The right of self-defence against non-state actors is increasingly invoked and accepted in the practice of states. However, the recognition of this right must overcome a fundamental obstacle: that of explaining why the rights of the host state, in particular its right of territorial sovereignty, is not infringed by the self-defensive force used within its territory. In practice, states invoking self-defence against non-state actors rely on the involvement of the host state with those actors to justify the use of force in that state's territory. It is not clear, from a legal standpoint, how to rationalize the fact of involvement as a form of legal justification. For some, involvement amounts to attribution. For others, involvement is a form of complicity. For others still, involvement may entail a breach of the host state's due diligence obligation to protect the rights of other states in its territory. All of these solutions are deficient in some way, and have failed to receive general endorsement. This article considers whether there may be a different, as yet neglected, solution: self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. The article shows that this is not a perfect solution either, since positive law remains uncertain on this point. Nevertheless, it is a solution that may provide a better normative framework for the development of the law of self-defence against non-state actors.

On the basis of a thorough empirical analysis, the article comes to a number of theoretical conclusions which have never previously been discussed in the literature. In particular, it demonstrates that the Court's procedure is governed not only by ‘procedural law’ but also by norms which are non-legal. Moreover, it clearly circumscribes which norms in the documents relating to the functioning of the Court are procedural and which lack this character. In their entirety, provisions governing the Court's procedure form a ‘normative system’, with the law being only one of its elements. The Court's procedural norms originate both from the traditional sources of international law as well as from sources which, according to the usual classification, do not necessarily belong to that category. The procedural norms that are derived from all of these sources, while not tending towards uniformity in terms of their characteristics and effect, nevertheless form a system which operates as a whole. The procedure of the International Court of Justice does not fit neatly within the general scheme of ‘legal versus non-legal norms’; neither can one readily apply the theory of traditional sources of international law to a procedural system which brings together heterogeneous elements and must therefore be explained keeping in mind its own logic and nature.

This article argues in favour of broadening the trade and environment debate in the World Trade Organization (WTO) to include a developmental perspective. WTO litigation involving environmental regulation touches upon the issue of global justice and the power asymmetries structurally embedded in the global economy. The recognition of the WTO as a legitimate global institution, therefore, depends on its ability to reconcile the respect for the right to regulate with the need to give due regard to the interests and concerns of foreign constituencies affected by domestic regulation. By imposing other-regarding obligations, WTO law can act as a mechanism of external accountability of powerful states vis-à-vis affected foreigners, especially where asymmetric relations and different stages of economic development are involved. The article applies this framework to analyze the legal reasoning of the Appellate Body in the US-Tuna II dispute between the US and Mexico – a dispute illustrating the complex intertwinement between economic, environmental and developmental issues. It concludes that the use of the concepts of ‘even-handedness’ and ‘calibration’ under Article 2.1 of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade did not enable the Appellate Body to strike an adequate balance between the right to regulate and external accountability. While in the original report the Appellate Body used ‘even-handedness’ to impose only a minimal level of external accountability on the US, in the compliance report, the Appellate Body has gone too far by failing to defer to the US risk assessment amidst scientific controversy and uncertainty.

This article critiques the global concern that international commercial arbitration (ICA) is becoming increasingly ‘judicialized’, addressing the growing sentiment in ICA that arbitral proceedings are too lengthy, expensive, and complex. Assuming a contrarian perspective, it argues that attempts to address the cost and length of arbitration proceedings ought not to undermine the value of finely reasoned arbitral decisions grounded in law and justice. It also argues for a contextual assessment of ICA that extends beyond the debate over ‘judicialization’.

Using global illustrations and ICA developments in Australia as an initial guide, this article suggests that balancing party autonomy, accountability, efficiency, and fairness in ICA can help resolve these growing criticisms of ‘judicialization’. Ultimately, the reform of international arbitration should take place within a framework of ‘international best practice’ that is both analytical in nature and functional in operation. As such, ICA should not only be affordable and expeditious, it should serve as a legitimate and effective method of resolving international commercial disputes. In addition, it should balance the virtue of transparent proceedings against the need to respect the confidences of the parties.

