Skip to main content

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
Cancel
×
×
Home
  • Home
Article
  • Cited by 240
  • Cited by
    Crossref Citations
    Crossref logo
    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.
    Rogers-Vaughn, Bruce 2018. Pastoral Theology and Care. p. 55.

    Etzioni, Amitai 2018. Theoretical Implications of “High Rent”. Sociological Forum,

    Nieswandt, Katharina 2018. What Is Conventionalism about Moral Rights and Duties?. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, p. 1.

    Emmenegger, Patrick and Marx, Paul 2018. The Politics of Inequality as Organised Spectacle: Why the Swiss Do Not Want to Tax the Rich. New Political Economy, p. 1.

    Meckling, Jonas and Nahm, Jonas 2018. The power of process: State capacity and climate policy. Governance,

    Morais, José 2018. Literacy and democracy. Language, Cognition and Neuroscience, Vol. 33, Issue. 3, p. 351.

    Goda, Thomas 2018. The global concentration of wealth. Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 42, Issue. 1, p. 95.

    Fenn, Paul Douglas 2018. Enlightenment in an Age of Destruction. p. 71.

    Sorace, Miriam 2018. The European Union democratic deficit: Substantive representation in the European Parliament at the input stage. European Union Politics, Vol. 19, Issue. 1, p. 3.

    Knowles, Ryan T. and Clark, Christopher H. 2018. How common is the common good? Moving beyond idealistic notions of deliberative democracy in education. Teaching and Teacher Education, Vol. 71, p. 12.

    Rasmussen, Anne Romeijn, Jeroen and Toshkov, Dimiter 2018. Dynamics of Regulatory Policymaking in Sweden: The Role of Media Advocacy and Public Opinion. Scandinavian Political Studies,

    Kassab, Hanna Samir 2018. Grand Strategies of Weak States and Great Powers. p. 185.

    Rasmussen, Anne Mäder, Lars Kai and Reher, Stefanie 2018. With a Little Help From The People? The Role of Public Opinion in Advocacy Success. Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 51, Issue. 2, p. 139.

    Rhodes, Jesse H. Schaffner, Brian F. and La Raja, Raymond J. 2018. Detecting and Understanding Donor Strategies in Midterm Elections. Political Research Quarterly, p. 106591291774932.

    Dingler, Sarah C. Kroeber, Corinna and Fortin-Rittberger, Jessica 2018. Do parliaments underrepresent women’s policy preferences? Exploring gender equality in policy congruence in 21 European democracies. Journal of European Public Policy, p. 1.

    Ferreira, Pedro Cavalcanti and Guimarães, Guido Penido 2018. The impact of heterogeneity of discount factors and asset returns on inequality. Applied Economics, Vol. 50, Issue. 4, p. 371.

    Lubienski, Christopher 2018. The critical challenge: Policy networks and market models for education. Policy Futures in Education, p. 147821031775127.

    Kassab, Hanna Samir 2018. Grand Strategies of Weak States and Great Powers. p. 51.

    Horpedahl, Jeremy 2018. Do the poor want to be regulated? Public opinion surveys on regulation in the United States, 1981–2002. Public Choice,

    Miller, Susan M. Witko, Christopher and Woods, Neal D. 2018. How the Unorganized Mass Public (Sometimes) Gets Represented in Regulatory Politics. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 71, Issue. 1, p. 88.

    Download full list
    ×
  • Access

Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens

  • Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page
Abstract

Each of four theoretical traditions in the study of American politics—which can be characterized as theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, and two types of interest-group pluralism, Majoritarian Pluralism and Biased Pluralism—offers different predictions about which sets of actors have how much influence over public policy: average citizens; economic elites; and organized interest groups, mass-based or business-oriented.

A great deal of empirical research speaks to the policy influence of one or another set of actors, but until recently it has not been possible to test these contrasting theoretical predictions against each other within a single statistical model. We report on an effort to do so, using a unique data set that includes measures of the key variables for 1,779 policy issues.

Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism.

