Introduction
“Slovenes represent only an insignificant part of Yugoslav emigration to Argentina. Even though the embassy tries its best to help them, it has to exercise caution because they are Italian citizens. Needless to say, it expects loyal support from them in exchange.”Footnote 1
The words of the Yugoslav ambassador Ivan Švegel, himself of of Slovene origin, demonstrate the intricacies of nation-building in interwar Europe. As an ethnic minority, Slovenes of Venezia Giulia/the Julian MarchFootnote 2 found themselves at the intersection of interests advanced by a “nationalizing state” aiming to Italianize them, and the “external national homeland” of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (from 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, hereafter I will refer to the state simply as Yugoslavia) which considered them co-nationals belonging to a single transborder nation (Brubaker Reference Brubaker1996, 5).
Much like the rest of East Central Europe, where the First World War “failed to end” (Gerwarth Reference Gerwarth2016), the area encompassing the Julian March underwent unprecedented political and social upheaval in the immediate post-war period. In Trieste, conflict between the Italian nationalist liberals who governed the city council and the rising Slovene bourgeoise had been present before the war, but they were never as bloody as in the period following the conflict. The violence of the fascist militias reflected the experience of their members, brutalized by the experience of war. In addition, now the military authorities were also involved in the persecution of Slavs, fueling ethnic hatred and supporting the myth of the mutilated victory, the feeling of betrayal because the Italian state did not acquire the territories promised by the secret London Treaty with which it joined the Entente powers (Klabjan Reference Klabjan2018, 998; Bresciani Reference Bresciani, Buchen and Grelka2016, 58).
In turn, the emerging fascist regime aimed to carry out a policy of “ethnic bonification”— “improvement” of the ethnic composition of the territory by assimilating or substituting Slovenes and Croats with Italians in order to fully “reintegrate” the territory of the Julian March, which had been annexed to Italy with the Treaty of Rapallo in 1920 (Kacin-Wohinz Reference Kacin Wohinz and Verginella2008, 35–44). Emigration from the territory had already begun before the region’s annexation to Italy. Similarly to other newly-acquired European territories which were subject to nationalization and removal of state employees, Italy too planned to substitute the non-Italians employed in state companies and public service. With the introduction of fascism, these first emigrants were followed by teachers affected by the Italianization of education imposed by the 1923/4 school reform, which permitted lessons to be taught in Italian only. Leggi fascistissime, the laws which introduced totalitarian dictatorship, were passed in 1926 and initiated the third phase of emigration. At that time, associations of ethnic minorities regarded to be dissociated from the territory they inhabited (the regime referred to them using the term allogeni), were dissolved, and the ethnic press was outlawed. As a result, the “traditional opposition,” those organized in the Slovene-national organizations, left the region to settle in Yugoslavia. Soon they were accompanied by young anti-fascists involved in clandestine rebellion, who were punished by intimidation, incarceration, and even a few death sentences (Vovko Reference Vovko1978, 450–451).
The agrarian crisis, caused by the dissolution of savings banks and impoverishment of the region, led to further outflows, mainly to Argentina. Denationalization measures, which triggered a massive outflow of minority members, were concomitant to the adoption of the new demographic policy in 1927, which empowered Italy to outlaw the emigration of ethnic Italians (Kacin-Wohinz Reference Kacin Wohinz and Mislej1995, 24–27; Grossutti Reference Grossutti2013, 164–165). However, the law did not concern the emigration of ethnic minorities. The departure of allogeni, as Mussolini declared, was not to be obstructed, but rather encouraged (Kacin-Wohinz Reference Kacin Wohinz and Mislej1995, 23–25). Despite the severity of the measures undertaken, Italian population management was based on similar foundations as those pursued not only in the East Central part of the continent, but in Europe in general.Footnote 3 To varying degrees, nation-building strategies in European states consisted of “purifying” the nation by promoting the departure of non-national elements, while circumscribing the exit of those belonging to the constitutive nation (Zahra Reference Zahra2016, 109–110; Brunnbauer Reference Brunnbauer2012, 605). Of the 100,000 who left the Julian March during the interwar period, about 70,000 went to Yugoslavia, while 22,000 fled to Argentina, and 5,000 to Belgium and France (Kalc Reference Kalc1996, 26–27).
Forced Italianization of the territory transformed emigrant Slovenes from the Julian March into a diaspora, monitored by both Italy and Yugoslavia. Italy carefully monitored the activities of the emigrants because they were Italian citizens pursuing antifascist goals. The fascist regime considered any opposition to be anti-Italian and hence fought hard to suppress it (Pretelli Reference Pretelli2010, 60–61). Yugoslavia, on the other hand, based on the emigrants’ ethno-cultural background, considered emigrants from the Julian March to form part of the “Tenth Banovina”—the supposed tenth administrative unit of the Kingdom consisting of Yugoslavs abroad (Brunnbauer Reference Brunnbauer2016, 223). However, as the emigrants were Italian citizens, Yugoslavia could not incorporate them into its polity. Therefore, the state could use only “diaspora building mechanisms” not “diaspora integration mechanisms” when engaging them (Gamlen Reference Gamlen2008, 851).
While migration studies have traditionally focused on the role of receiving states in shaping emigrants’ loyalties, the study of sending states’ policies has been long neglected (Waldinger and Green Reference Waldinger, Green, Waldinger and Green2016, 9; Green and Weil Reference Green, Weil, Weil and Green2007, 1–2; Østergaard-Nielsen Reference Østergaard-Nielsen2003, 3). However, as scholars have departed from the “modern geopolitical imagination” which perceived territorially bounded nation-states as a decisive factor in international processes (Gamlen Reference Gamlen2008, 841; Ragazzi Reference Ragazzi2017, 4), the research on states’ transnational politics has been increasing steadily. Building on the growing number of historical case studies dealing with the processes of creating diasporas (Brunnbauer, Reference Brunnbauer2016, Choate Reference Choate2008; Gabaccia, Hoerder and Walaszek Reference Gabaccia, Hoerder, Walaszek, Weil and Green2007; Pretelli Reference Pretelli2010; Ragazzi Reference Ragazzi2017) in the following article I will evaluate strategies of Yugoslav extraterritorial control over the Julian March emigrants in Argentina. Moreover, in line with Aliano (Reference Aliano2012), who examined Mussolini’s nationalization project of the Italian community in Argentina, I aim to explore how the Julian March community reacted to the Yugoslav extraterritorial project of co-opting them into the national community and reshaped it in a way that it suited their needs. I argue that in order to understand the multitude of emigrants’ responses, contextualizing the emigrant reaction in the Argentine framework is necessary. Despite thorough studies of Yugoslav migration policies (Brunnbauer Reference Brunnbauer2016; Đikanović Reference Đikanović2012; Miletić Reference Miletić2009), works specifically addressing the way the emigrant communities reacted to extraterritorial projects of nation-building are missing.