The inspiration for this article came from a call for amicus curiae briefs issued in April 2016 by the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). The call sought guidance on: whether, under customary international law applicable between 1975 and 1979, an attack by a state or organization against members of its own armed forces may amount to an attack directed against a civilian population for the purpose of constituting a crime against humanity under Article 5 of the ECCC Law. We argue that customary international law justifies a finding that an attack on members of the armed forces can constitute crimes against humanity. In particular, the article focuses on the importance placed on the persecution element of crimes against humanity in the post-Second World War jurisprudence, and the broad interpretation of the term ‘civilian’. The article also examines the jurisprudence of contemporary international courts, finding that in some cases the courts have interpreted the term ‘civilian’ as incorporating hors de combat. However, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Court (ICC) have moved towards a more restrictive interpretation of the term ‘civilian’, potentially excluding members of the armed forces. We argue that this move is regressive, and against the spirit in which the offence of crimes against humanity was created. The ECCC has an opportunity to counter this restrictive approach, thereby narrowing the protection gap which crimes against humanity were initially created to close.

‘Climate change inundation’ – the process whereby climate change-related impacts like rising sea levels, higher storm surges, and changing rainfall patterns interact with and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities like poverty, isolation, resource scarcity, and inadequate infrastructure – presents a unique challenge to the territorial, legal, and political infrastructure of low-lying coral atoll island states. This article uses the example of climate change inundation to illustrate some of the shortcomings of the mainstream ‘minimum threshold’ account of statehood. It then proposes an alternative account of the criteria of statehood as a set of overlapping similarities or relationships between state-like entities, drawing on Wittgenstein's concept of ‘family resemblances’. Although problematic in some respects, this family resemblance account provides a broader conceptual space for assessing the merits of alternative forms of statehood.

International humanitarian law establishes explicit safeguards applicable to detention occurring in non-international armed conflict. However, debate exists as to whether these treaty provisions establish an implicit legal basis for detention. This article approaches this debate in light of the application of international humanitarian law to non-state armed groups. It examines the principal arguments against implicit detention authority and then applies the law of treaty interpretation to international humanitarian law's detention-related provisions. On the basis of current understandings of international law – and the prohibition of arbitrary detention in particular – it is concluded that international humanitarian law must be interpreted as establishing implicit detention authority, in order to ensure the continued regulation of armed groups. Although, perhaps, problematic from certain states’ perspective, this conclusion is reflective of the current state of international law. However, this is not necessarily the end of the story. A number of potential ‘ways forward’ are identified: implicit detention authority may be (i) rejected; (ii) accepted; or (iii) re-examined in light of the non-state status of armed groups, and what this means for the content of the prohibition of arbitrary detention. These scenarios are examined in light of the desire to ensure: the coherency of international law including recognition of the role of armed groups, the continued effectiveness of international humanitarian law, and state sovereignty. An emphasis is placed on understanding the non-state status of armed groups and what this means for international regulation and the content of imposed obligations.

On 5 October 2016, the International Court of Justice (ICJ, the Court) rendered three judgments declining to take jurisdiction in the Marshall Islands cases, in which that state alleged that India, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom violated their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and customary international law. In declining to take jurisdiction, the Court further confirmed its recent shift to jurisdictional formalism, initiated in Georgia v. Russia and confirmed in both Belgium v. Senegal and the Alleged Violations (Nicaragua v. Colombia) judgment. What is more, the Court heightened the burden of proving the existence of a dispute by incorporating an ‘objective awareness’ requirement in its analysis. The present contribution critically situates the Court's judgments within the context of the law of state responsibility and global security, with particular emphasis on the broader implications going forward. It first explores the principal features of the Court's formalistic shift on jurisdictional matters in the cases, setting the stage for the subsequent discussion. The article then turns to the broader implications of these decisions for state responsibility, taking into consideration that the ‘disputes’ submitted to the Court are not strictly bilateral in nature. My ambition is also to highlight the nexus between jurisdictional issues, state responsibility law, and broader questions of access to justice in multilateral disputes. By way of conclusion, the article highlights the importance of identifying creative solutions in a post-Marshall Islands world, suggesting the UN General Assembly as a law-making facilitator and the UN Security Council as an alternate – albeit imperfect – dispute settlement forum to tackle multilateral disputes with global security implications.

Over the past few decades, states have granted greater independence and authority to international courts, yet still retain their ability to control who sits on the bench. This article examines how governments use their power of judicial nomination and appointment in the context of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and assesses the relative influence of three factors on states’ vote choices for ICJ candidates: the candidates’ probability of (in)sensitivity to political considerations; their qualifications; and the role of interstate politics. Drawing on a new dataset of candidates nominated for election to the ICJ between 1949 and 2010, we demonstrate that electing states base their initial vote choices largely on the same set of factors within both bodies that elect ICJ judges: the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. In particular, professional experiences signaling a probability of insensitivity to political considerations reduce a candidate's expected vote share. A candidate's qualifications, on the other hand, do not appear to make a considerable difference in winning more votes. Finally, the amount of support during the nomination stage is highly correlated with vote share, suggesting that considerable screening occurs prior to nomination and that the number of nominations received facilitates co-ordination of vote choice across states.

