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Institutional Strangulation: Bureaucratic Politics and Financial Reform in the Obama Administration

  • Daniel Carpenter (a1)
Abstract

The politics of financial reform represent a genuine test case for American politics and its institutions. The Obama administration's proposed reforms pit common (largely unorganized) interests against well-organized and wealthy minority interests. I describe how the withering and unfolding of financial reform has occurred not through open institutional opposition but through a quieter process that I call institutional strangulation. Institutional strangulation consists of much more than the stoppage of policies by aggregation of veto points as designed in the US Constitution. In the case of financial reform, it has non-constitutional veto points, including committee politics and cultural veto points (gender and professional finance), strategies of partisan intransigence, and perhaps most significantly, the bureaucratic politics of turf and reputation. These patterns can weaken common-interest reforms, especially in the broad arena of consumer protection.

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Dan Immergluck . 2009. Foreclosed: High-Risk Lending, Deregulation, and the Undermining of America's Mortgage Market. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Keith Krehbiel . 1998. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U. S. Lawmaking. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stephen Skowronek . 1982. Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kathleen Thelen . 2004. How Institutions Evolve. New York: Cambridge University Press.

George Tsebelis . 2002. Veto Players: How Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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Perspectives on Politics
  • ISSN: 1537-5927
  • EISSN: 1541-0986
  • URL: /core/journals/perspectives-on-politics
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