Scholarship dealing with the relation of states towards their co-nationals abroad has mostly studied policies of migrant-sending states and kin-state policies separately, thereby limiting the progress of understanding states’ transborder engagement (Waterbury Reference Waterbury, Baubock and Faist2010, 131). While remaining focused on the issue of the emigrants in Argentina, the case of the stranded Yugoslav minority allows me to examine in what way policies Yugoslavia advanced towards “its” minorities converged with and deviated from the ones with which it aimed at emigrant co-nationals. The fact that Yugoslavia, as most of the European states in that era, devised state-building policies on ethnicist principles, implied that the state aimed at including Yugoslavs beyond its borders into its national community. However, despite being based on similar principles, policies targeting stranded minorities and other emigrants differed in practice. Apart from obvious geopolitical considerations, Yugoslavia did not link the issue of Julian March minority with the emigrant “Tenth Banovina” more forcefully, because the Julian March never really acquired a place in the Yugoslav identity, which is a prerequisite for any considerable extraterritorial engagement (Østergaard-Nielsen Reference Østergaard-Nielsen2003, 219).
It is particularly worthwhile to examine the relations between Yugoslavia and the Julian March emigrants because it forces us to reconsider Yugoslav strategies of building its “two diasporas” and understand why the state was not particularly successful in fostering transborder loyalties. Yugoslavia faced comparable challenges, as did the other successor states that emerged after the collapse of empires in East Central Europe. Understanding the case of Yugoslav’s relation to the Julian March emigrants therefore helps us to gain insight into dynamics of state-diaspora relations in the context of shifting borders and nationalizing political regimes. Particularly, it demonstrates how troublesome a state’s strategies of co-opting emigrants from a disputed territory in the national community can be, if the state which presents itself as a homeland cannot deploy mechanisms to integrate the diaspora into its polity.
I begin my essay by discussing how Yugoslavia’s attitude towards Julian March emigrants was shaped in the context of forming a loyal diaspora. In this respect, I examine how migration policy reflected nation-building ideology and analyze the way in which it relates to the policy targeting the stranded minorities.
The explanation of subtleties of Yugoslav policies targeting co-nationals abroad will serve to contextualize the relationship of the Yugoslav diplomatic corps with the emigrants from the “unredeemed territory” in Argentina. By studying the archival material of the Yugoslav Embassy in Buenos Aires, I will demonstrate that during the royal dictatorship, relations between the emigrants and the Yugoslav diplomatic corps were often marked by friction.
In the following part of the article, I demonstrate that the closer relationship that the embassy established with the emigrant community in the second half of the 1930s was possible thanks to the shift in the Yugoslav political structure in which Slovene clerical politicians began to play a prominent part and due to the gradual economic stabilization of the emigrant community.
Finally, with a view to examining the emigrants’ attitude to Yugoslavia, I present some texts from all emigrant newspapers and analyze their commemorative practices. These texts were written either at the time the newspapers were founded or when the shift in editorial board occurred. Very often they refer to significant events in the Yugoslav homeland (such as the proclamation of dictatorship or the beginning of World War II). The newspapers reflect contrasting visions of Yugoslavia because their contributors were emigrants of different political affiliations, such as pro-Yugoslav nationalists, social democrats who advocated a social and national reorganization of Yugoslavia, and socialists who proposed a social revolution.
Following Nora’s (Reference Nora1996) concept of the site of memory (lieu de mémoire) I highlight the celebration of Yugoslav unification as a form of crystallization of Yugoslav identity. By examining newspaper articles which refer to the celebration of unification, it will be evident that beneath the apparently consensual agreement on the significance of unification, there lay diverging viewpoints on Yugoslavia which coalesced only during the celebration.
Even though the study of emigrant identifications is beyond the scope of this article, the reference to newspaper reports about the “unredeemed brothers” and anthropological examination of this emigrant community undertaken by Molek (Reference Molek2016)Footnote 4 will demonstrate that the emigrants markedly identified with the Julian March region perceived by them as imperiled. Moreover, the fact that Yugoslavia failed to address the Julian March issue, and provide them needed socio-economic assistance, drew the emigrants into envisioning their own image of homeland. Based on the research focused on emigrant correspondence (Zobec Reference Zobec2013), I contend that many emigrants were indifferent to the Yugoslav national project and were refusing to take part in the Julian March campaign. In line with Gabaccia (Reference Gabaccia2000) I argue that instead of forming a “de-territorialized nation-state,” many emigrants drew their loyalties to their native communities and relatives. However, to what extent this attitude resulted from an inconsistent Yugoslav policy marked by coercion which drew the emigrants closer to unwelcoming host society, and to what degree it was a normal response of the emigrants to dislocation, remains open to debate.
Julian March Emigrants and the “Tenth Banovina”
The organization of Yugoslav migration services followed European trends, especially the standards developed by Italy and Hungary, countries which managed to subordinate migration flows to state control. The high number of returnees entering the country after the Great War and the unimpeded outflow of population convinced the authorities of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes that the “emigration problem” should not be disregarded (Đikanović Reference Đikanović2012, 77–79). In order to effectively regulate migration flows and render them beneficial for the state, the authorities passed a migration law which stipulated control over migratory movement and provided social support for emigrants. By defining the emigrant as the “citizen of the Kingdom of SCS who emigrates overseas to earn money through physical labor, or who joins the relatives who had emigrated earlier under the same conditions”Footnote 5 and assigning migrations to the Ministry of Social Policy, the state relegated migrations to the field of socio-economic affairs. However, as Yugoslavia was constituted as a nationalizing state which exercised power “less over territory and more over populations” (Ragazzi Reference Ragazzi2017, 12), it is no wonder that it addressed the issue of migrations in the context of its nation-building enterprise.
The development of the Yugoslav migration policy was thus ideologically underpinned by nation-building and reflected the state’s complex composition. The centralized unitary Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was created by merging regions previously under Habsburg rule with the Serbian Kingdom. The regions’ different socio-political traditions obstructed institutionalization of the common migration policy (Brunnbauer Reference Brunnbauer2012, 609). Disagreements in organization of Migration Service between the Croat and Serb part of Yugoslavia were resolved only in 1923. At that time, the main authority regarding migrations was assigned to the Emigration Department at the Ministry of Social Policy while the Emigration Commissariat in Zagreb (shortly functioning as the General Emigration Commissariat) continued to be responsible for information service, transport control and legal assistance to the emigrants.Footnote 6 It is important to note the complexity of the Yugoslav Migration Service in order to understand the role Slovene emigrant organizations later on had in arranging migration policies.
