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Property Rights, Deregulation, and Entrepreneurial Development in a Transition Economy

  • Wubiao Zhou (a1)
Abstract
ABSTRACT

This article investigates the relative roles of formal property rights institutions versus deregulated markets in entrepreneurial development, based on China's market transition. Empirically, it is not yet known which set of institutions matters more for entrepreneurship, particularly in the long run, despite the existence of well-established theoretical arguments for each. Using provincial-level panel data from China's transition economy, this study has the following findings: On average, both formal protection of property rights and deregulated markets have positive effects on entrepreneurial development; yet, as market transition progresses, the effect of formal protection of property rights increases, while that of deregulated markets decreases. These results are robust to both multiple model specifications and an endogeneity test using an instrumental variable approach. Overall, therefore, while both sets of institutions indeed play positive roles in entrepreneurial development, property rights institutions may be more fundamental in the long run.

摘要:

基于中国的市场转型, 本文研究正式的产权机制对比创业发展中解除管制的市场的相对作用。实证上, 现在还不知道那种机制, 特别是从长期来看, 对企业家精神更为重要, 尽管支持每种机制的完善的理论观点都存在。使用从中国转型经济中的省级平行数据, 这项研究有以下发现:平均而言, 正式的产权保护和解除管制的市场两者都对创业发展有积极作用; 然而, 随着市场转型的推进, 正式的产权保护的作用增加, 而解除管制的市场的作用降少。这些结果对多模型规范和用工具变量法做的内生性测试两者都是稳健的。总体上, 因此两种机制在创业发展中确实都能起到积极的作用, 但从长远来看, 产权机制可能是更根本的。

यह शोध पत्र चीन के बाजारोन्मुख संक्रमण के आधार पर उद्यमिता के विकास में औपचारिक संपत्ति अधिकार संस्थानों व अविनियमित बाज़ारों के तुलनात्मक योगदान का अनुसंधान करता है. आनुभविक तौर पर दोनों ही संस्थान संकुलों पर उपलब्ध प्रामाणिक तर्कों की उपलब्धि के बावजूद यह नियत नहीं है कि किसका उद्यमिता उत्थान पर विशेष तौर पर लम्बी अवधि में अधिक प्रभाव है. चीनी परिवर्तनशील अर्थव्यवस्था से प्रान्त-स्तरीय बहु-आयामी दीर्घकालीन आकड़ों (पैनल डाटा) के आधार पर इस शोध के निम्न निष्कर्ष हैं: औसतन उद्यमिता विकास पर औपचारिक संपत्ति अधिकारों कि रक्षा तथा अविनियमित बाजार- दोनों का सकारात्मक प्रभाव है; इसके बावजूद बाजारोन्मुखता के विकास के साथ औपचारिक संपत्ति रक्षा का प्रभाव बढ़ता है और अविनियमित बाज़ारों का प्रभाव घटता है. यह परिणाम बहुल आदर्श विनिर्देश और निमित्त चर पद्धति के आधार पर किया गए अन्तर्जात आधारित परीक्षण पर सुदृढ़ निकलते हैं. इसलिए जहाँ उद्यमिता विकास में दोनों ही प्रकार के संस्थानों का सकारात्मक योगदान है, दीर्घकालीन परिप्रेक्ष्य में संपत्ति अधिकार संस्थान अधिक महत्वपूर्ण हो सकते हैं.

Sumário:

Este artigo investiga os papeis relativos das instituições de direitos de propriedade formal em relação a mercados desregulados no desenvolvimento empresarial, com base na transição de mercado na China. Empiricamente, ainda não se sabe que conjunto de instituições importa mais para o empreendedorismo, particularmente a longo prazo, apesar da existência de argumentos teóricos bem estabelecidos para cada um. Usando dados em painel ao nível provincial na economia de transição da China, este estudo tem as seguintes descobertas: em média, tanto a proteção formal dos direitos de propriedade quanto os mercados desregulados têm efeitos positivos no desenvolvimento empresarial; ainda assim, à medida que a transição de mercado avança, o efeito da proteção formal dos direitos de propriedade aumenta, enquanto que o efeito dos mercados desregulados diminui. Esses resultados são robustos tanto para as especificações de vários modelos quanto para um teste de endogeneidade usando uma abordagem com variável instrumental. No geral, portanto, enquanto ambos os conjuntos de instituições desempenham papéis positivos no desenvolvimento empreendedor, as instituições de direitos de propriedade podem ser mais fundamentais a longo prazo.

АННОТАЦИЯ:

В этой статье исследуется роль формальных институтов, регулирующих права собственности, в сравнении с дерегуляцией рынков для развития предпринимательства в условиях переходной экономики Китая. Эмпирически пока неизвестно, какой тип институтов имеет большее значение для предпринимательства, особенно в долгосрочной перспективе, несмотря на наличие устоявшихся теоретических аргументов для каждого типа. На основании данных на уровне провинций в переходной экономике Китая, это исследование делает следующие выводы: в целом, как формальная защита прав собственности, так и дерегулирование рынков оказывают положительное влияние на развитие предпринимательства; однако, по мере перехода к рыночной экономике, значение формальной защиты прав собственности возрастает, в то время как значение дерегуляции рынков уменьшается. Эти результаты являются надежными, поскольку они соответствуют требованиям многоуровневой модели, а также проходят тест на эндогенность с использованием метода инструментальных переменных. В целом, соответственно, хотя оба типа институтов действительно играют положительную роль в развитии предпринимательства, формальные институты прав собственности могут быть более фундаментальными в долгосрочной перспективе.

RESUMEN:

Este artículo investiga los roles relativos de las instituciones formales de derechos de propiedad frente a los mercados desregulados en el desarrollo empresarial, basados en la transición del mercado chino. Empíricamente, aún no es conocido cuál es el conjunto de instituciones más importante para el emprendimiento, particularmente en el largo plazo, a pesar de la existencia de argumentos teóricos bien establecidos para cada uno. Usando un panel de datos a nivel provincial de la economía en transición China, este estudio tiene los siguientes hallazgos: En promedio, tanto para la protección formal de los derechos de protección como los mercados desregulados tienen efectos positivos en el desarrollo empresarial; sin embargo, a medida que avanza la transición del mercado, el efecto de la protección formal de los derechos de propiedad aumenta, mientras que los de los mercados desregulados disminuye. Estos resultados son robustos tanto para especificaciones de múltiples modelos y una prueba de endogeneidad usando un enfoque de variables instrumentales. En general, por consiguiente, mientras ambos conjuntos de instituciones en efecto juegan roles positivos en el desarrollo empresarial, las instituciones de derechos de propiedad pueden ser más fundamentales en el largo plazo.

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