The International Court of Justice and other international tribunals have a much more prominent role in settling international disputes than they did 50 years ago. It follows that the measures for the protection of the independence of the institutions and their members are even more important. Those protections include the qualifications judges are to have, the methods of their election and selection, their commitment to their responsibilities, and their methods of work. Also important are the reactions to their decisions by states, particularly the parties, the wider international community and the contribution of the rulings of the institutions to the clarification of the law and its development.

On 16 March 2016, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) rejected on jurisdictional grounds a victims’ request to investigate a case of environmental destruction by Chevron in Ecuador. A little over a year later, on 15 September 2016, the Prosecutor released a policy paper indicating that her office would consider hearing cases of environmental destruction. This article examines how the ICC can prosecute environmental destruction as a crime against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. It presents a survey of the potential jurisdictional and substantive issues of prosecuting environmental issues and uses the victims’ request asking the Prosecutor to investigate environmental destruction by Chevron in the Ecuadorian Amazon as a backdrop. The article proceeds in three parts. Firstly, it discusses the request by the victims in Ecuador asking for the Prosecutor to investigate. Secondly, it sets out the basic jurisdictional framework of the ICC and analyzes why the Prosecutor rejected the victims’ request. Thirdly, it examines Article 7 and concludes that while peacetime environmental destruction committed by a non-state actor that results in a humanitarian atrocity can qualify as a crime against humanity, the factual circumstances alleged in the Ecuadorian victims’ request did not amount to a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute.

As a standard of review, ‘objective reasonableness’ has been in the academic spotlight after the Whaling in the Antarctic judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court). The Court's approach was conceptually innovative and seemed to have operated a partial reversal of the burden of proof in favour of the applicant. In response to certain criticisms addressed to that decision, this article makes two claims. First, ‘reasonableness’, while being inherently vague, gives a justifiable degree of discretion to judges, thereby enabling them to make difficult adjudicatory choices without departing from the applicable legal framework. Second, the term finds sufficient support in the Court's case law dealing with state discretion in the implementation of treaties. Both claims relate to the very same core idea: that even if one remains sceptical as to the capacity of the term to enhance certainty, ‘reasonableness’ is a basic conceptual tool that facilitates judicial review in complex cases, including those of a scientific nature.

One of the most interesting and controversial crimes that belong to the subject matter jurisdiction of the newly to be established African Criminal Chamber is undoubtedly the crime of unconstitutional change of government. This article explores the question why this offence is upgraded to the regional level of criminal law enforcement. After all, any criminalization of the conduct at a regional level and the concomitant inclusion of the offence in the jurisdiction of regional courts raises questions about the right of foreign intervention in internal political affairs and the curtailment of the right to rebel. The crime of unconstitutional change of government is tested against these principles and it is concluded that they do not impede criminalization, nor the elevation of the crime to a regional level. In search of a positive argument in defence of the inclusion of the crime within the jurisdiction of the African Court, I contend that the best explanation is that insurgencies are not contained to single states but are inclined to spread to other countries. In view of the specific African experience, where endemic conflicts have proved to be contagious, it is clear that states have a common interest in suppressing both the dynamic and static form of unconstitutional change of government.

In recent times, transitional justice practice has increasingly seen truth commissions tasked with administering accountability programmes, distinct from, and in addition to, their traditional truth-seeking role. Such accountability schemes typically take the form of granting or recommending amnesty for those who disclose involvement in past crimes or facilitate reintegration on the basis of similar disclosures. Self-incriminating disclosures made in the course of traditional truth commission proceedings generally attract a robust set of legal safeguards. However, the protections within transitional accountability schemes administered by truth commissions tend to be less stringent. This article explores this anomaly, focusing particularly on the extent to which the privilege against self-incrimination is protected within truth commission-administered accountability programmes. It considers the programmes operated to date, and the levels of protection afforded, and demonstrates a lack of consistent practice in the safeguarding of individual rights within these programmes. It examines international legal standards on the privilege against self-incrimination and questions whether the procedures operated by accountability programmes can be reconciled with international norms in order to protect those who make self-incriminating disclosures within accountability initiatives. The article argues that a failure to ensure individual rights against self-incrimination risks compromising the efficacy of the programmes themselves and the contribution that they can make to long-term peace and reconciliation in transitional states.