Despite the centrifugal tendencies, the state worked on building a unified Yugoslav nation out of its constitutive “tribal” identities of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Brunnbauer Reference Brunnbauer2016, 212). The state, therefore, became a political representation of (male) Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, depriving the non-constitutive ethnic groups and women of civil rights (Wachtel Reference Wachtel2003, 91). Ethnic foundations of the Yugoslav polity were also evident in the Citizenship Law, passed in 1928, which facilitated the acquisition of citizenship for the people of “Serbo-Croat-Slovene” descent born abroad and continuation of membership to Yugoslavs abroad, unless they renounced it.Footnote 7 Population management thus reflected the ethnicized political structures. It is no wonder therefore, that the authorities extolled the Italian socio-economic model, which seemed promising in stopping the drain of the ethnic element while setting no restrictions on emigration to those belonging to non-constitutive ethnicities.Footnote 8 Consequently, Yugoslav emigration experts proposed to “financially subsidize the departure of national minorities.”Footnote 9
As exemplified in the Citizenship Law, policymakers envisioned a de-territorialized Yugoslav nation composed of those belonging to the unified “tripartite” nation. With the support of the consular infrastructure and organizations such as Savez organizacija iseljenika (Union of Emigrants’ Associations), people of Yugoslav origin living abroad were thereby to be transformed into a single unbound nation tied to the motherland. The Yugoslav enterprise of building a diaspora significantly differed from similar projects pursued in other European states such as Italy or Poland. Whereas Italy aimed to maintain the Italian identity of the emigrants who mostly resettled after the establishment of the state, the Polish diaspora Polonia had been envisaged by the emigrants before the founding of the state and was later institutionalized by the state apparatus (Choate Reference Choate2008; Gabaccia, Hoerder, and Walaszek Reference Gabaccia, Hoerder, Walaszek, Weil and Green2007, 76-79). By contrast, Yugoslavia worked on instilling a unified Yugoslav identification on emigrants of mostly Croat and Slovene extraction who predominantly emigrated as subjects of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and were often loyal to the Habsburgs. Not only was it difficult to engage the emigrants, who through the jus sanguinis were now Yugoslavs, but the state’s efforts suffered from an inadequate diplomatic infrastructure and haphazard strategies in dealing with its fellow citizens. Shortly after the adoption of the Migration Law, Yugoslav emissaries in the country of greatest emigration, the USA, began to complain that Migration Law was passed without consulting the consular infrastructure in the USA and therefore without recognizing the needs of the emigrants.Footnote 10
At the end of the 1920s, new challenges such as the cessation of overseas emigration, its reorientation towards the Western Europe, and the issue of emigrants’ assimilation led to a reorganization of Migration Law which was never accomplished. At that time, the Yugoslav diplomatic corps were better suited to deal with the emigrants. However, in the use of coercion and seduction, which depended on the loyalty of the emigrants to the regime, the attitude of the Yugoslav consular infrastructure resembled the one in fascist Italy. While Italy aimed at infusing loyal emigrant communities with fascist doctrine, it reserved the right to deprive anti-fascist emigrants of their citizenship (Pretelli Reference Pretelli2010, 50–57; Bertonha Reference Bertonha2001, 3). The way in which the Yugoslav diplomatic corps treated the emigrants, in fact, mirrored the policy pursued by the royal dictatorial regime on the Yugoslav territory to achieve active obedience from its subjects, with those who refused to do so being harassed and monitored.Footnote 11
Persecution of undesired emigrants at the hands of diplomatic personnel greatly diminished the Yugoslav potential of acquiring emigrant allegiance and it was thus vocally denounced at the congress of Yugoslav emigrants in Ljubljana (Izseljenski vestnik, September 1935, 1). Furthermore, substantial differences in social background between Yugoslav diplomatic personnel and emigrants undermined the state’s capability of successfully engaging with its co-nationals (cf. Waldinger and Green Reference Waldinger, Green, Waldinger and Green2016, 21).Footnote 12 In addition, loosely defined strategies, discussed anew whenever the state was confronted with political tensions and migration challenges, did not change considerably in the entire period of interwar Yugoslavia. Disseminating national consciousness and impeding emigrants’ “denationalization” were regarded as cornerstones of migration policy.Footnote 13 Yet the means of achieving this aim were never clearly defined (Hranilović Reference Hranilović1987, 327–328). Consequently, the structural weaknesses of Yugoslav migration and diplomatic services worsened the state’s capability of handling emigrants’ issues, let alone its capacity for imbuing emigrants with the idea of belonging to the “Tenth Banovina.”
The ethnic bases of Yugoslav nation-building put the state’s attitude towards emigrants and “unredeemed brothers” (a term used by Yugoslav politics to refer to co-nationals who were “cut off” from the Yugoslav homeland by the border demarcation) on an equal footing. Both attitudes originated from the discourse that based governmental power on the creation of a community defined by ancestry, ethnicity and culture (Ragazzi Reference Ragazzi2017, 13). Although they were based on similar foundations, in practice the policies addressing the emigrants and those on “unredeemed” territories hardly ever corresponded. While the issue of emigration was related to the shifts in migratory movements, changing needs of the emigrants and the transformation of Yugoslav socio-political structures, the Yugoslav policy targeting the “enslaved brothers” was even more complex. It was intrinsically conditioned by the intricate composition of Yugoslavia, the geopolitical context, and the way Yugoslavia treated minorities in its territory. First, the issue of the Julian March and border delimitation on the Upper Adriatic mostly concerned Slovene and Croat politics and was largely alien to the Serb ruling elite, which directed its geopolitical interests towards the Balkans and the Danube region (Čermelj Reference Čermelj1955, 194; Tchoukarine Reference Tchoukarine2011, 40). Moreover, Yugoslavia was a state that preferred status quo to border revisionism in neighborhood relations (Mylonas Reference Mylonas2012, 147). Second, Yugoslavia had border disputes with virtually all its neighbors, with the exception of Greece. Fascist Italy, which conditioned Yugoslav policy towards the Julian March, sought to exploit the resentment of Yugoslavia’s neighbors, to encircle and isolate the country on the international stage and destabilize it internally by supporting separatist movements (Sala Reference Sala, Collotti, Labanca and Sala2000, 228). Third, Yugoslavia had a record of mistreatment of ethnic minorities on its territory. Since Yugoslavia was, unlike ItalyFootnote 14, subject to Minority Treaty obligations, petitions denouncing especially the Yugoslav treatment of Macedonian minorities flooded the League of Nations (Azcarate Reference Azcarate1972, 48–51; Cowan Reference Cowan2003). The attitude of Yugoslav authorities towards the minorities would therefore have delegitimised the state’s efforts to raise awareness of the Julian March issue.