  • View HTML
      • Send article to Kindle

      To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

      Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

      Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

      Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens
      Available formats
      ×
      Send article to Dropbox

      To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

      Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens
      Available formats
      ×
      Send article to Google Drive

      To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

      Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens
      Available formats
      ×
Copyright
COPYRIGHT: © American Political Science Association 2014 
References
Hide All
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963 [1951]. Social Choice and Individual Values. 2d ed. New York: Wiley.
Bachrach, Peter, and Baratz, Morton S.. 1962. “Two Faces of Power.” American Political Science Review 56(4): 947–52.
Bartels, Larry M. 2008. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton University Press.
Bauer, Raymond A., Pool, Ithiel de Sola, and Dexter, Lewis Anthony. 1967. American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade. New York: Atherton.
Baumgartner, Frank R., Berry, Jeffrey M., Hojnacki, Marie, Kimball, David C., and Leech, Beth L.. 2009. Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Beard, Charles A. 2012 [1913]. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. New York, Simon and Schuster.
Bentley, Arthur F. 1908. The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Berry, Jeffrey M. 1999. The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups. Washington, DC: Brookings.
Black, Duncan. 1948. “On the Rationale of Group Decision-making.” Journal of Political Economy 56: 23–34.
Black, Duncan. 1958. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Block, Fred. 1977. “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State.” Socialist Revolution 7(3): 6–28.
Block, Fred. 2007. “Understanding the Divergent Trajectories of the United States and Western Europe: A Neo-Polanyian Analysis.” Politics and Society (March): 1–31.
Burch, Philip H. 1980-81. Elites in American History. 3 vol. New York: Holmes & Meier.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Herron, Michael C., and Shotts, Kenneth W.. 2001. “Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking.” American Journal of Political Science 45: 532–50.
Dahl, Robert A. 1956. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Dahl, Robert A. 1961. Who Governs? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Dahl, Robert A. 1989. Democracy and its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Davis, Otto A., Hinich, Melvin J., and Ordeshook, Peter C.. 1970. “An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process.” American Political Science Review 64(2): 426–48.
Domhoff, G. William. 2013. Who Rules America: The Triumph of the Corporate Rich. 7th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
Erikson, Robert S., MacKuen, Michael B., and Stimson, James A.. 2002. The Macro Polity. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Erikson, Robert S., Wright, Gerald C., and McIver, John P.. 1993. Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ferguson, Thomas. 1995. Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Fiorina, Morris. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Gilens, Martin. 2011. “Two-thirds Full? Citizen Competence and Democratic Governance.” In New Directions in Public Opinion, ed. Berinsky, Adam. New York: Routledge.
Gilens, Martin. 2012. Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton University Press.
Hacker, Jacob S., and Pierson, Paul. 2010. Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned its Back on the Middle Class. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James, and Jay, John. 1961 [1787–88]. The Federalist Papers, ed. Rossiter, Clinton. New York: New American Library.
Hotelling, Harold. 1929. “Stability in Competition.” Economic Journal 39: 41–57.
Isaac, Jeffrey. 1987a. “Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique.” Polity 20(1): 4–31.
Isaac, Jeffrey. 1987b. Power and Marxist Theory. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Jacobs, Larry R., and Page, Benjamin I.. 2005. “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” American Political Science Review 99(1): 107–23.
Katznelson, Ira. 2013. Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time. New York: Liveright.
Key, V.O. Jr. 1961. Public Opinion and American Democracy. New York: Knopf.
Lindblom, Charles E. 1977. Politics and Markets. New York: Basic.
Lincoln, Abraham. 1989 [1863]. “Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.” In Speeches and Writings 1859–1865. New York: Library of America.
Lukes, Steven. 1974. Power: A Radical View. London: Macmillan.
Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. “Rethinking Representation.” American Political Science Review 97(4): 515–28.
Marx, Karl, and Engels, Friedrich. 1972 [1848–1888]. Manifesto of the Communist Party . In The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Tucker, Robert C.. New York: W.W. Norton. See also http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch01.htm