International criminal law is being pulled in different directions by various conflicting considerations – deterrence, retribution, justice for victims, reconciliation, and setting the historical record. This trend is detrimental to the survival of the system as it erodes coherence and undermines its legitimacy. One may suggest that international criminal law needs a principle objective to bring order to the system. This article argues that while this statement may be true, it is equally important to have a discussion about pragmatic policy choices underlying the system. Acknowledging that the role of international criminal law is symbolic assists with constraining over-ambition implicit in the discipline. Treating symbolism as a policy consideration places necessary checks on other goals proclaimed by international courts and UN executive bodies and also serves as a tool informing the exercise of discretion in international criminal law.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established with the aim of prosecuting individuals for the gravest crimes of concern to the international community. Yet some provisions of its Statute (the Rome Statute) recognize the need for temporarily setting aside criminal investigations or prosecutions in favour of different considerations. Two of these provisions are Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) of the Statute. They allow the Prosecutor of the Court to use his or her discretion in deciding not to initiate an investigation or a prosecution in the ‘interests of justice’. Nonetheless, the ambiguity of this phrase, coupled with an absent definition, have given rise to a polarized debate about its meaning and the Prosecutor's ensuing margin of discretion: some consider matters of peace and security and alternative justice mechanisms as possible ‘interests of justice’, while others exclude them. Among those adopting the latter view is the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), as can be inferred from a 2007 Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice and a 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, which continue to be upheld by the Office. Against this backdrop and amid new developments at the ICC which call into question the OTP's position, the purpose of this article is to develop a comprehensive interpretation of Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) of the Rome Statute, using all the interpretative tools provided by Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

The justification for a majority of international judges sitting on hybrid international criminal tribunals is tremendously undertheorized. At present, policymakers must rely on base pragmatic considerations that allege that local judges are either too incapable or too corrupt. This may or may not be true. It is, however, certainly unattractive and inadequate as an argument. In this article, I sketch out a principled theoretical argument defending internationalization of hybrid tribunals. Drawing on debates in municipal jurisdictions on the principle of fair reflection, my principled justification centres on institutional and sociological legitimacy. As international crimes strike at two societies – the local and the global – hybrid tribunals should be composed of both international and local judges. In principle, the severity of international crimes dictates that international judges should predominate. However, peculiar contextual factors may suggest moderating the principle of fair reflection in appropriate circumstances.

The emergence of new international criminal courts in the 1990s intensified an existing professional contest to define international crimes. This ongoing competition concerned which crimes should be termed international and consequently become the subject of international institution-building and prosecution. The article draws upon Pierre Bourdieu's analytical tool of the ‘field’ in order to investigate how legal professionals located in different fields of practice have crafted and promoted specific crimes as international, in successive phases. The focus of the analysis is on two stages of this development. The first is the protracted emergence of a field of ‘core crimes’ centred on a specific set of crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The second is an emergent contestation of this focus on ‘core crimes’ embedded in the careers of legal professionals engaged in the field of anti-corruption. By adapting the impactful narratives developed around core crimes, this second phase of contestation becomes a new frontline in the wider endeavour to define the role of criminal law in a larger international space of governance and politics.

The increased use of information and communication technologies arguably represents important opportunities for the field of transitional justice, notably with respect to the optimization of existing mechanisms and the development of new ones. This article focuses on state-based and typically very formal mechanisms, namely international, internationalized and national criminal tribunals as well as truth and reconciliation commissions. These institutions often apply and engage with international law and operate with the involvement or under the close scrutiny of the international community. Moreover, they can be expected to be the first ones to embrace insights from the field of cyberjustice to a significant extent.

Enhancing access to and participation in such mechanisms, rendering them more cost-efficient and facilitating information-sharing would correspond to generally accepted norms relating to both international human rights and justice. However, cyberjustice initiatives may also entrench an already common ‘toolkit approach’ in the field of transitional justice. This article builds on recent critiques of the dominant legalistic and normatively driven transitional justice paradigm and argues that transitional justice + cyberjustice hence risks furthering a technocratic top-down approach that unduly limits creative solutions. By adopting a critical legal-pluralistic approach that conceives individuals as law-creative actors and that is cognizant of the close relationship between means and ends, the article imagines ways of benefiting from the promises of transitional justice + cyberjustice.

Are historians or other country specialists needed in the investigation and prosecution of crimes under international law? Experiences at international tribunals, from the Nuremberg Trials to the present, offer different answers to this question. This article argues that country specialists are indispensable and demonstrates how, time and again, in international or national settings, practical necessities have led to structural models in which lawyers, investigators and country specialists work together. A ‘best practices’ model for interdisciplinary investigations adopted by a group of national and international prosecution units is presented in detail. When creating new international tribunals, the UN did not incorporate this model. What is needed for future tribunals is a structural framework of the Office of the Prosecutor, which includes country specialists.