The ban on all ethnic political activities in the Julian March provoked the emigration of intellectuals and anti-fascist activists to Yugoslavia. Consequently, rising concern about the plight of Julian March minority began to be channeled through the highly politicized emigrant movement. When relations with Italy were tense, Yugoslavia exploited the emigrants’ resentment against the fascist regime and their philo-Yugoslavism (the emigrants embraced Yugoslavia as a bulwark against the Italian expansion) to divert attention and promote internal stability. According to the observations of the Italian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, the state took advantage of emigrants’ engagement in order to combat separatist and autonomist tendencies which opposed integralism (the belief that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were but tribes of an indivisible Yugoslav nation) supported by the royal dictatorship.Footnote 15
Moreover, as the fascist Italy prevented Yugoslav authorities from engaging Yugoslavs in the Julian March, minority and migration activists worked tirelessly to internationalize the minority issue by informing the Yugoslav emigrant communities overseas. Following the example of the Polish diaspora organization World Alliance of Poles from Abroad, formed in 1934 during Piłsudski’s dictatorship, the migration activist Hinko Sirovatka proposed the formation of a similar society that would bind all Yugoslavs to their homeland. Together with the well-connected Julian March émigré Ivan Marija ČokFootnote 16 he sought state support for the realization of this project. However, even though the inaugural meeting of the Working Community for the World Union of Yugoslavs had already taken place, the enterprise lacked ministerial support and therefore did not yield the desired fruits.Footnote 17
The second half of the 1930s eventually signaled rapprochement between Italy and Yugoslavia. As a result of the shift in the geopolitical balance in Europe, brought by the rise of Nazi Germany, an alliance between the previously hostile Italy and France, and the Italian war against Ethiopia, cordial relations were established between Italy and Yugoslavia (Bucarelli Reference Bucarelli2006, 326). Engaging the Julian March minority would have undermined Yugoslav relations with Italy, which became all the more important after Yugoslavia lost its traditional backing in France. Italy requested that Yugoslavia stops the activities of emigrant associations on its territory.Footnote 18 Nonetheless, emigrants’ denunciations of the fascist regime did not subside completely; the engagement was merely transferred from Yugoslavia to the distant USA and especially to Argentina.
The engagement of the Yugoslav diplomatic corps with the Julian March emigrants in Argentina shifted from initial distrust to mutual understanding. Yet, from the beginning when the attitude of diplomatic representatives resembled authoritarian policies of subduing opposition in Yugoslavia, to the cordial relations established in the second half of the 1930s, the Yugoslav authorities treated the Julian March emigrants exclusively as members of the “Tenth Banovina.” They never associated their emigrant position with the minority issue. Even in the late 1930s, when relations improved due to the shift in Yugoslav politics and the greater contribution of Slovene emigrant associations to the Yugoslav migration policy, emigrants were treated exclusively as members of a dispersed nation, without the benefits and responsibilities they would have as the Yugoslav citizens. The emigrants themselves, however, nurtured strong attachment towards the “unredeemed territory.” Consequently, Yugoslav policy was unsuccessful in encouraging the loyalty of this emigrant group. First, the policy of subduing emigrants who were critical of the Yugoslav regime did not yield the desired results. Instead of crushing dissent, it only reinforced the criticism and divided the community even more strongly. Second, the fact that Yugoslav diplomatic corps were unable to address the issue of “unredeemed brothers” and offer the community desired assistance alienated the emigrants, leading them to devise their own alternative visions of homeland or to “disappear” in the host society.
Combating Dissent: the Yugoslav Diplomatic Representatives and their Enemies
Relations between emigrants from Yugoslavia as well as from the Julian March and the diplomatic corps in Argentina were far from ideal. Not only were the emigrants disturbed by the social cleavage which separated them from the diplomatic representatives, they were also infuriated by the behavior of the diplomatic corps, which was often on the brink of legality.Footnote 19 For instance, the first Yugoslav ambassador to Argentina Ivo Grisogono (then still the general consul) became notorious for profiting from trafficking immigrants to the United States.Footnote 20 However, the emigrants hoped that with the arrival of Ivan Švegel in 1931, the neglect and haughtiness displayed by previous representatives would be replaced by awareness and concern.
Švegel was a career diplomat of Slovene origin who began his duties in the Austro-Hungarian consular service. As a consul in the United States of America, he became well acquainted with the social and economic issues of emigrants. It was unusual for a Slovene to get a diplomatic position as Yugoslav diplomacy was dominated by the Serb personnel. However, thanks to his experience and admiration for King Aleksandar, Švegel was chosen for the position in Buenos Aires. Švegel often found himself in conflict, most of his offices were short-lived, and the one in Buenos Aires was no exception. There he spent less than a year (Rahten Reference Rahten2018).
The distrust towards Švegel grew with his supposedly direct interventions in the operation of emigrants’ associations. The conflict between the ambassador and the emigrant community occurred during an economic crisis which severely affected the Argentine economy and left many workers, including immigrants from the Julian March, unemployed and penniless (Sjekloča Reference Sjekloča2004, 101–102). Disputes with the emigrants, most notably those coming from the Julian March and regarded as loyal by the previous ambassador, grew so intense that Švegel decided to report them to the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the letter, he portrayed himself as a victim of intrigues and reckless claims (mostly concerning lucrative jobs and other monetary issues) advanced by the Julian March emigrants. Consequently, Švegel denounced the editors of the Slovenski tednik newspaper, who criticized the ambassador’s neglect of the emigrant community, to the Argentine police.Footnote 21 Paradoxically, the previous ambassador, Milorad Stražnicky, considered the journal to be the only “Yugoslav patriotic newspaper defending our [Yugoslav] interests in South America”. He regarded it so valuable that its closure would bring about, as he remarked, a “great loss for the national cause.”Footnote 22
The misunderstanding between Švegel and the emigrants seems to stem from the issue of citizenship. The emigrants could not understand the ambassador’s unwillingness to offer them assistance despite their alleged struggle for the Slovene victims of discrimination in Italy, which had supposedly begun already before their departure (Slovenski tednik, October 31, 1931). Conversely, given the precarious relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, Švegel thought that showing cordiality towards the emigrant community could prompt a diplomatic scandal with Italy. The relations between Italy and Yugoslavia in the beginning of the 1930s were indeed fragile, so Švegel’s doubts were not unfounded (Bucarelli Reference Bucarelli2006, 174). Still, given that the Yugoslav authorities supported the engagement of Julian March emigrants on the Yugoslav territory at that time, it is surprising that Švegel opposed establishing closer ties with the community. Nevertheless, such an attitude demonstrates that the Yugoslav ruling elite had no real plan for internationalizing the issue of Julian March. Not only did Švegel refrain from engaging the emigrants, he also accused them of being under the influence of communism.Footnote 23
Communist Party members in Yugoslavia were consistently persecuted since the party was outlawed in 1921 (Banac Reference Banac1984, 329; Djilas Reference Djilas1991, 64). Nevertheless, Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in Argentina began to show concern for the emigrants’ communist engagement only by the end of the 1920s. That was a time when massive strikes and protests caused by the political crisis and economic depression brought the period marked by political liberalism and relative economic prosperity to an end (Horowitz Reference Horowitz2008, 190). As the Argentine economy depended on the export of crops, the drop in prices of agricultural products caused by the economic crisis had devastating consequences. The aging reformist President Hipolito Yrigoyen’sFootnote 24 second term (1928–30) was marked by conservative opposition within his own Radical Party, but also by resistance from other social classes, such as aristocrats and the military. In September 1930, a group of aristocratic conservatives, anti-Yrigoyen Radicals, independent socialists, and fascist nationalists participated in the coup carried out by the General Jose Felix Uriburu, a fascist sympathizer (Finchelstein Reference Finchelstein2010, 50). During the turmoil which preceded the coup, a couple of fervent leftist activists from the Julian March arrived in Buenos Aires and tied the first association of Julian March emigrants in Argentina, Ljudski oder [The Popular Stage] (it consisted of working class emigrants), to the Yugoslav section of the Argentine Communist Party (Zobec Reference Zobec2019, 228–229; Genorio Reference Genorio1988).
