void’. State, Wagner et al. v. Collector of Delaware, 31 N.J.L. 189, 195 (1865).

155. The Tidewater Co. v. Coster, 18 N.J.Eq. 518 (1866); State v. Mayor of Hoboken, 39 N.J.L. 291 (1873); State, Agens, Pros. v. Newark, 37 ibid, at 415 (1874).

156. People ex rel. Crowell v. Lawrence, 41 N.Y. 137 (1869).

157. Gordon v. Cornes, 47 N.Y. 608 (1872).

158. Opinion of the Justices, 58 Me. 590, 591 (1870).

159. Ibid, at 593–95.

160. Hansen v. Iowa, 27 Iowa 28 (1869). See also Allan v. Jay, 60 Me. 124 (1871); Lowell v. Boston, 110 Mass. 454 (1873); Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 342 (1860)); Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350 (1869); Whiting v. Sheboygan and Fon du Lac R.R. Co., 25 Wis. 167 (1870); People v. Twp. Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (1870).

161. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 133 (1st edition published in 1868).

162. Jacobs Clyde E., Law Writers and the Courts: The Influence of Thomas M. Cooley, Christopher G. Tiedeman, and John F. Dillon Upon American Constitutional Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954) 27; Twiss Benjamin R., Lawyers and the Constitution: How Laissez-Faire Came to the Supreme Court (Princeton, N.J., 1942) passim; Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State, supra note 9 at 128–29.

163. People v. Twp. Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich, at 487.

164. Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution, supra note 162 at 18.

165. People v. Twp. Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich, at 486.

166. Dillion , ‘Property—Its Rights and Duties in our Legal and Social Systems’, Proceedings of the New York State Bar Association xviii (1895) 3364, 46.

167. Stone v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307 (1886); Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).

168. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).

169. 165 U.S. 578 (1897). For examples of the traditional, Supreme Court-centered account, see Hamilton, ‘Path of Due Process’, supra note 8; Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, supra note 16 at 397–418.

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