May, Kenneth O. 1952. “A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decisions.” Econometrica 20: 680–84.
McChesney, Fred S. 1997. Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
McConnell, Grant. 1966. Private Power and American Democracy. New York: Random House.
McKelvey, Richard. 1976. “ Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control.” Journal of Economic Theory 12: 472–82.
Michels, Robert. 2001 [1911]. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books.
Milbrath, Lester W. 1963. The Washington Lobbyists. Chicago, IL: Rand-McNally.
Miliband, Ralph. 1969. The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic.
Mills, C. Wright. 1959 [1956]. The Power Elite. Galaxy edition. New York: Oxford University Press.
Monroe, Alan D. 1979. “Consistency between Public Preferences and National Policy Decisions.” American Politics Quarterly 7: 3–18.
Monroe, Alan D. 1998. “Public Opinion and Public Policy 1980–1993.” Public Opinion Quarterly 68: 6–28.
Olson, Mancur Jr. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Page, Benjamin I., Bartels, Larry M., and Seawright, Jason. 2013. “Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans.” Perspectives on Politics 11(1): 51–73.
Page, Benjamin I., and Hennessy, Cari Lynn. 2008. “What Affluent Americans Want from Politics.” WP-11-08. Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University.
Page, Benjamin I., and Jacobs, Lawrence R.. 2009. Class War? What Americans Really Think about Economic Inequality. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Page, Benjamin I., and Shapiro, Robert Y.. 1983. “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy.” American Political Science Review 77(1): 175–90.
Page, Benjamin I. 1992. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Poole, Keith, and Rosenthal, Howard. 2007. Ideology and Congress. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Przeworksi, Adam, and Wallerstein, Michael. 1982. “The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies.” American Political Science Review 76(2): 215–38.
Schattschneider, E.E. 1935. Politics, Pressures and the Tariff. New York: Prentice-Hall.
Schattschneider, E.E. 1960. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Verba, Sidney, and Brady, Henry E.. 2012. The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sen, Amartya K. 1970. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco, CA: Holden-Day.
Skocpol, Theda. 1992. Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Skocpol, Theda, and Finegold, Kenneth. 1982. “State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal.” Political Science Quarterly 97: 255–78.
Smith, Mark A. 2000. American Business and Political Power: Public Opinion, Elections, and Democracy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Stigler, George J. 1971. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1): 3–21.
Stimson, James A., MacKuen, Michael B., and Erikson, Robert S.. 1995. “Dynamic Representation.” American Political Science Review 89(3): 543–65.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. 2000 [1835–1840]. Democracy in America. Trans. and ed. Mansfield, Harvey C. and Winthrop, Delba. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Truman, David B. 1971 [1951]. The Governmental Process. 2d. ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
U.S. Census Bureau, 2013. “Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage: 2012” (September). Available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/pdf/20130917_ip_slides_with_plotpoints.pdf.
Winters, Jeffrey A. 2011. Oligarchy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Winters, Jeffrey A., and Page, Benjamin I.. 2009. “Oligarchy in the United States?” Perspectives on Politics 7(4): 731–51.
Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Rosenstone, Steven J.. 1980. Who Votes? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Zaller, John. 2003. “Coming to Terms with V.O. Key’s Concept of Latent Opinion.” In Electoral Democracy, ed. MacKuen, Michael B. and Rabinowitz, George. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Perspectives on Politics
  • ISSN: 1537-5927
  • EISSN: 1541-0986
  • URL: /core/journals/perspectives-on-politics
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *

CAPTCHA *

Skip to the audio challenge
×
Type Description Title
WORD
Supplementary materials

Gilens Supplementary Material
Gilens Supplementary Material 1

 Word (78 KB)
78 KB
WORD
Supplementary materials

Gilens Supplementary Material
Gilens Supplementary Material 2

 Word (39 KB)
39 KB
PDF
Supplementary materials

Gilens Supplementary Material
Gilens Supplementary Material 5

 PDF (36 KB)
36 KB
UNKNOWN
Supplementary materials

Gilens Supplementary Material
Gilens Supplementary Material 6

 Unknown (4.4 MB)
4.4 MB
PDF
Supplementary materials

Gilens Supplementary Material
Gilens Supplementary Material 4

 PDF (16 KB)
16 KB
PDF
Supplementary materials

Gilens Supplementary Material
Gilens Supplementary Material 3

 PDF (38 KB)
38 KB

Metrics

Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 36820
Total number of PDF views: 35667 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 231378 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 23rd April 2018. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Cancel
Confirm
×