Communists’ transnational ties, as exemplified in cooperation between the Yugoslav section in Argentina and communists in Yugoslavia, threatened to undermine the Yugoslav dictatorial regime. Therefore, the Yugoslav diplomatic corps soon began to regard communism as a serious threat. In order to counter the communist transnational appeal, they adopted measures of extraterritorial control in cooperation with the Argentine repressive organs. Uriburu’s regime became a reliable partner in the Yugoslav hunt for communist activists. The Yugoslav Embassy devised a project which aimed to suppress communist activism in emigration, prevent the communist “contagion” of national-minded associations, as well as sever the communists’ ties with their comrades in Yugoslavia.Footnote 25
In effect, the hunt for communists turned out to be a quest for quelling the emigrants who were disloyal to the Yugoslav regime. Furthermore, the embassy did not mind Italian citizenship when denouncing the emigrants to the Argentine authorities. Consequently, the emigrants affiliated with Slovenski tednik, previously considered to form a loyal part of the Yugoslav emigrant community, were now incarcerated precisely because the embassy blamed them for communist activism (Kacin, 1937, 123–128). What is more, their journal was banned from entering Yugoslavia under the pretext that it propagated communism. The statement made in their newspaper that the Julian March emigrants should remain in Argentina if a war erupted in Yugoslavia was one in the series of assertions that outraged the diplomatic corps. For the embassy, this statement clearly indicated that the newspaper adopted an “anational and communist” line of writing.Footnote 26
Yugoslavia was not alone in its persecution of disloyal members of the Julian March emigrant community. Likewise, the Italian diplomatic corps intensively collaborated with the Argentine authorities in exercising surveillance and suppression over the same emigrant group. Moreover, the Italian diplomatic service was better informed about the emigrants’ activism, largely because it could count on a developed system of control over political opponents, which facilitated intermittent observation and surveillance begun prior to their departure to Argentina (Zobec Reference Zobec2019; Cresciani Reference Cresciani2004). Undoubtedly, the Julian March emigrants wanted to be dissociated from the Italian state. However, what was their attitude to the state which was perceived as a homeland but was at the same time following its Italian counterpart in subduing the opposition? Needless to say, the attitude of the Yugoslav diplomatic corps was not only aggressive, but it also consisted of attracting the nationally-conscious emigrants and transforming them into loyal members of the Yugoslav unbound nation. However, the case of the Julian March emigrants shows that this project had but limited success.
Transforming the Julian March’s Emigrants into a “Tenth Banovina”
The fear that the Yugoslav community in Argentina was becoming more and more alienated from the state encouraged the embassy to devise a plan of infusing the community with nation-building ideology. In order to fight anti-state sentiments, the dissemination of national-minded pressFootnote 27 was to be accompanied by the establishment of immigrant associations based on the Yugoslav SokolFootnote 28 tradition. Sokol-inspired associations were considered to be vehicles for disseminating Yugoslav ideology.Footnote 29
Yugoslav representatives could also count on the support of Julian March emigrants. However, it was not until the arrival of Ambassador Izidor Cankar in Reference Cankar1937 that the embassy established closer contact with the community of Julian March emigrants in Argentina. Izidor Cankar was a cousin of Ivan Cankar, a prominent Slovene writer and supporter of social democracy who was widely acclaimed among Slovene popular masses. Izidor was a theologian and art historian who first served as a priest but later abandoned the Catholic Church. Having studied at prestigious European universities, he was a professor and public intellectual, closely linked to the dominant conservative Slovenian People’s Party. Cankar enrolled in the Yugoslav diplomatic service with the help of Anton Korošec, then Minister of the Interior and an ally of the regent Prince Pavle Karađorđević as well as an indisputable leader of the aforementioned party. An elitist by conviction, Cankar despised communism (Rahten Reference Rahten2009).
Although Cankar had to function as a representative of the Kingdom, his cordial relations with the community in Argentina could be attributed to the role he played in the Slovene public sphere and to his belief in Slovene autonomism within the Yugoslav state. In addition, Cankar displayed vivid concern for the issue of Julian March minority, which was, however, circumscribed by his role of an ambassador (Puhar Reference Puhar2016, 69–70). Moreover, when evaluating Cankar’s relation to the Julian March emigrant community, the importance of several factors, such as the economic stabilization of the emigrant communityFootnote 30 and the transition from dictatorship in Yugoslavia, should not be overlooked. In addition, the Yugoslav “democratization” was coupled with the rearrangement of the emigration service in which the Slovene Raphael Society directed by the Catholic Church began to exert greater influence. The Emigration Congress in Ljubljana in 1935, organized by the Raphael Society, served as a backlash to the arrangement of migration services during the royal dictatorship. President of the Raphael Society, priest Kazimir Zakrajšek, declared that the emigrants had absolutely no wish for the last three years, “full of emigrant complaints over the attitude of diplomatic corps,” to return. (I. slovenski izseljenski kongres v Ljubljani dne 1. julija 1935, 1936, 8).
In order to effectively gain insight into the Julian March emigrant community, Cankar hired the emigrant Viktor Kjuder, who previously edited the pro-Yugoslav newspaper Novi List (and worked for the liberal newspaper Edinost while still in the Julian March), to work as his secretary (Mislej Reference Mislej and Godina1999, 81). Slovene emigrants stopped resenting the Yugoslav government, as Cankar noted, ascribing the shift in their attitude to a decline in “communist propaganda” and to the end of the dictatorship in Yugoslavia.Footnote 31 Indeed, with the deportation and extradition of the most engaged Julian March communists to Italy, the movement lost its bellicose appeal (Zobec Reference Zobec2019, 230). Nevertheless, Cankar never managed to attract leftist emigrants, who disliked his conservatism and rejected his education program supported by the Raphael Society and run by Slovene nuns (Njiva, November 1937, 1).
Furthermore, the opposition of the most numerous Yugoslav group in Argentina, the Croats, was strong, not only among the separatist Ustaše Footnote 32 grouped in the associations under the name The Croat Homeguard (Hrvatski domobran). Consequently, while Slovenes predominantly appreciated Cankar’s willingness to support the community’s activities, Croats disapproved of the ambassador’s alleged interference in the work of emigrant organizations.Footnote 33
Cankar helped the emigrants in organizing education and supported the unification of two previously antagonistic organizations into a single society. As a Yugoslav emissary, he asked the emigrants to cherish the state which he represented as the only bulwark against foreign expansion on Slovene territory, a vision shared by many Slovene politicians at that time (Perovšek Reference Perovšek2009, 245–246, Banac 1988, 342). Furthermore, he called for a unified Yugoslav national identity and asked the emigrants to refrain from involvement in the “homeland’s” political affairs. Namely, he believed that any discussion of political issues among emigrants was counterproductive because they were not familiar with them. Doing so would only divide the community, he thought. Furthermore, Cankar stated that emigrants were recognized abroad but as members of the Yugoslav nation (Slovenski list, January 9, 1937, 1). This belief, however, supporting integral Yugoslavism which aimed to create a unified Yugoslav nation out of the tribal identities of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, was abandoned in Yugoslavia at that time in favor of real Yugoslavism that allowed “tribal” differences (Troch 2016, 238).
Ambassador Cankar managed to gain significant support from the emigrant community. However, to what extent was the community really united in its backing of the ambassador’s initiatives which ultimately embodied the Yugoslav state? After all, what was the emigrants’ view on the unified South Slav state and in what way did it relate to the ideas championed by the state representatives? In the following part of the article I will discuss the emigrants’ visions of Yugoslavia and examine in what way they were influenced by the intervention of the state’s representatives. As I will demonstrate, the emigrants’ views also depended on their social origin and reflected a current socio-political context.
There is No Single Yugoslavia: Emigrants’ Visions of Yugoslavia and the Impact of Yugoslav Diplomacy
A certain affinity for South Slav unity cut across ideological barriers separating groups of Julian March emigrants. Furthermore, the Yugoslavism championed by Julian March emigrants was not a novelty among Slovene emigrants in Argentina. The Yugoslav National Defense (Jugoslovanska narodna odbrana), which was made up of emigrants who arrived before the First World War, was an organization aimed at supporting the Yugoslav Committee in London and the emerging Yugoslav state (Mislej Reference Mislej1988, 118). Nevertheless, the views of the “old” and “new” migrants regarding Yugoslavia were disparate. While the former enthusiastically followed the process of South Slav “unification,” the latter drew their attention to an already functioning “homeland.” Therefore, while the long-distance nationalism of the first was linked to the national ideology which preceded the formation of the state, in the case of the latter it had to do with the ideology originating from the established Yugoslavia (cf. Brubaker Reference Brubaker1996, 4). Distinctions aside, neither of the emigrant groups had experienced life in Yugoslavia even though they both called the South Slav state their “home.” Unlike the first organized emigrants, those from the Julian March were not uniformly supportive of Yugoslavia, and distinct viewpoints could be observed.
Even though different political attitudes were present among the emigrants, it should be emphasized that from the point of view of social composition they were predominantly laborers and proletarianized peasants (Kalc Reference Kalc2016, 5). Furthermore, they came from the area of Trieste, which was an important industrial hub of the Habsburg Empire with a strong labor movement. In the immediate postwar period this zone witnessed intense labor struggles and revolutionary engagement. Activities were not confined to Trieste. The socialist movement, which championed the improvement of workers’ conditions across national divisions, also gained a considerable support in Gorizia, another area experiencing significant emigration to Argentina (Regent Reference Regent1967, 114–115). Consequently, it is not surprising that many emigrants were inclined towards leftist ideas.
However, national-minded views resonated among the emigrants as well. Associations which advocated them passionately were “heirs” to the liberal society Edinost (also including clerical members), dissolved by the fascist suppression in the Julian March in 1927/28. Before the Great War, when Trieste became a hotbed for national antagonisms, Slovene liberals believed that affirmation of ethnic associations was necessary to combat assimilation and challenge the hegemony of the Italian bourgeoisie. Moreover, the liberals had their own national labor organization (Cattaruzza Reference Cattaruzza and Engman1992). With the cessation of the Slovene political life under fascism, many former members of Edinost fled to Yugoslavia, where they established new associations. Even though many emigrants were convinced philo-Yugoslavs and believed in a strong Yugoslav state as a bulwark against the Italian expansionism, the skeptical young faction (mlada struja) and the loyal representatives of the former governing class of Slovenes in the Julian March, known also by the name old faction (stara struja), stood apart. Whereas the former advocated international antifascist struggle and regarded the Yugoslav regime as authoritarian, the latter championed irredentism (annexation of the Julian March to Yugoslavia) and were unquestionably in favor of royal centralism (Kalc Reference Kalc1996, 35–39).
The liberal association of Julian March emigrants in Argentina called Prosveta adopted a national-minded perspective and was, as the Ambassador Stražnicky remarked, “loyally defending Yugoslav interests.”Footnote 34 It even applauded the proclamation of the royal dictatorship (Slovenski tednik, May 18, 1929, 1). However, the association’s confrontations with Ambassador Švegel split the society in two. Those who remained in Prosveta and published the journal Slovenski tednik continued to support the idea of Yugoslav unification within the single state, which they considered to be the ultimate guarantee of “Slovene national existence.” However, they became fiercely critical of the regime, particularly of its representatives in Argentina (Slovenski tednik, December 23, 1933, 16). Furthermore, they embraced leftist ideas, but unlike the communists they regarded education and not revolution as decisive in the improvement of workers’ conditions (Slovenski tednik, March 4, 1933, 1). They also believed that only a pan-Slavic alliance spearheaded by the Soviet Union could protect the Yugoslav state and the Slovenes in the Julian March against Italian and German aggression (Slovenski tednik, January 25, 1936, 1).
By contrast, the former members of Prosveta who continued to support the Yugoslav Embassy formed organizations which were indisputably in favor of the Kingdom. They became identified with the newspaper Novi list, supporting the Yugoslav government and edited by Viktor Kjuder, the journalist who would later become the ambassador’s secretary. Similarly to Cankar, they considered the emigrants to be too distant from Yugoslavia to discuss publicly the country’s politics, hence they discouraged them from doing so. In addition, they conflated opposition to the regime with disloyalty towards the state. They thus accused the group of Prosveta of inciting hatred against Yugoslavia (Novi list, December 2, Reference Kjuder1933, 1). In short, views of the former members of Prosveta were almost congruent with those advanced by the embassy.
With the arrival of Ambassador Cankar, diverging views of Novi list and Slovenski tednik were reconciled in a single paper Slovenski list, which in fact adopted the attitude of the Kingdom’s supporter Novi list. Therefore, criticism of the Yugoslav authorities was abandoned on the grounds that “screaming against this or that regime in emigration was only provoking intrigues among the emigrants” (Slovenski list, March 20, 1937, 1). However, despite the compromise, voices of dissent continued to appear. Tensions in the journal reflected the division between loyalists and those who rejected the Kingdom. As the author of the articles published in Slovenski list stated, the split was largely the product of a generational gap setting the devoted old and the resistant young apart (Slovenski list, September 6, 1940, 1). In this regard, the ideological rift in Argentina mirrored the division present among Julian March emigrants in Yugoslavia between the representatives of the mlada struja and the loyalists of the stara struja. It is therefore not surprising that Ivan Marija Čok, the leader of the Union of the Yugoslav Emigrants from the Julian March, an umbrella organization of emigrant associations in Yugoslavia linked to the royal court and directed by the stara struja, established contacts with the loyalist emigrant group in Argentina (Novi list, January 13, 1934, 2).
Finally, the emigrants affiliated with Ljudski oder, who continued the tradition of the eponymous socialist organization from the Julian March, from the very beginning disapproved of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and perceived it to be not distant from its Italian fascist counterpart (Delavski list, March 15, 1929, 1). Even though their communist zeal gradually waned, they never wanted to associate with the royal Yugoslavia. Still, they believed that a Yugoslav state was needed but thought that its potential could be realized only with socialist reconstruction (Njiva, February 1941, 165–166).
Despite the prevailing support for some form of Yugoslav state among the Julian March emigrants, many of them were repelled by the way in which the mission of creating an unbound nation including them as well was carried out. Engendering loyalty to the state was met with staunch opposition because the diplomatic representatives followed the state’s policy of conflating opposition to the dictatorial regime with the resistance to Yugoslavism (Troch Reference Troch2010, 236). In addition, the fact that the diplomatic corps were unable to address the minority issue of Julian March or offer the emigrants from this area socio-economic assistance, alienated them. Therefore, the emigrants very often superseded the promoted loyalty with their own projections of a South Slavic homeland. Even at a time of apparently unanimous support for the Yugoslav state during the mandate of Ambassador Cankar, many emigrants disagreed with his strategies and therefore also with the state-sponsored representations of Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, the emigrants’ views were not only a result of the embassy’s interventions, but were also predetermined by their social origin as well as by political socialization.
Commemorations of Yugoslav unification were a place where political projects advanced by Yugoslav representatives intersected with emigrants’ initiatives. Consequently, they offer an illustrative example which can shed some light on the way in which the memorial practices of emigrants converged with and deviated from those advanced by the state. Since memories constitute a vital part of identifications, group identities can be understood by observing their memorial practices (Halbwachs Reference Halbwachs2001).
Commemorating National Unification in Argentina
December 1, 1918 was the day when the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs (comprising the population which had previously lived under Habsburg rule) merged with the Kingdom of Serbia to form the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The Unification Day, as it was known, has been celebrated throughout the kingdom ever since and celebrations were also promoted among inhabitants of the Yugoslav “Tenth Banovina.” Following Nora (Reference Nora1996, 7), I argue that the need to commemorate the Unification Day in emigration was even more pronounced simply because the emigrants were alienated from Yugoslav society, hence their Yugoslav identification was particularly fragile. Therefore, the Unification Day served as a site of memory, a vehicle to bridge the gap that separated the Julian March emigrants from the state, both because of their Italian citizenship and the distance. However, considering that commemorative activity is a field of contest even though it may appear consensual (Gillis Reference Gillis and Gillis1994, 5), it should be noted that meanings attributed to unification by the emigrants were not always congruous with the significance invested by the state.
The emigrants neither negated the importance of commemorating the heroes fallen for the Yugoslav homeland nor opposed the glorification of the “King-Unifier” and the dynasty. However, unlike official memory, their remembrance of unification was accompanied by a regret for the “unredeemed brothers” in the “enslaved” Julian March. Consequently, as the emigrants identified with the plight of the Julian March (Molek Reference Molek2016, 9), they organized events at which they condemned the fascist terror over the region. The Trieste Trial, which involved the sentencing of anti-fascists involved in a bomb attack on the fascist newspaper Il popolo di Trieste in the Julian March, was thus transformed into principal lieu de mémoire which mobilized the community around the idea of an imperiled minority. The trial, which coincided with Uriburu’s coup in Argentina, provoked protests of Slovene emigrants around the world, with particularly vocal denunciations taking place in the United States (Kalc, Milharčič Hladnik Reference Kalc and Mirjam2015). In Argentina, the leftist emigrants participated in a manifestation organized by Italian antifascists, but the event was quickly dissolved by the dictatorial government (Mislej Reference Mislej1996, 98).
Yugoslav diplomatic representatives never raised the issue of Slovenes and Croats in Italy so as not to provoke a diplomatic scandal. This issue became particularly sensitive after the rapprochement with Italy and especially after signing the bilateral Belgrade Agreement in 1937 which introduced Yugoslav-Italian partnership. Therefore, even though contacts with the emigrant community in the second half of the 1930s were amplified, the diplomatic corps were under no condition allowed to address the issue of the “enslaved region.” It is thus hardly surprising that the state representatives did not oppose the events organized by the emigrants to commemorate the Trieste Trial,Footnote 35 but were not able to support such activities in any way either.
Yet another issue which revealed divergent views of the homeland, the official one and the one advanced by emigrants, concerned the social rearrangement of Yugoslavia. This aspect becomes clear only by paying attention to emigrants’ comments on the celebration in which they appealed for the socio-economic transformation of Yugoslavia.
The first recorded celebration of unification in which Julian March emigrants in Argentina participated was held in 1935. The reason why it had not been organized earlier is unclear but probably previous initiatives were hindered by tensions between the embassy and the emigrants during the dictatorship. The first celebration was organized by pro-Yugoslav emigrant associations without the presence of state representatives (Novi list, December 6, 1935, 2). In the following year, the embassy took part in the organization, indicating a reconciliation with the emigrant community. Many Yugoslav organizations participated, including the associations of Julian March emigrants. Nonetheless, the rift between those who followed the state representatives in their devotion to Yugoslavia and the ones who preferred to have a different vision of the “homeland” reappeared (Novi list, December 5, 1936, 2). One of the texts published after the event reveals that the group of Prosveta, despite participating in the official celebration, did not want to mix their allegiance to the Yugoslav nation with their feelings towards the policies advanced by the state (Slovenski tednik, December 12, 1936, 1).
The celebration in 1938 commemorating the 20th anniversary of Yugoslav unification was perhaps the biggest event of this type organized in Argentina. Not only were Yugoslav diplomatic personnel present, but also representatives of Greece, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. By that time, the voices of Julian March emigrants were almost unison in championing Cankar’s enterprise, hence no discord between the views advanced by the state and those advocated by the emigrants could be found. As the newspaper editorial stated, “Yugoslavism is not a matter of state borders or passports, it is inscribed in our hearts and souls” (Slovenski list, December 9, 1938, 1). What followed was the reference to the speech of one of the most reputable members of the Yugoslav community, the architect Viktor Sulčič, who displayed sincere devotion to the Yugoslav state and its dynasty (ibid.).
Despite its link with the embassy, the newspaper Slovenski list did not simply replicate the official attitude, and discord soon appeared. Its clear indication was the description of unification commemoration in 1939. It was written in the light of the war which had erupted in Europe and with the awareness of Hitler’s way of tackling the issue of German minorities. The editorial thus called for the abolition of all national minorities and for the establishment of national units congruent with supposed national borders. Furthermore, the editorial demanded that the Yugoslav economy should work for “popular benefit” rather than in “capitalist interests” (Slovenski list, December 1, 1939, 1). The emigrants, therefore, expected the Julian March to be annexed to Yugoslavia. A call for the inclusion of the “unredeemed lands” was absent from the diplomatic discourse because Yugoslavia, particularly after the Belgrade Agreement, refrained from revisionism. Furthermore, the desire for economic restructuring was completely alien to the state’s interests and it reflected emigrants’ receptiveness to leftist ideas.
The analysis of the commemorative practices demonstrates that only by examining the individual interpretations of the process to which the state aspired to give a uniform meaning is it possible to disentangle a complex web of relations between the state representatives and the emigrant groups. Not surprisingly, the ideological rift separating the groups becomes clear when commemorative practices are examined. Notwithstanding the efforts aimed at coalescing the emigrant groups and tying them to the Yugoslav homeland, particularly during the mandate of Ambassador Cankar, this operation had but limited success. Despite Cankar’s reputation, there were emigrants who found his politics repellent. Not only did the leftist emigrants remain steadfastly opposed to any Kingdom-induced activity, but even a considerable number of those who embraced the state-sponsored celebrations did so only superficially.
Memories of the displacement provoked by the fascist terror cut across political divisions and differing views on the Yugoslav homeland among emigrants. Even though many regarded Yugoslavia as their homeland, they often identified themselves as stateless persons without a proper country to look after them. Hence, they defined themselves as refugees or political exiles rather than typical emigrants (Novi list, September 12, 1936, 2). One of the most active members of the emigrant community, Franc Kurinčič, in his memoirs vividly described this particular feeling as follows: “We were some sort of rightless elements. We were not Yugoslavs, even less Argentinians. We did not want to be Italians even though we had their passaporto” (Kurinčič Reference Kurinčič1964, 216–217).
Torn between volatile and at times intimidating policy of their “homeland” and assimilationist mechanisms of the host society that conflated Slavic identities with socialism, many Julian March emigrants sank into “invisibility,” refraining thus from associational activities and substituting their native language with Spanish in daily communication (Molek Reference Molek2016, 15). Although many emigrants prefer to relate to their networks of relatives than to their state of origin, it is probable that in the case of Julian March emigrants’ indifference to national narratives was further intensified because of their “homelessness.” The analysis of emigrants’ correspondence has thus revealed that the emigrants, rather than commemorating national unification or grievance over the Julian March, perpetuated memories on their native communities (Zobec Reference Zobec2013).
Conclusion
The analysis of Yugoslav control over emigrants from the Julian March region of Italy allows an examination of how Yugoslavia’s policies targeting the state’s “two diasporas” intersected. Since Yugoslav nation-building was framed in ethnic terms, aiming to create a polity based on common ancestry rather than on a territorial-bound citizenship, it is not surprising that Italian citizenship did not prevent Yugoslavia from treating the Julian March emigrants as faithful members of its “Tenth Banovina.” In fact, Yugoslav strategies of creating the “unbound nation” were not dissimilar to European trends of the era. Hungary likewise aspired to exercise control over emigrants from Prekmurje (the region adjudicated to Yugoslavia with the Treaty of Trianon in 1920) residing in Pennsylvania and to convince them of their unique Wendish identityFootnote 36 (Kuzmič Reference Kuzmič2001). However, whereas Hungary placed revisionism on the top of its political agenda (in fact it was the exemplary representative of revisionism in Europe), Yugoslavia, beset by pressures from its expansionist neighbors and struggling with internal divisions, sought to maintain the status quo. In addition, as the problem of the Julian March was alien to the ruling elite, it failed to inspire decision-makers’ geopolitical imaginations. It is therefore hardly surprising that the authorities were so reluctant to address the issue, let alone bind the “problem” of stranded minorities with the position of the Yugoslav “Tenth Banovina.” Consequently, even though Yugoslavia envisioned its nation extending well beyond the borders, in practice the policies targeting emigrant Yugoslavs and those in the neighboring countries hardly ever overlapped.
Close examination of the way in which Yugoslavia’s diplomatic corps approached the Julian March emigrants reveals that Yugoslavia was not particularly efficient in building a diaspora. As the attitude of the state’s representatives was volatile, reflecting the socio-political dynamics in Yugoslavia, it is not surprising that emigrants often felt repelled by policies that inflicted divisions. Even when advesarial politics gave way to cordial cooperation, the fact that the diplomatic corps were unable to address the issue of “unredeemed territory” or provide much-needed social assistance pushed many emigrants to reshape the officially proclaimed discourse.
However, as Brunnbauer (Reference Brunnbauer2016, 244) argued, the significance of the emigration policies of interwar Yugoslavia should not be measured only in their immediate effects, but also in their long-term consequences. Agencies dealing with the migration policy in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia left a lasting impact on the way in which socialist Yugoslavia regulated its approach towards emigrants. Furthermore, the political tensions and inter-ethnic relations which affected socialist Yugoslavia were not dissimilar to those of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The emigrants’ engagement with the “enslaved” territory continued throughout World War II and their claim that the region should be annexed to socialist Yugoslavia was presented to the Paris Peace Conference. Most of them cheerfully embraced the eventual incorporation of the greater part of the region to Yugoslavia in 1947. Indeed, socialist Yugoslavia began to figure as a homeland and even treated the emigrants as a part of the friendly “old” diaspora—in contrast to the hostile “new” diaspora which consisted of emigrants who fled with the triumph of communism.
The relation between the Julian March emigrants and Yugoslav authorities has a broader significance, as it demonstrates how delicate the interaction between emigrants and their homeland may be if the emigrants come from a disputed territory. The article shows that although policies devised on ethnic principles aim at targeting co-nationals abroad, they are not necessarily able to transgress the barriers of citizenship. Moreover, it demonstrates that emigrants who are not adequately treated by the state that presents itself as their homeland tend to fashion alternative visions of belonging.
Yet the issue of the Julian March emigrants is embedded in the interwar context, and thus reminiscent of the position held by the Jewish refugees as described by Hannah Arendt in her essay “We Refugees.” In order to flee their precarious situation of statelessness many Jews opted for quick assimilation into host societies (Arendt Reference Arendt2007). Likewise, the Julian March emigrants, placed between a powerless homeland and a society unwelcoming of their particular identities, often embraced oblivion and anonymity in Argentine society.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Aleksandra Tobiasz, Dr Aleksej Kalc, and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. In addition, he would like to thank Jean McCollister for proofreading the first draft of this paper.
Disclosure
The author has nothing to disclose.
Financial support
This work was supported by the Slovene Research Agency (ARRS) under Grant Z5-1880 “Minorities, Diasporas and the Subversives: Extraterritorial Control Over the Slovene Emigrants during the Interwar Period.”
